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Abstract
Wallace, Jasmine. PhD. The University of Memphis. August 2021. Fugitive Gestures: The
persistence of Black meaning and Black life in an anti-Black world. Major Professors: Mary
Beth Mader.

My dissertation, Fugitive Gestures: The persistence of Black meaning and Black life in
an anti-Black world, develops a phenomenological analysis of contemporary Black lived
experience in the US occurring in fugitive spaces—territories independent of white supremacy
and anti-Black disciplinary techniques. In contrast to Afropessimists who argue that
contemporary Black subjects exist as nonbeing, I demonstrate the presence of contemporary
Black meaning and Black being as expressed in Black gestures. First, I develop the concept
‘Black archive’ to describe how contemporary Black subjects live with the conceptual awareness
of historical anti-Blackness as it unfolds in the present; are symbolically marked by ‘the
hieroglyphics of the flesh’; and, finally, share a collective memory of chattel slavery. The Black
archive, thus, historicizes an analysis of the contemporary Black subject in contrast to the unhistoricized political ontology on which Afropessimists rely. Next, drawing upon MerleauPontian phenomenology, I examine how the racializing gaze—a phenomenological structure of
white supremacy—inhibits the Black phenomenal body to distort the Black body image,
fragment the Black body schema, and un-synthesize the Black habit body. I argue that in fugitive
spaces, by contrast, the Black phenomenal body is no longer inhibited by the racializing gaze of
white supremacy. This freedom from the racializing gaze allows Black subjects the freedom to
cultivate a robust habit body capable of spontaneous and creative movements, which are
immanently meaningful because they emerge from an uninhibited embodied intentionality. I
identify Black being and Black meaning as expressed in three examples of Black gesture: i) the
Black Nod, ii) Tommie Smith’s and John Carlos’ raised fists during the 1968 Olympics and, iii)
v

the Black queer ballroom scene. Thus, while Black lived experience is disciplined and inhibited
under white supremacy, we can recognize the persistence of Black being and Black meaning as
expressed in Black gestures.
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Introduction
Originally, this dissertation was motivated by an interest in Black gestures. Among the
questions driving the project were the following: how can gestures be racialized? How are
gestures overdetermined or pre-determined ahead of their performance? And how are Black
gestures interpreted such that, in themselves, they constitute an immediate threat?
This interest in Black gestures emerged for me in the aftermath of the 2015 murder of
Freddie Gray. Following his murder, several news media outlets made reference to Gray’s eye
contact with the police officer as a sufficient condition for the police pursuit leading to his death,
and thus for his death itself.1 But the fact that this detail was so quickly and uncritically adopted
by many media outlets gave me pause. What was it exactly about Gray’s eye contact that made
him a target of police violence? I came to believe that it was Gray’s gesture, his eye contact,
which constituted a disturbance to the police responsible for his murder.
Raised in the wake of Blackness, which involves bodily orientations that make our
Blackness more or less visible, more or less suspicious, I intuitively felt that Gray may have
known the dangers of making eye contact with the police. And, indeed, whether or not Gray

Kim Bellware, a journalist with HuffPost reported the following: “Police arrested Gray in a high-crime area of the
city when he made eye contact and then ran” (Kim Bellware, “How the Fight To Convict Baltimore Cops in Freddie
Gray’s Death Fell Apart,” HuffPost, July 31, 2016, https://www.huffpost.com/entry/freddie-gray-trialproblems_n_5798feb1e4b02d5d5ed3ed67?guccounter=1&guce_referrer=aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuZ29vZ2xlLmNvbS8
&guce_referrer_sig=AQAAAIlRd9ilfCx1AvvqF6fC8flLqKNUyKS3k_myLRR0aBiu71r3KItdTWG8e3OQF7SogZ
1JmU0nlVqjQnfRF5tnf49dkVxMWr3y2TKkAgFNuwFLrlcqE5sxNVQ7wXVexMNWbVV30JXEsl71LzYIYdg0U8Q_7V-L8pm-5Mc0n-cTExz); David A.
Graham, reporter with The Atlantic, wrote: “Authorities can’t say if there was a particularly good reason why police
arrested Gray. According to the city, an officer made eye contact with Gray” (David A. Graham, "The Mysterious
Death of Freddie Gray," The Atlantic, April 22, 2015, https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/04/themysterious-death-of-freddie-gray/391119/); and Jonathan Capehart, reporter with The Washington Post, wrote:
“Remember the reason Gray was pursued in the first place? According to Deputy Commissioner Jerry Rodriguez, ‘A
lieutenant begins pursing Mr. Gray after making eye contact with two individuals” (Jonathan Capehart, “’After
making eye contact,’ Baltimore chases Ferguson,” The Washington Post, April 23, 2015,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-partisan/wp/2015/04/23/after-making-eye-contact-baltimore-chasesferguson/?noredirect=on).
1
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knew of this danger, however, the news media reporting implied through frequent and uncritical
mention of Gray’s eye contact that he “should have known.” They described his gesture as
inherently provocative: How dare this young Black man look at these officers of the state? But
Gray’s eye contact violated not only a social order, but a phenomenological one as well. The
motivation of the officers’ violent attack upon Gray was his unwillingness to shrink before a
racializing gaze.
But why of all the facts relevant to Gray’s murder, I wondered, was it the fact of eye
contact that became salient in the media’s portrayal of the event? And how was his gesture
perceived from the police officer’s point of view? In other words, what did Gray’s eye contact
mean in this context? Further, while the event of Gray’s murder instigated these initial
reflections, it was also evident that the event could not be understood in isolation: his murder
was not a stand-alone case. As I dug deeper into police statements and news media coverage of
the circumstances surrounding other—too many, far too many—Black persons murdered at the
hands of the state, I wondered how many of these narratives relied upon a perceived meaning
expressed in the gesture performed by a Black subject. In other words, I began to think more
seriously about the frequency with which the apparent meanings expressed in gestures were used
to explain why one acted in a violent, sometimes deadly, response. Trayvon Martin’s hoodie, a
sartorial gesture, was in and of itself suspicious from the perspective of ‘he who shall not be
named,’ the officer that murdered him. Renisha McBride, who knocked on the door of a stranger
out of utter desperation for assistance after a car crash, was also perceived, by another who will
go unnamed here as so threatening that her presence warranted the use of deadly force. The
narratives made available to the public through police and media reporting, it is clear, are prepackaged and consistently represent the perspective of the murderers. After all, Gray, Martin,
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and McBride, and countless others, are no longer alive and, therefore, not able to offer their own
account of their encounters. In reflecting upon the various and, yet distinct deadly encounters, I
suspected that meanings perceived in isolated movements—gestures—had taken the place of
overtly racialized scripts, which have long justified anti-Black violence in the US and beyond.
In part, I offer this autobiographical account of what originally led to my concern with
understanding gestures through a socio-historico lens to understand the shift in focus my
dissertation has undergone over the past year. I, like many other Black people, have become
increasingly exhausted by the ever-increasing representations of Black death. To say that I have
become exhausted by these graphic images of anti-Black violence is, for me, a way of saying that
the death of Black people is over-represented in the dominant news and social media outlets
available to the US and abroad. I was drowning in the various accounts of Black life as already
contextualized in terms of Black death. What Saidiya Hartman calls the “terrible spectacle” that
is the overrepresentation of Black death, however, was not unique to mainstream media. A
similar tendency manifests itself in the areas of academia concerned with Blackness and perhaps
most notably in the Afropessimist tradition. Hartman’s work, however, identifies the possibility
of a different kind of analysis of Blackness. She famously begins her 1997 Scenes of Subjection
by refusing to reproduce the violence perpetuated upon Frederick Douglass’ aunt Hester by their
white captor in order, she writes, “to call attention to the ease with which such scenes are usually
reiterated, the casualness with which they are circulated, and the consequences of this routine
display of the slave’s ravaged body.”2
But rather than provide an analysis of anti-Black violence as Hartman does, and as I had
originally intended, I became drawn to forms of Black life that persist despite the constant siege

2

Saidiya Hartman, Scenes of Subjection: Terror, Slavery, and Self-Making in Nineteenth Century America (New
York: Oxford Press, 1997).
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on Black life. That is, my focus shifted from an analysis of anti-Black violence to an exploration
of the joy, the celebratory nature, and the comradery that structures contemporary Black life.
Despite the vulnerability to violence to which Black people are subjected under white
supremacy, I can say with confidence that the Black people in my life—myself included—would
not wish to be anything other than Black. So, my project, Fugitive Gestures, is intended to
highlight the meaning of and in Black life. And I seek to do so, moreover, in a manner that
neither reduces Black life to anti-Black violence, nor primarily conceives of Black life on and in
relation to white supremacy. My specific philosophical concern is with how Black people live,
feel, move when they are at-home, that is, among other Black people and not immediately
surveilled by white supremacy.
On such a realization, my philosophical commitments and, thus, inquiry shifted from
analyzing anti-Black violence to analyzing how Black subjects experience their race while, at the
same time, remaining conscious that their race has historically served as a sufficient explanation
for Black death. This shift in approach brought me to the concept of “fugitivity,” which, as
considered by theorists of Black studies, is irreducible to any one condition and, as such, offers a
way to theorize Blackness beyond white supremacy or Black death. I discovered, or, more
precisely, I increasingly became aware that the space of fugitivity affords Black subjects the
opportunity to experience their race independent of what is available to them under white
supremacy. The space of fugitivity is a place that is not permitted, so to speak. Drawing upon
Foucault, one could say it is an undisciplined space. Informed by the works of Hartman, I thus
re-oriented my labors toward unearthing the fugitive territories available under white supremacy,
and the fugitive lives therein.

4

First, this dissertation does not plan to reveal either those ‘state secrets,’ as it were,
concerning Black subjects who enter into the space of fugitivity. Nor does it intend to provide a
road map into these fugitive spaces. Rather, this project examines the freedoms afforded Black
subjects during their temporary reprieve in fugitive spaces, which exist at a liminal distance from
the direct surveillance of white supremacy. Such turn in perspective enables my inquiry to focus
on Black being, Black meaning, and Black ways of life.
This dissertation, Fugitive Gestures: The persistence of Black meaning and Black life in
an anti-Black world, develops a phenomenological analysis of contemporary Black lived
experience in the US occurring in fugitive spaces—territories independent of white supremacy
and anti-Black disciplinary techniques. In contrast to Afropessimists who argue that
contemporary Black subjects exist as nonbeing, I demonstrate the presence of contemporary
Black meaning and Black being as expressed in Black gestures.
The dissertation begins with Chapter I: Dehumanization and Ontological Violence under
Chattel Slavery, which explores the psychological, physical, and ontological forms of violence
that constituted US chattel slavery. These violences, I argue, dehumanized enslaved subjects,
reducing their ontological presence.3 Drawing on Frederick Douglass’ 1845 autobiography,

I use the term ‘ontological presence’ throughout this dissertation to broadly refer to the ontological being of
subjects. I do so in order to provide an account of Black ontology that is sufficiently general for responding to
claims concerning Black being made by theorists working from a variety of traditions. For example, in his 2018 text,
Ontological Terror: Blackness, Nihilism, and Emancipation, Afropessimist Calvin Warren develops an ontometaphysical account of Blackness as nonbeing. Drawing upon Heideggerian ontology and metaphysics, Warren
argues that Blackness is a function of onto-metaphysics—a function that makes being possible for non-Black
subjects. In another case, Jared Sexton uses Orlando Patterson’s sociological concept ‘social death’ in his 2011
article, “The Social Life of Social Death,” to make what he refers to as the ‘metapolitical’—which I understand to
mean political ontology—and ‘metaphysical’ claim that contemporary Black subjects have inherited the status of
social death originally constituted during chattel slavery. Unlike Warren who primarily works in the philosophical
tradition, Sexton works in multiple disciplines including cultural studies, film studies, and African American
Studies. It is perhaps because Sexton is not, strictly speaking, a philosopher that he never clearly defines the
metaphysical and/or ontological sense in which he understands the social death of Black subjects. That is, Sexton
does not clearly characterize his use of social death as metaphysical, ontological, or existential. Instead, his
discussion of Black social death includes a range of conceptual frameworks: political, economic, cultural, and even
existential. In addition to this, Sexton’s frequent use of the term ‘being’, along with his rejection of a purely
3
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Narrative of the Life of a Frederick Douglass, an American Slave, I show, both the dimensions
of enslaved subjects’ ontological absence and, at once, the fugitive acts through which they
restored ontological presence to themselves.4 Following my account of Douglass, I turn to
Hartman’s Scenes of Subjection, to explore enslaved persons’ nonbeing by identifying how their
ambiguous position vis-a-vis humanity rendered them vulnerable to commodification. 5
Explicating Hartman’s argument that enslaved subjects existed as fungible commodities, I
articulate a notion of fugitivity as slaves “stealing [themselves] away.” I argue that stealing
away, more than the act of undermining white dominance and surveillance, is best understood as
the practice of cultivating meaning independent of white supremacy. Finally, I draw on Hortense
Spiller’s argument that, following the abolition of chattel slavery, previously enslaved subjects
repossessed their bodies, becoming embodied persons no longer reducible to “flesh.” Spiller’s
distinction allows me, in turn, to differentiate between the ontological status of slaves and that of
contemporary Black subjects, arranging the architecture for the argument I then stage in Chapter
III.
Before I engage in that discussion, however, I examine the historically specific
phenomenological structure of white supremacy conditioning the contemporary US. Chapter II:
An Account of White Supremacy and the Racializing Gaze examines how the racializing gaze

sociological definition of social death, suggests that he intends to make a claim upon the ontological existence of
Black subjects in his characterization of Black subjects as socially dead. The term ‘ontological presence’ is,
therefore, specific enough to an ontological framework to analyze Black being and, at the same time, broad enough
for a response to differing and ambiguous claims about Black being made by various Afropessimists. See Calvin
Warren, Ontological Terror: Blackness, Nihilism, and Emancipation, (Durham: Duke University Press, 2018) and
Jared Sexton, “The Social Life of Social Death: On Afro-Pessimism and Black Optimism,” In Tensions Journal 5
(2011): 1-47.
4

Frederick Douglass, Narrative of the Life of a Frederick Douglass, an American Slaver (Boston: The Anti-Slavery
Office, 1845).
5

Saidiya Hartman, Scenes of Subjection: Terror, Slavery, and Self-Making in Nineteenth Century America (New
York: Oxford Press, 1997).
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inhibits the Black subject’s ability to cultivate what I call, using Maurice Merleau-Ponty, a
‘robust habit body’ otherwise enabling spontaneous and creative acts and the free production of
meaning. The purpose of this chapter is to prepare for my subsequent discussions in both
Chapter III and Chapter IV by sketching the phenomenological structure of white supremacy
from which Black subjects flee in the space of fugitivity. Using Merleau-Ponty’s concept of
‘habit body,’ I build a conceptual framework distinguishing between ‘routinized habituation’ and
‘robust habituation,’ to articulate how non-white subjects under white supremacy are rendered
unable to cultivate a robust habit body, the necessary condition for making creative and
spontaneous meaning.
In Chapter III: Historicizing Blackness, I explore some of the ways that the history of
anti-Black violence conditions contemporary Black subject formation in the US. To show how
Black life has always exceeded the trauma and suffering with which it is associated, I reject the
view that Black subjects are determined by the history of anti-Black violence and instead
contend that they are simply conditioned by it. I make this case, first, by analyzing Saidiya
Hartman’s concept of the ‘afterlives of slavery.’ I argue that Hartman’s concept retains an
obdurate ambiguity that has allowed subsequent interpreters in the tradition of Afropessimism to
deploy it in ways that flatten the historical difference distinguishing chattel slavery from Black
life in the contemporary US. I then turn to Sylvia Wynter’s historiography and political ontology
of Man in order to demonstrate, again, how Afropessimists—particularly Frank Wilderson III,
Jared Sexton, and Calvin Warren—transhistoricize her historically-situated ontological analysis.
As an alternative to the determinism often exhibited in Afropessimist readings of Black
subjectivity as the ‘afterlives of slavery,’ I develop the concept of the ‘Black archive’ to describe
how the history of anti-Blackness conditions contemporary Black subject formation without
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wholly dictating it. I define the Black archive as the assemblage of multiple discursive regimes
that are similarly regulated by anti-Black disciplinary and regulatory techniques. As such, the
Black archive is that in, through, and as which contemporary Black subjects live. Under this
category of analysis, I describe how contemporary Black subjects live with the conceptual
awareness of historical anti-Blackness as it unfolds in the present; how they are symbolically
marked by ‘the hieroglyphics of the flesh’; and, finally, the ways in which they share a collective
memory of chattel slavery. The Black archive, thus, historicizes an analysis of the contemporary
Black subject as conditioned in contrast to the un-historicized political ontology often found in
Afropessimist readings.
Building on this analysis, Chapter IV: The Crucible of Black Gesture, turns to chart an
account of Black gesture as “fugitive meaning,” that is, as immanent expressions of Black
meaning that are not about either white supremacy or anti-Blackness. I begin this chapter with an
examination of Vilém Flusser’s theory of gesture, which identifies gestures as deliberate acts
performed by subjects seeking to represent and express an underlying symbolic meaning.
Gestures, for Flusser, are tools of the body and, as such, cannot be, in Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s
terms, “immanently meaningful.” I thus argue that, in following Immanuel Kant in conceiving of
subjectivity as consciousness, Flusser occludes the body’s potential to produce meaning. To
develop an alternative conception of gesture, I turn instead to Merleau-Ponty’s existentialphenomenological theory of gesture as rooted in embodied intentionality and thus as that which
is immanently meaningful. In other words, I show that, because, for Merleau-Ponty, linguistic
and bodily gestures emerge from an embodied intentionality, they are meaningful in themselves.

8

By recovering the meaning and being of Blackness and refusing to treat Black subjects
only as effects of white supremacy, this dissertation aspires to open possibilities for
philosophical treatments of Blackness and modes of comprehending contemporary Black life.
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Chapter One: Dehumanization and Ontological Violence under Chattel Slavery
This chapter concerns the psychological, physical, and ontological forms of violence that
constituted US chattel slavery. I consider how the psychological and physical violence used to
dehumanize enslaved subjects concomitantly reduced their ontological status to nonbeing. I
explore the ontological position of the enslaved subject by, first, identifying acts expressive of
the enslaved subject’s humanity as well as their captor’s ironic recognition and denial of this
humanity as depicted in Frederick Douglass’ 1845 autobiography, Narrative of the Life of a
Frederick Douglass, an American Slave.1 Next, drawing on Saidiya Hartman’s ‘fungibility’ and
Hortense Spiller’s ‘flesh,’ I develop an ontological account of the enslaved subject as nonbeing.
In the final section of this chapter, I argue against contemporary theorists, most notably those
working in Afropessimism, who claim that the nonbeing of enslaved subjects can be extended to
the contemporary Black subject who, it is said, continues to exist as nonbeing.2 I emphasize the
historical specificity of Hartman’s and Spiller’s work to argue that, while enslaved subjects
existed as nonbeing, a concrete analysis of the ontological status of contemporary Black subjects
in the US is still lacking. In fact, as I demonstrate in the final chapter of this dissertation,
contemporary Black subjects express meaning through gestures, which is indicative of
ontological presence and, therefore, being.



Frederick Douglass, Narrative of the Life of a Frederick Douglass, an American Slaver (Boston: The Anti-Slavery
Office, 1845). I use the term ‘captive’ throughout this dissertation to refer to white members of dominant society
during chattel slavery in order to distinguish dominant white society during chattel slavery from dominant white
society in the contemporary US.
2

Afropessimism here refers to an academic tradition in the US concerning Black studies. This is distinct from Afropessimism which refers to the colonial analysis that the African continent would remain arrested in their development
without Western intervention. For more on the distinction between Afropessimism and Afro-Pessimism, see Gloria
Wekker, “Afropessimism,” European Journal of Women’s Studies 28, no. 1 (2020): 86-97.
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I begin this chapter with Frederick Douglass’ account of learning to read as described in
his 1845 autobiography, Narrative of the Life of a Frederick Douglass, an American Slave. I
argue that Douglass’ fugitive act of educating himself led to an existential confrontation with his
existence. Through education, Douglass re-opened a future foreclosed to him through his
enslavement and, as a result, regained his ontological being. This ontological transformation
demonstrates the nonbeing many enslaved subjects were meant to occupy, as well as the
potential for fugitive acts to restore one’s ontological presence.
Next, reading the opening passages of Douglass’ 1845 autobiography, I argue that the
distribution of knowledge regarding the personal history of enslaved subjects constituted a
psychological form of violence. Adopting a Foucauldian analysis of power/knowledge, I argue
that, although chattel slavery relied primarily upon the use of unilateral techniques of sovereign
power to maintain and reproduce itself, in Douglass’ autobiography we can recognize early
forms of biopower qua regulatory techniques at work. Contrasting the strict record-keeping
regarding an enslaved subject’s birthplace with the lack of access or lack of records related to
their birthdate, I demonstrate that power/knowledge was an important tool for maintaining
chattel slavery. By denying Douglass and other enslaved subject’s knowledge of their history,
white subjects sought to alienate enslaved people from that history and reinforce their being as
different in kind from whites. This, combined with their vulnerability to spectacular forms of
punishment, constituted the existence of enslaved subjects as one of nonbeing.
Following my account of Douglass, I turn to Saidiya Hartman’s 1997 text, Scenes of
Subjection: Terror, Slavery, and Self-Making in Nineteenth Century America, to further examine
the nonbeing of enslaved subjects.3 Hartman demonstrates that enslaved subjects were made to

3

Saidiya Hartman, Scenes of Subjection: Terror, Slavery, and Self-Making in Nineteenth Century America (New
York: Oxford Press, 1997).
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occupy an ambivalent position with regard to humanity. They were not entirely excluded from
humanity because their capacity to feel pleasure and pain, their capacity to produce pleasure and
pain for dominant white subjects, and their culpability for transgressing the law were used by
whites—slave owners and non-slave owners—to assert dominance and further the subjugation of
enslaved subjects. According to Hartman, the enslaved subject’s precarious position with regard
to humanity rendered them vulnerable to commodification. That is, the ‘not-quite-human’
character of the enslaved subject excluded them from ethical consideration and, therefore, made
them eligible for commodification. Thus, Hartman argues that the enslaved subject existed as a
fungible commodity—interchangeable and replaceable.
Finally, I draw upon Hortense Spillers’ theory of the captive subject transformed into
flesh, as originally developed in her 1987 article, “Mama’s Baby, Papa’s Maybe: An American
Grammar Book,” to examine the physical violence used by captors to dehumanize and, in turn,
de-ontologize enslaved subjects.4 Spillers argues that the practices and instruments used to
wound enslaved subjects transformed them into ‘flesh.’ However, as Spillers argues, after chattel
slavery was formally abolished in the US, enslaved subjects re-possessed their bodies and, as a
result, the liberated Black subject became an embodied person rather than flesh. I introduce
Spillers’ concept ‘flesh’ after my discussion of Hartman’s work, despite the fact that Hartman
herself draws upon Spillers, for two reasons. First, Spillers does not return to her concept ‘flesh’
in any rigorous fashion, which proves difficult for establishing a comprehensive exegesis of the
term. Despite this, however, this concept has been adopted and used by many contemporary
theorists, most notably those working in Afropessimism, to develop claims about the existence of
contemporary Black subjects. I provide a brief discussion of Spillers’ concept ‘flesh’ in
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preparation for my critique of Afropessimists’ unhistoricized claims regarding the ontological
existence of Black subjects. This leads to my second reason for waiting until the end of this
chapter to explicate Spillers’ work. My discussion of Spillers involves a shift from analyzing the
ontological presence of enslaved subjects to establishing the historical parameters around which
enslaved subjects and contemporary Black subjects in the US, respectively, can be made. Thus,
the discussion of Spillers in the chapter marks a point of transition from ontology to historicity. I
develop a critique of Afropessimist theorists, including David Marriott, Frank Wilderson III,
Calvin Warren, and Jared Sexton who, I will argue, wrongly extend Spillers’ concept of ‘flesh’
to claim that the contemporary Black subject exists as flesh and, therefore, as nonbeing. Given
the historicity of Spillers’ account of ‘flesh’, we should say, rather, that contemporary Black
subjects are beings whose bodies are symbolically marked by ‘hieroglyphics of the flesh,’ a
concept I develop further in chapter III of this dissertation. The original ontological schism that
occurred during chattel slavery must, therefore, serve as an archetype and not a description of the
contemporary ontological order in the US.
Douglass and Dehumanization: Regaining Ontological Presence
Frederick Douglass’ multiple autobiographies have been a source for many scholars of
Black studies to illustrate the physical violence used in the constitution and maintenance of
chattel slavery, as well as the effects of these processes on the subject (de-)formation of enslaved
people. Saidiya Hartman’s Scenes of Subjection, opens with a reference to the “terrible
spectacle” of Aunt Hester’s beating as documented in Douglass’ 1845 autobiography, Narrative
of the Life of Frederick Douglass. 5 Hartman describes this event as an “inaugural moment” for
Douglass—the moment in which his subjectivity was constituted as ‘slave.’ Similarly, Christina
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Sharpe’s 2010 text, Monstrous Intimacies: Making Post-Slavery Subjects, opens with a
discussion of Aunt Hester’s beating, though unlike Hartman who refuses to reconstruct
Douglass’ account, Sharpe quotes Douglass’ description of the ‘terrible spectacle’ at length. 6
This scene helps to frame Sharpe’s project of identifying the “ongoing processes of
subjectification during slavery and into post-slavery to which all postmodern subjects are made
subject.”7 While I think both Hartman’s and Sharpe’s readings of Douglass are insightful, I do
not go so far as to say that contemporary Black subjects are constituted by the forms of antiBlack violence used during chattel slavery. I will develop my own account of contemporary
Black subjectivity in chapter III of this dissertation where I introduce the concept of the ‘Black
archive’ as an alternative to Hartman’s ‘afterlives of slavery’ and Sharpe’s ‘living in the wake.’
In contrast to Hartman’s and Sharpe’s reading of Douglass, I focus on how his lack of access to
knowledge and the systems of surveillance guarding against his acquisition of knowledge are
best understood as a regulatory technique of power intended to dehumanize him.
Let me now develop this account. In his 1845 autobiography, Douglass describes learning
to read despite obstacles and warnings against his education. Douglass explains that by gaining
access to knowledge previously unavailable to him, his very existence was transformed. When
Auld, Douglass’ “owner,” discovers that he is being instructed in reading, he warns both his wife
and Douglass of the dangers of the education of enslaved people. 8 Auld claims that educating
enslaved subjects is not only illegal, but dangerous, which suggests the threat a knowledgeable
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enslaved subject posed to the chattel slavery system’s ability to maintain itself. Auld argues that
educating enslaved subjects is both “unlawful, as well as unsafe.” 9 This is because, as Auld
explains to his wife, an educated enslaved subject “would at once become unmanageable, and of
no value to his master. As to himself, it could do him no good, but a great deal of harm.” 10 That
Douglass could become unmanageable if educated is a warning to Auld’s wife; that he could do
himself harm, is a warning to Douglass himself. Auld’s concern that Douglass would become
discontented and unhappy with his condition is ironic, given his identification of Douglass as a
non-subject. Auld is concerned that Douglass would become a less valuable commodity if
educated because he could potentially learn a means of escape, or at the very least, he could
become defiant. Auld was also concerned, however, that Douglass might become unhappy,
which makes sense only if Auld appreciates Douglass’ ability to care about his existence. If, as
existentialist theorists have argued, only a human [Dasein] has the capacity to reflect upon and,
in turn, care about their existence, then Auld’s concern for Douglass is a concern for him as a
subject rather than as property. 11 Thus, in one and the same breath, Auld identifies Douglass as
both property and human, object and subject. This is precisely how dehumanization functions,
for only if one is in a position to claim one’s humanity can one’s humanity be denied.
Refusing to heed Auld’s warning of the dangers he could do to himself if educated,
Douglass continues his education in secret. Soon thereafter, however, Douglass proves Auld
right. Reading speeches and dialogues related to emancipation, Douglass begins to give language
to his as yet undeveloped dreams of freedom. He writes, “these documents enabled me to utter
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my thoughts” and they “gave tongue to interesting thoughts of my own soul, which had
frequently flashed through my mind, and died away for want of utterance.” 12 Through reading,
Douglass begins to articulate the language of freedom that has only ever existed for him as an
intuition. Cleary, he understood the injustice of Aunt Hester’s beating, for example, even before
he had the language of justice. What education affords Douglass is the opportunity to formulate
the injustice of chattel slavery as an argument. The institution of chattel slavery becomes, for
him, a crime, and the evidence of this crime is so obvious that Douglass finds fault with those
who ignore or participate in it.
Through education, Douglass learns the justice of freedom and the injustice of his
slavery. And, as Auld predicted, Douglass becomes both unmanageable and discontent.
Thoughts of escape and freedom give Douglass a sense of agency over a future which has, until
then, already been determined for him. Now able to imagine a future, however, Douglass finds
his present condition unbearable. He writes, “I often found myself regretting my own existence,
and wishing myself dead; and but for the hope of being free, I have no doubt but that I should
have killed myself or done something for which I should have been killed.” 13 Douglass details
his life before learning to read, as if it were a mere report of events for his reader. He describes
where he was born and who his various captors are, and he recounts the everyday scenes of
violence that constitute chattel slavery. But learning to read forces Douglass to reflect upon his
condition and, in turn, to become invested in his existence—even if his investment first takes the
form of regretting his existence. Furthermore, Douglass’ account of the existential
transformation he underwent through educating himself demonstrates that Auld was not only
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correct in his judgment that if educated, Douglass would be unhappy; Auld was also correct in
his judgment that knowledge made enslaved subjects less docile. Even more, Douglass’s
education restored the ontological presence that had been stripped from him as an enslaved
subject. In this context, ontological presence is the existential situation of a subjectivity who is in
a position to envision a kind of future for themselves. Invested in his future, Douglass was no
longer property, but a subject.
Douglass and Biopower
Douglass begins his 1845 autobiography, Narrative of the Life of a Frederick Douglass,
with a description of what he knows and does not know of his own history.
I was born in Tuckahoe, near Hillsborough, and about twelve miles from Easton, in Talbot
county, Maryland. I have no accurate knowledge of my age, never having seen any
authentic record containing it. By far the larger part of the slaves know as little of their
ages as horses know of theirs, and it is the wish of most masters within my knowledge to
keep their slaves thus ignorant. I do not remember to have ever met a slave who could tell
of his birthday. They seldom come nearer to it than planting-time, harvest-time, cherrytime, spring-time, or fall-times. A want of information concerning my own was a source
of unhappiness to me even during childhood. The white children could tell their ages. I
could not tell why I ought to be deprived of the same privilege. I was not allowed to make
any inquiries on the part of my master concerning it. He deemed all such inquiries on the
part of a slave improper and impertinent, and evidence of a restless spirit. The nearest
estimate I can give makes me now between twenty-seven and twenty-eight years of age. I
come to this, from hearing my master say, sometime during 1835, I was about seventeen
years old.14
The fact that he knows precisely where he was born is not unimportant, in my view. Though we
are not told how he came to know the place of his birth, we know that records concerning a
slave’s location, even a slave’s birthplace, were important for the effective management of the
enslaved.15 The Fugitive Slave Acts of 1793 and 1850 are testament to the fact that tracking and
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locating slaves was essential for the maintenance of chattel slavery as an institution. Douglass is
also clear in the above account that his limited knowledge regarding his own history was
purposefully curated by his “owner,” which was a common practice used by other “slave
owners.” He describes his lack of knowledge regarding his birthdate as a source of sadness. It
appears that his sadness is not simply because he does not know, but also because he is not
allowed to know. If his “owner” did have a record of Douglass’ actual birthdate, Douglass would
not be given access to it. As he writes, any inquiry the enslaved made to their captors was taken
to be indicative of a ‘restless spirit.’ Curiosity is, for the captor, an exercise of humanity, which
must be extinguished. This is because the more knowledge one has about their condition, the less
docile they become under enslavement. Douglass’ own existential transformation through
education is testament to the relation between knowledge and docility. The more he learned
about his situation, the less willing he was to accept it. Transforming his intuitions of freedom
into language, Douglass came to loathe his captor, was tormented by his captivity, and become
consumed with gaining his freedom. 16
Reading Douglass’ account of the distribution of knowledge through Michel Foucault’s
analysis of power/knowledge, we see that knowledge and power cannot be disarticulated.
Foucault himself never analyzed the concrete conditions of chattel slavery, and instead
developed the majority of his analysis within the context of Western European history; his work
on the Iranian Revolution is the exception to this rule. However, one can easily identify in
Douglass’ account of what he does, does not, and cannot know the expressions of Foucauldian
regulatory power.
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In his 1975 text, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, Foucault describes the
historical emergence of a new form of power, namely biopower, which he traces back to the
beginning of the nineteenth century.17 Prior to this, the dominant mode of power in Western
Europe was monarchical power, which relied upon what he refers to as ‘spectacular punishment’
in order to exert control. Foucault argues that sovereign power was a display of the monarch’s
power; public displays of torture, though not directly performed by the monarch her/himself,
were symbolic expressions of the monarch’s will. Foucault writes:
In this liturgy of punishment, there must be an emphatic affirmation of power and of its
intrinsic superiority. And this superiority is not simply that of right, but that of the physical
strength of the sovereign beating down upon the body of his adversary and mastering it: by
breaking the law, the offender touched the very person of the prince. 18
Under sovereign power, the law and the monarch were one and the same. Therefore, a
transgression of the law was, at the same time, a direct transgression against the monarch. The
dominance of the monarch could only be guaranteed by the spectacular expression of the
monarch’s will before the public and through the dramatic destruction of the offender’s body.
Because the monarch could not be in all places at once, s/he had to express the invincibility of
monarchical power in front of the public, who was intended to witness in the spectacle of
punishment the very strength of the monarch.
In contrast to sovereign power, biopower constituted what Foucault calls the ‘age of
sobriety.’ Under this new form of power, punishment targets the body, though not through its
destruction. What was previously a concentrated and unilateral system of domination,
transformed into a diffuse network wherein power is “exercised rather than possessed.” 19 One is
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therefore in relation to power rather than entirely submitted to it. Specifically, the body becomes
the site through which power is expressed. Power invests in the body through disciplinary
techniques that govern the body’s movements and regulatory techniques that focus upon the
body as a biological organism. Both techniques of power work in and through knowledge of the
body. Foucault explains, “power produces knowledge […and] power and knowledge directly
imply one another.”20 In the age of sobriety, power and knowledge cannot be disarticulated.
Knowledge is both a function and exercise of power and power is expressed and exercised in
knowledge.
Before I further develop Foucault’s account of disciplinary and regulatory techniques of
power, it is first important to recognize that sovereign power, as described by Foucault,
characterizes the system of power governing chattel slavery. Rather, he develops his theory of
sovereign power through an analysis actual monarchical power. However, because chattel
slavery shares similar techniques of domination and punishment with Foucault’s analysis of the
monarch, I extend his theory to examine the system of power governing chattel slaver. The
enslaved subject was regularly subjected to physical violence directed at destroying their body,
and often, this violence was performed in front of other enslaved subjects in order to warn them
against any infractions. Punishment, thus, was used as an expression of the captor’s rule even
when this punishment was performed by another. Thus, in the US, biopower had not yet fully
replaced sovereign power during the early nineteenth century. However, Foucault is clear in his
account of the historical transition from sovereign to biopower that this transition neither
occurred all at once, nor did it occur at the same time in all countries. In Discipline and Punish,
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he explicitly lists the US, along with Austria and Russia, as examples of this transition occurring
later and in an elliptical manner.21
Hartman offers a critique of the interpretation of chattel slavery through the lens of
biopower. In Scenes of Subjection, Hartman argues that Foucault’s theory of biopower cannot
account for the “direct and simple forms of domination” that constituted chattel slavery. 22 In her
view, because chattel slavery did not end until the late nineteenth century and because it
functioned according to dominant or sovereign power as opposed to the more diffuse networks of
biopower, then it would seem that Foucault’s periodization is inaccurate as relates to the US. I
take it that Hartman’s critique has more to do with Foucault’s periodization of biopower’s
emergence than it does biopower’s inability to account for slavery. However, as I have just
argued, even as Foucault dates biopower’s emergence to the early nineteenth century, he adds the
qualification that this transformation of power did not occur all at once, nor did it occur at the
same time in all regions, especially in the US.
This point is important for understanding Hartman’s critique of Foucault’s theory of
agency, which she also develops in Scenes of Subjection. While I do not consider Hartman’s
thesis regarding agency in great detail in this project, it is important to identify how her critique
of Foucault’s claims related to biopower lead her to make a similarly mistaken critique, in my
view, of his theory of agency. Citing a 1984 interview given by Foucault, “the ethic of care for
the self as a practice of freedom,” Hartman argues that Foucault’s concept of power excludes
systems of domination from a relation to power: “As Foucault remarks, ‘There cannot be
relations of power as opposed to domination unless subjects are free. If one were completely at
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the disposition of the other and became his thing […] there would not be relations of power.”23
Hartman adds “as opposed to domination” to this quote in support of her claim. However, in this
article, Foucault’s comments concerning domination are made with regard to a larger network of
power. Foucault explains:
this analysis of relations of power constitutes a very complex field; it sometimes meets
what we can call facts or states of domination, in which the relations of power, instead of
being variable and allowing different partners a strategy which alters them, find themselves
firmly set and congealed.24
For Foucault, domination is one mode of power within the more complex field of power.
Domination is characterized by the reified relations between subjects or groups, which prevent
levels of interaction and reciprocation that may alter the power relation itself. Take for example
the class antagonism between a worker who must sell their labor for money and a member of the
bourgeoisie who owns the means of production. While workers may demand safe working
conditions, fair pay, etc. they do so within the asymmetrical system of power constitutive of
capitalism. However, no subject is simply a worker; we are all immersed within networks of
power with varying relations of domination and reciprocity, and our status as worker our
bourgeois constitutes one of these networks. And because biopower is characterized, for
Foucault, by its diffuse networks as opposed to the single system of domination under sovereign
power, then it follows that Hartman’s critique of Foucault is misguided. If chattel slavery did
function according to dominant and unilateral power, as I think it did, then it is anachronistic to
apply Foucault’s concept of agency expressed under biopower to that context of chattel slavery.
Identifying the limits of Hartman’s critique of Foucault helps to frame my own use of his theory
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of power/knowledge in the context of chattel slavery. For we shall see that under chattel slavery,
power relations of reciprocity co-existed with dominant power relations, even though the latter
were more pervasive than the former.
Let me now develop this Foucaultian reading of the relation between power and
knowledge in chattel slavery. Returning to Foucault, we find in his 1976 text, History of
Sexuality Volume I: An Introduction, an account of disciplinary and regulatory techniques of
power.25 For the purposes of understanding Douglass’ account of what he knows/is not allowed
to know, let us consider the regulatory techniques used in the processes of dehumanization
during chattel slavery. In History of Sexuality Vol. 1, Foucault describes the aim and scope of
regulatory techniques as follows:
The second [technique of biopower…] focused on the species body, the body imbued with
the mechanics of life and serving as the basis of the biological processes: propagation,
births, mortality, the level of health, life expectancy and longevity, with all the conditions
that can cause these to vary. Their supervision was effected through an entire series of
regulatory controls: a biopolitics of the population.26
The biological functions of a subject’s body were, according to Foucault, a means of investing in
the body to ensure its efficient functioning within networks of power. In contrast to sovereign
punishment, which primarily focused upon the body in terms of its destruction, biopower focuses
on the body as a life-organism. The health of the body, therefore, is taken up in
power/knowledge for the purposes of a given institution’s ends. However, we should qualify this
by saying that knowledge of the body here is not knowledge a subject has of another’s body.
Rather, knowledge and power co-function through increasing fields of knowledge related to the
functioning of a subject’s body qua biological organism—e.g. vital statistics, or records of births

25

Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality Volume 1: An Introduction, trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Vintage
Books, 1978).
26

Ibid., 139.

23

and deaths. Foucault argues that during the nineteenth century sex became a political issue and,
in turn, a target of biopower. Discourse on sex and sexuality proliferated during this time and
knowledge of the body’s sexual capacities became an essential means through which powerknowledge could manage the life of subjects. Foucault writes: “the mechanisms of power are
addressed to the body, to life, to what causes it to proliferate, to what reinforces the species, its
stamina, its ability to dominate, or its capacity for being used.” 27 The concern for the body’s
ability to proliferate required increasingly detailed knowledge of the subject’s reproductive life
along and increasingly detailed mechanisms of regulating the subject’s reproductive capacities.
The psychoanalyst, for example, could assess whether or not a woman was hysterical through an
exploration of her unconscious accessed through conversation. If she was deemed hysterical,
then she might be regarded as unfit for motherhood and birth control could be offered in order to
prevent her from reproducing. Knowledge of her mental state served as means to regulate her
body through the regulation of her reproductive capacities.
The relation between the species body and biopower is exemplified in the calculation of
the enslaved subject’s ability to yield economic value based on their sex, age, and overall health.
Angela Davis describes the process by which the enslaved subject’s biological organism was
assessed by their captors in terms of their productivity in order to determine their value as a
commodity. In her 1981 book, Women, Race & Class, Davis writes:
Most slaveowners established systems of calculating their slaves’ yield in terms of the
average rates of productivity they demanded. Children, thus, were frequently rated as
quarter hands. Women, it was generally assumed, were full hands—unless they had been
expressly assigned to be ‘breeders’ or ‘sucklers,’ in which case they sometimes ranked as
less than full hands.28
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As a commodity, an enslaved female subject’s capacity to create more property, i.e., have
children who would be taken up as property and laborers within chattel slavery, constituted
important information about her species body in the interests of capitalism. In this case, we see
power’s investment in the body of the enslaved subject, which was not restricted to sovereign
power’s focus on destroying the body. To be sure, the destruction of the enslaved subject’s body
would win out over the maintenance of their bodily health if the enslaved subject committed
some violation as determined by dominant power. Treated as a commodity whose value
depended upon their biological functioning—i.e. their ability to provide productive and
reproductive labor—enslaved subjects were de-humanized and, in turn, de-ontologized. By
restricting an enslaved subject’s value entirely to their biological properties, their captors also
excluded the enslaved subject from the category of human. This is because the category human,
as I understand Hartman’s use of the term, is not solely a biological or species category; it is also
an ethical category. Hence, to be treated only as a species being who is a human, is not the same
as to be treated humanely, or as being endowed with rights in virtue of being a member of the
species ‘human.’
The classification of enslaved people by biological capacity carried further implications
as well. Labeling enslaved female subjects ‘breeders’ or ‘sucklers’ was not simply a reduction of
these subjects to their species body, but, as Hortense Spillers argues in “Mama’s Baby, Papa’s
Maybe” it was also an act of ungendering them. In the case of chattel slavery, Spillers argues, the
transformation undergone by the enslaved subject was not the reduction to their body or even to
their species body, but to flesh. Spillers distinguishes between ‘the body’ and ‘flesh.’ The body,
for Spillers, is the “territory of cultural and political maneuver.” 29 The body concerns the
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subject’s position within the networks of socio-cultural relations such as the status of mother.
Spillers’ notion of body is distinct from the flesh because the former is marked by and legible
according to socio-cultural discourse. In contrast to the body, Spillers defines ‘flesh’ as “that
zero degree of social conceptualization that does not escape concealment under the brush of
discourse, or the reflexes of iconography.” 30 Flesh constitutes the enslaved subject’s existence in
terms of their vulnerability to destruction. It is not a description of their position in power, but a
description of their very existence. In the processes of wounding the enslaved subject, Spillers
argues, the body is not simply annihilated, but transformed into flesh: “If we mean ‘flesh’ as a
primary narrative, then we mean its seared, divided, ripped-apartness, riveted to the ship’s hole,
fallen, or ‘escaped’ overboard.”31 In some cases, such as when the enslaved subject was ripped
apart as Spillers describes, their body was annihilated in spectacular punishment. Flesh concerns
the body, but only as a mechanism through which dominant power can exercise its strength. In
Spillers’ interpretation of Foucault, the subject body is produced in and through discourse; in her
view, this does not apply to the enslaved subject because the enslaved subject is not a body and,
therefore, stands outside of discourse.32 Because, as I have discussed, dominant power relations
under chattel slavery existed along other relations of power, I think Spiller’s interpretation of the
enslaved subject’s relation to discourse is too narrow. In other words, the enslaved subject’s
status as flesh and, thus, position outside of culture, is an accurate analysis of the enslaved
subject view within the relation of domination. However, as Spillers herself demonstrates,
enslaved subjects developed alternative cultural relations amongst themselves, which did not
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reflect the culture and power relations of dominant society. For example, Spillers argues kinship
loses its meaning for enslaved subjects though “African peoples in the New World did […]
maintain the powerful ties of sympathy that bind blood-relations in a network of feeling, of
continuity.”33 So, kinship relations among enslaved subjects were not recognized among
dominant culture, but it does not follow that enslaved subjects themselves did not recognize their
cultural position as parent or child.
In my view, the distinction between body and flesh tracks the transition between
biopower and sovereign power. That is, the enslaved subject was subject to violent practices
aimed at wounding the body. In this manner, the health of the enslaved subject’s body was not
invested in, but rather constantly open to destruction. Enslaved subjects were at times compelled
to witness these punishments. In these instances, the enslaved subjects who were made to act as
spectators to this annihilation witnessed not simply the strength of the power to which they were
beholden, but also their own ontological transmutation into flesh. This is because the enslaved
were not merely commodities whose value guaranteed their survival, but they were also utterly
fungible, a concept I explore in the next section. The fungible existence of the enslaved, their
replaceability, along with their vulnerability to a form of violence that could rip their bodies
apart, meant that they witnessed in the violence enacted upon other enslaved subjects their own
vulnerability to such violence.
Both male and female enslaved subjects were subject to spectacular violence and
captivity, which transformed them into flesh. However, Spillers argues that enslaved female
subjects endured a unique mode of violence that led to their ungendering. That is, enslaved
female subjects were reduced to a commodity, vulnerable to physical violence, and regarded as a
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tool for breeding. Exploring Douglass’ description of children who were torn away from their
mothers in an effort to disrupt the bonds made in kinship, Spillers argues that the enslaved
subject was used for her capacity to make children and, at the same time, stripped of her position
as mother: “In the system that Douglass articulates, genetic reproduction becomes, then, not an
elaboration of the life-principle in its cultural overlap, but an extension of the boundaries of
proliferating properties.”34 The enslaved fetus was already assigned the status of property, even
though its existence depended upon the “life principle” of reproduction. In dominant (i.e. nonenslaved) society, this life principle assigned women the position of mothers and men that of
fathers. However, because the enslaved subject is not a human life within dominant society—a
socio-cultural subject—the enslaved female subject could not occupy the position of mother, nor
could the enslaved male subject occupy the position of father. What makes the ungendering of
the enslaved female subject unique, according to Spillers, is the identifiable and direct
connection she had with the enslaved fetus inside her; during chattel slavery the father of an
enslaved child or fetus was generally ambiguous or unknown to both enslaved subjects and their
captors. Douglass even remarks that he suspects his mother’s “owner” may be his father, though,
for him it matters little who his father actually was. It matters little, because the bonds of kinship
were unavailable to enslaved subjects even when they were able to identify their genetic kin
relations. Even if Douglass could confirm that his mother’s captor was his genetic father, it
would necessarily follow that his genetic father would function as his cultural father. In other
words, Douglass’ genetic father would not care for, protect, love him because kinship was
disallowed under slavery, especially if an enslaved subject’s genetic father was white.
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Before turning to Hartman’s account of fungibility, I want to briefly return to Douglass’
account of what he knows and does not know in the context of Foucault’s theory of regulatory
power. Douglass is allowed to know his birthplace, perhaps because it serves as a reminder to
him that his location matters for power’s ability to function effectively. However, he is not
allowed to know his birthdate, and he is made aware that white people know their birthdates,
because denying him this knowledge is, again, effective for power’s functioning. For, lacking the
origin of his history, Douglass is denied access to the position of subject. He would have no date
during which he could mark the beginning of another year in his life. His age in general terms,
not his precise birthdate, matters under chattel slavery because it determines his value as a
commodity. That is, whether he was born during planting-time or harvest-time is sufficient for
his captor’s ability to calculate his worth. Anything beyond that would simply aid to stir his
‘restless spirit’ and render him unmanageable by his captor as well as unhappy with his own
condition. To know that you are the kind of being who is not allowed information about yourself;
learning that others like you are similarly denied this knowledge; and perhaps most importantly,
learning that others who are not like you are allowed this knowledge, is a psychological
technique of dehumanization. Limiting and regulating Douglass’ access to his own history was,
therefore, a means of dehumanizing him and, in turn, securing his status as a commodity for
another. Stated otherwise, what Douglass describes in the opening lines of his 1845
autobiography is an asymmetrical ontological order wherein slaves constitute a different kind of
being than whites.
Hartman on Fungibility
Hartman takes the question of what kind of being the enslaved subject constituted as the
point of departure for Scenes of Subjection. According to Hartman, enslaved subjects occupied a
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paradoxical position in relation to humanity, which is expressed in various ontological position
related to property, pleasure, and possession. On the one hand, the humanity of enslaved subjects
was denied by whites in order to dismiss any ethical obligations they might have to their
captives.35 On the other hand, the humanity of enslaved subjects was recognized and used by
whites in service of their domination, oppression, and subjection. Hartman is most explicit about
the ambivalent status of the enslaved in her discussion of Black pain: “The black is both
insensate and content, indifferent to pain and induced to work by threats of corporeal
punishment. These contradictions are partly explained by the ambiguous and precarious status of
the black in the ‘great chain of being’.” 36 Here she qualifies this account of the enslaved person’s
alleged indifference and sensitivity to pain as ‘only part’ of the explanation for the severity of
physical violence to which enslaved subjects were submitted. This is because, as I will
demonstrate shortly, white subjects also submitted enslaved subjects to pain in order to
experience pleasure for themselves. Where exactly Black subjects are positioned in relation to
the human has, thus, been an open and unanswered question since Africans were forcibly
introduced to the US through captivity.
According to Hartman, it is precisely because the humanity of enslaved subjects was not
only recognized, but also used as a tool of domination, that liberal appeals to humanist values
such as empathy and consent necessarily prove insufficient for Black liberation. Hartman
critiques liberal political theories operating in and since the period of US slavery that rely upon
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humanist language to make claims about freedom. What these traditions fail to recognize,
Hartman argues, is that the liberalist conception of freedom is not freedom from coerced labor,
but freedom from chattel slavery; the liberal notion of freedom is conceivable only in relation to
slavery, and thus free citizens are only possible in contrast to enslaved subjects. However, as
Hartman explains, Emancipation freed enslaved subjects from chattel slavery, but Black subjects
remained unfree because of coerced labor. Hartman argues that liberal political theory conceived
of freedom as universal and, thus, attainable by all subjects. In contrast to this, she argues that
universal freedom is contradictory to the liberal notion of freedom because it implies, as she
says, “certain notions of the subject and subjection.”37 In other words, Hartman argues that, at
least since chattel slavery in the US, the notion of freedom is conceived of in relation to
subjection, which means that the free subject in the US context is only conceptually possible in
relation to the unfree subject. Given this, Hartman argues that both Emancipation and
Reconstruction failed to achieve freedom for Black subjects because they relied upon humanism
and liberalism, which does not recognize that freedom inextricably linked Blackness with
bondage, subjugation, and domination. During Emancipation, freedom was defined as ‘freedom
from’ slavery. However, because the US depended upon forced labor to sustain the sociopolitical ideals according to which white people had come to define themselves, this
conceptualization of emancipation soon had to be revised in order to allow for coercive labor.
During the US industrial revolution, Hartman explains, “the totalizing vision of managing labor
had one eye directed toward slavery and the other toward freedom.” 38 Thus, calls for the
abolition of free labor qua were quickly followed with concerns for the health of the US
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economy. Abolitionists restricted their conception of freedom to the liberalist framework of
freedom as ‘freedom from’ bondage; they thus advocated for a form of freedom that still left
freed Black subjects vulnerable to coerced labor. While this coerced labor would remain distinct
from chattel slavery, it would similarly target Black subject at a disproportionate rate.
This above critique of the liberalist and humanist misconception of freedom is one that
Hartman argues remains true for contemporary political theory in the US. It calls into question
whether or not anyone—especially Black subjects—can achieve freedom qua full liberation in
the US. Hartman argues that we are left with the question “whether the rights of man and citizen
are realizable or whether the appellation ‘human’ can be borne equally by all.” 39 Ultimately,
Hartman answers this question in the negative. Chattel slavery constituted a fundamental fracture
between Blackness and human, which, according to Hartman, still conditions liberated
contemporary Black subject formation in the US.
Recognizing that Black subjects occupy an ambivalent position in relation to the human,
Hartman analyzes the ontological status of enslaved subjects. That is, if enslaved subjects were
not-quite human, then what were they? As it turns out, the ambivalent position of enslaved
subjects ran throughout their relation to all other ontological positions with the network of power
constitutive of chattel slavery. Just as enslaved subjects were recognized by whites as
paradoxically having and not having humanity, so too did they vacillate between object and
person, agents with an independent will and a possession to be owned, socially dead and
responsible for transgressing the law.40
Hartman, Scenes, 6. In a footnote, Hartman cites Sylvia Wynter’s article, “On Disenchanting Discourse,” which
may suggest that Hartman places human in quotation marks as a reference to Wynter’s concept of ‘genres-of-man.’
See Sylvia Wynter, “On Disenchanting Discourse: ‘Minority’ Literary Criticism and beyond,” Cultural Critique no.
7 (1987): 207-244.
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Situating her analysis within the networks of dominant power governing chattel slavery,
Hartman defines the ontological position of the enslaved as a fungible commodity: “the
fungibility of the commodity makes the captive body an abstract and empty vessel vulnerable to
the projection of others’ feelings, ideas, desires, values.”41 As fungible, the enslaved position can
be occupied by any white subjects. White subjects could imagine themselves in the position of
the enslaved subject and derive pleasure from this transference or feel empathy at the
imagination of their own suffering. Hartman describes slave abolitionist John Rankin’s 1837
Letters on American Slavery to demonstrate this point. In these letters, Rankin describes the
brutality to which enslaved subjects are regularly submitted in graphic detail. Still concerned that
these scenes would not affectively move his reader, Rankin asks them to imagine that he and his
family were similarly subjected to such torture. By substituting himself in place of the enslaved
subject, Hartman argues, Rankin demonstrates the fundamentally fungible character of the
enslaved. Furthermore, Hartman explains that Rankin must occupy the position of the enslaved
in his reader’s imagination if he hopes to engender their feelings of empathy for the enslaved
subject:
Rankin must volunteer himself and his family for abasement. […] the effort to counteract
the commonplace callousness to black suffering requires that the white body be positioned
in the place of the black body in order to make this suffering visible and intelligible. 42
Thus, the enslaved is not merely fungible qua exchangeability with other enslaved subjects, but
also fungible qua position of interchangeability for a “masochistic fantasy” from which white
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subjects may derive pleasure. 43 It is precisely because enslaved subjects occupy an ambivalent
position with respect to humanity, for dominant subjects, that they cannot themselves be the
occasion for empathy. Therefore, white subjects must imagine themselves in place of enslaved
subjects in order to extend their empathy, thus treating the enslaved as a “vessel for the uses,
thoughts, and feelings of others.”44 Because humanity implies empathy, according to Hartman,
white subjects had to channel their empathy for enslaved subjects through their own suffering so
as to avoid attributing humanity to the enslaved themselves. Treating the enslaved body as a
mirror that depicts an image of themselves as the victim of violence, the white subject reifies the
enslaved as an interchangeable and fungible commodity in their very efforts to humanize the
enslaved subject. Hartman argues that the white subject’s use of approximation to illustrate the
enslaved subject’s suffering allowed them to circumvent the proximity of the ethical relation
constitutive of humanity. 45
The enslaved subject was a fungible commodity, though their commodification did not
reduce them to mere property. This is because the enslaved subject was also made responsible
for their infractions, a fact which presupposed their legal personhood, even if their level of
personhood was only minimally conceived. The enslaved subject was a person before the law,
though they lacked the potential to consent and, thereby, express their agency. Hartman writes:
“the law’s recognition of slave humanity nullified the captive’s ability to give consent or act as
an agent and, at the same time, acknowledged the intentionality and agency of the enslaved.” 46
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The enslaved subject could break the law even though the law could not be used to protect them.
They could, for example, be charged with “stealing themselves”, taking away the property of
their captors by literally taking themselves away through escape. However, lacking the potential
to consent, an enslaved subject could not be raped, at least not with regard to the crime of rape.
Thus, the commodification of enslaved subjects made them both legal property and legal person.
They were property for their captors and persons before the law.
Hartman argues that after Emancipation the free Black subject was not and is not freed
from their fungibility. Black subjects were no longer property to be possessed by another, but,
Hartman argues, Black subjects remained interchangeable and exchangeable from the
perspective of dominant society. Hartman claims that immediately following Emancipation, the
techniques of violence that secured the enslaved subject’s position as property were replaced
with:
The liberty of contract that spawned debt-peonage, the bestowal of rights that engendered
indebtedness and obligation and licensed naked forms of domination and coercion, and the
cultivation of a work ethic that promoted self-discipline and induced internal forms of
policing.47
After abolition, the domination of Black subjects no longer took the form of strict captivity, but
of various techniques of socio-political oppression including coerced labor and debt-peonage.
This was made possible only after first formally attributing legal personhood to Black subjects in
the eyes of the law; legal personhood here refers to the liberty of contract, right to indebtedness,
and the obligation to uphold the law. As subjects with rights, Black persons could not be forced
into chattel slavery, but they could be coerced to labor if they transgressed the law. In her 2003
book, Are Prisons Obsolete?, Angela Davis explains that ‘Black Codes’ (1865-1968) replaced
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the ‘Slave Codes’ (1661-1865) under chattel slavery and constituted a set of laws that only
applied to freed Black subjects. Davis writes: “The new Black Codes proscribed a range of
actions—such as vagrancy, absence from work, breach of job contracts, the possession of
firearms, and insulting gestures or acts—that were criminalized when the person charged was
black.”48 The right to bear arms was written in the Constitution but denied to Black subjects after
slavery. Thus, a number of actions granted as rights to white subjects were criminalized when
performed by Black subjects. While the US law has changed since Emancipation and even more
since the end of Jim Crow, both Hartman and Davis contend that the historical criminalization of
Blackness has continued for contemporary Black subjects in the US. Davis identifies this
continuation of Black criminalization in the expansion of the US prison system, which she
argues, has always disproportionately targeted Black subjects. Hartman, however, makes an even
greater claim that it was not just Black criminalization that continued after slavery until and
including today, but the fungibility of Blackness itself that has continued. That is, Hartman
argues that the character of interchangeability and exchangeability that figured the enslaved
subject remains a condition of contemporary Black subjectivity. According to Hartman, this is
not only because freedom is only conceivable in relation to Black subjugation, but also because
chattel slavery constituted a breach so significant that full redress is impossible.
The breach, for Hartman, is the gap created through “violent domination, dishonor, natal
alienation, and chattel status” between the enslaved and historical continuity. 49 The natal
alienation of enslaved subjects makes it impossible to establish genealogical continuity for both
the enslaved subject and the contemporary Black subject. Hartman explains that “the uncertainty
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of descent, the negation of paternity, the interdiction regarding the master-father’s name, and the
ambiguous legacy of inheritance and dispossession” prevented enslaved subjects from
identifying the origin of their genealogical lines of descent. There is no redress for this breach,
according to Hartman, because there is no way to fully restore the history lost to enslaved
subjects. She writes: “The limited means of redress available to the enslaved cannot compensate
for the enormity of this loss.” 50 The loss of anscestral origins, of social life, of freedom, of
tradition, and of humanity cannot be fully redressed unless such ancestry, social life, freedom,
tradition, and humanity are restored to the enslaved subject and, in turn, the contemporary
descendants of those who were enslaved. However, as Hartman explains, ancestry cannot be
restored for enslaved subjects because their kin relations were denied, undocumented, and
erased; nor can African traditions be restored for enslaved subjects because these subjects were
cut off from these traditions through displacement and captivity. Because contemporary Black
subjects are descendants of these enslaved subjects, their ancestry and traditions similarly lack an
origin and historical continuity. So long as the liberalist notion of freedom is conceptually tied to
the notion of subjugation, Hartman argues, contemporary Black subjects will continue to lack
full freedom. Without historical origins or historical continuity, both of which are impossible
according to Hartman, contemporary Black subjects will continue to exist as fungible and in an
ambivalent relation to humanity. The breach that rendered enslaved subjects fungible
commodities cannot be redressed, which means that this breach persists. While contemporary
Black subjects in the US have achieved some amount of historical continuity, Hartman argues
that their inability to establish historical origins guarantees that the breach brought about by
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chattel slavery will continue to endure. And so long as the breach remains, Hartman explains,
contemporary Black subjects will continue to exist as fungible commodities.51
Spillers’ ‘Flesh’ and Afropessimism’s Ontology
Hortense Spillers’ concept of the ‘flesh’ preceded and, in fact, influenced Hartman’s
analysis in Scenes of Subjection. However, I want to return to Spillers’ work after first engaging
Hartman’s for two reasons. First, while Spillers’ argument concerning ‘flesh’ and the
‘hieroglyphics of the body’ have proven influential for a number of contemporary theorists of
Black studies, she never returns to these concepts to further develop either their meaning or the
larger implications they may have for how we analyze contemporary Black subjectivity. 52 To be
clear, Spillers uses her analysis of the flesh to analyze how the violence done to enslaved Black
women led to their ungendering, which continues to condition contemporary Black women’s
subjectivity, though in a different manner. 53 Spillers’ ontological discussion of the enslaved
subject reduced to flesh clarifies that this process happened differently for men and women.
However, she claims that it did happen to all Black subjects submitted to chattel slavery. Despite
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their similar character as flesh, Spillers’ primary focus in “Mamas Baby, Papa’s Maybe,” is with
the ungendering unique to enslaved female subjects.
Many Afropessimists have relied upon Spillers’ concept ‘flesh’ to advance their claim
that contemporary Black subjects exist as nonbeing. Afropessimism, a recent American
discipline in Black studies, is defined by the position that contemporary Black subjects exist as
socially dead and, as a result, they exist as nonbeing.54 Though Afropessimism is a relatively
new tradition, it has become the subject of critique for many theorists of Black studies working
in a variety of disciplines. Sociologist Sirma Bilge, for example, has criticized the most
prominent theorists of Afropessimism, namely Frank Wilderson III and Jared Sexton, for using
Spillers’ work simply in order to pay lip service to Black feminism. 55 Others, such as cultural
theorist Fred Moten, have criticized Afro-Pessimism for over-extending Spillers’ own claims and
treating the concept of ‘flesh’ as a transhistorical condition of Black life. 56 For now, I will remain
agnostic in response to this first criticism; however, I do think theorists should be careful to do
these concepts justice, whether it be Spillers’ ‘flesh’ or Hartman’s ‘fungibility.’ My concern here
is not about authorial intent, but rather about the need to understand a concept adequately as well
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as to grasp its conceptual limits. Because Spillers’ work, in addition to Wynter’s, Hartman’s, and
Sharpe’s, has been used by Afropessimists and others working in Black studies to make claims
about the possibilities for contemporary Black life, I worry that we willfully misinterpret these
authors in order to make claims for which we lack a concrete analysis. In my reading of Spillers,
the captive body was reduced to flesh and the ‘liberated’ body has inherited this history in the
symbolic register as ‘hieroglyphics of the flesh’—the symbolic markings of ‘flesh’.57 Thus,
contemporary Black subjects are no longer flesh, though we bear the symbolic markings of this
fleshy history.
This brings me to the second reason for waiting until the end of this chapter to fully
develop Spillers’ concept ‘flesh’ into a conversation where she has already been referenced by
both myself and the authors with whom I engage. I want to be careful to restrict my analysis of
ontology and dehumanization to the practices used during slavery, in order to avoid flattening
out the historical differences between slavery and the contemporary US. This is by no means to
suggest that anti-Blackness no longer occurs as physical, psychical, or symbolic dehumanization.
One only need reflect upon the uproar of “All Lives Matter” in response to subjects’ declaring
that their Black lives mattered. However, there are important differences between the regulatory
and disciplinary techniques of anti-Blackness in the service of contemporary white supremacy in
the US, on the one hand, and those used in the service of chattel slavery, on the other. By too
quickly eliding these differences—a charge made by critics of Afropessimism about Lewis
Gordon, Gloria Wekker, among others, and one with which I agree—we run the risk of

I place ‘liberated’ in quotes here in keeping with Spillers’ argument that the extent to which contemporary Black
subjects are liberated must be questioned given the ruling episteme that continues to govern symbolic value today.
Spillers writes: “Even though this captive flesh/body has been ‘liberated,’ and no one need pretend that even the
quotation marks do not matter, dominant symbolic activity, the ruling episteme that releases the dynamics of naming
and valuation, remains grounded in the originating metaphors of captivity and mutilation.” (Spillers, “Mama’s Baby,
Papa’s Maybe,” 68). I explore Spillers claims regarding the ruling episteme later in this section.
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developing an ideal political theory that cannot address the concrete conditions of different
historical, cultural, and geographical contexts. Thus, I restrict my claims regarding the
ontological transmutation of the enslaved subject into flesh to the historical context of chattel
slavery. What I draw from Spillers’ work is the link she provides between practices traditionally
framed by the fields of philosophy and political theory as dehumanizing and the concomitant
ontological shifts in the theories of the Human. 58
Reduced to flesh, Spillers argues, the enslaved subject existed in a liminal position in
relation to culture. Captives were not thrown entirely outside of culture; rather, they became the
bridge between the outside and inside of culture. Spillers writes:
[the] lacerations, woundings, fissures, tears, scars, openings, ruptures, lesions, rendings,
punctures of the flesh create the distance between what I would designate a cultural
vestibulary and the culture, whose state apparatus, including judges, attorneys, ‘owners,’
‘soul drivers,’ ‘overseers,’ and ‘men of God,’ apparently colludes with a protocol of ‘search
and destroy.’59
Spillers’ concept of ‘cultural vestibulary’ is only briefly introduced in this article, and similar to
her concept ‘flesh’ she never returns to the notion of ‘cultural vestibulary’ in order to fully
explicate its meaning. However, we can interpret ‘cultural vestibulary’ from the above context to
mean that the captive subject, who existed as a cultural vestibulary, constituted the access to
culture. The captive subject, thus, existed in relation to culture, but in a relation that prevented
them from accessing culture. Just as captive subjects could not possess themselves, neither could
they access that for which they constituted the access point. In other words, captive subjects
could never enter culture because they were the condition for culture itself. After chattel slavery,
Spillers explains, Black subjects re-possessed their bodies, but they did not escape their position

I will return to Spillers’ work in chapter III of this dissertation to consider how the hieroglyphics of the flesh
condition contemporary Black subject formation as an embodiment of the Black archive.
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as ‘cultural vestibulary’. Thus, we should say that contemporary Black subjects are no longer
flesh, though what it means to exist as a cultural vestibulary in the context of twenty-first century
remain an open question.
Enslaved subjects were transformed into flesh through the instruments used to wound,
and the disciplinary practices of wounding, the body of the captive Black subject during slavery.
Insofar as Black people today are ‘liberated,’ we are no longer (legally) vulnerable to these same
practices and instruments of wounding, which means we are no longer vulnerable to a reduction
to flesh. Thus, it would not be true to say of contemporary Black subjects that we are flesh. As
‘liberated,’ the contemporary Black subject has re-acquired her body. However, according to
Spillers, the contemporary Black body contains the hieroglyphics of captivity’s fleshy history. In
his text Habeas Viscus, Alexander Weheliye explains that the body re-gained by the Black
subject was a body marked by the history of Black wounds qua hieroglyphics of the flesh:
What Spillers refers to as the ‘hieroglyphics of the flesh’ created by these instruments
[irons, whips, chains, etc.] is transmitted to succeeding generations of black subjects who
have been ‘liberated’ and granted body in the aftermath of de jure enslavement. The
hieroglyphics of the flesh do not vanish once affixed to proper personhood (the body);
rather, they endure as a pesky potential vital to the maneuverings of ‘cultural seeing by
skin color.’60
In the contemporary US, Black life is no longer lived as flesh, but as embodied personhood
marked by the history of wounds and wounding that once produced flesh. This, in my view, is
the point from which we may derive a contemporary analysis of Black subject formation. That is,
we can explore the ontological position of the cultural vestibulary constitutive of Blackness and
we may analyze how the histories of wounding are symbolically represented in the contemporary
Black body without extending Spiller’s concept of flesh beyond the context of chattel slavery. In
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this regard, I would consider Spiller’s theory regarding flesh to be an archetype for analyzing
contemporary Black subjectivity and their ontology under white supremacy in the US.
However, despite the historical specificity of Spillers’ concept of ‘flesh,’ as well as
Orlando Patterson’s account of ‘social death’, Wilderson, Sexton, Marriott, and others have
treated these concepts as transhistorical. 61 In other words, these theorists have extended analyses
of dehumanization and the enslaved subject’s nonexistence from x to argue that contemporary
Black subjects exist as nonbeing. In his 2016 article, “Corpsing; Or, The Matter of Black Life,”
for example, David Marriott defines social death and social death theory as follows:
the essence of the theory of black social death is taken to be a rule of life that prescribes to
blacks that they live under the command of death (as citizens, parents, sibling, and
subjects); consequently those who object this rule are said to live under a law of symbolic
death and are regarded as subjects who are already dead.62
That Marriott attributes the positions of citizens, parents, siblings, and subjects to Black subject
in his analysis of their social death is already an elision of the enslaved subject with the
contemporary Black subject in the US. As Spillers has argued, enslaved subjects could not
occupy the position of parent in the cultural order governing chattel slavery. Enslaved female
subjects could ‘produce’ children, but these children existed as property before they were born.
The ungendered flesh of enslaved female subjects prevented them from occupying the position
of mother, which is what, in part, characterized their social death. Marriott thus extends the
For more on Patterson’s concept of social death see Orlando Patterson, Slavery and Social Death: A Comparative
Study, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982). For more on critiques of Afropessimism’s use of the term
‘social death’ see Vincent Brown, “Social Death and Political Life in the Study of Slavery,” American Historical
Review 114, no. 5 (2009): 1231-1249; Lewis Gordon, Annie Menzel, George Shulman, et. al, “Critical Exchange:
Afro pessimism,” Contemporary Political Theory 17, no. 1 (2017): 105-137; Fred Moten, “Blackness and
Nothingness (Mysticism in the Flesh),” The South Atlantic Quarterly 112, no. 3 (2013): 737-780; and Sirma Bilge,
“The fungibility of intersectionality: an Afropessimist reading,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 43, no. 13 (2020): 22982326. For more on Afropessimist responses to these critiques see Jared Sexton, “The Social Life of Social Death: On
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symbolic order of chattel slavery into a context wherein Black women are regarded as mothers,
even if their position as such continues to be pathologized in the US as Spillers argues.
In a 2018 interview with The Harvard Gazette, Orlando Patterson specifically critiques
Afropessimist theorists for describing the contemporary Black subject as socially dead, when his
own analysis limits the application of the concept of social death to enslaved subjects during US
chattel slavery. 63 Patterson defines social death in his 1985 text, Slavery and Social Death: A
Comparative Study, in terms of the ‘natal alienation’ of enslaved subjects. He writes: “it was the
slave’s isolation, his strangeness that made him most valuable to the master; but it was this very
strangeness that most threatened the community […] this is the social death of the slave.”64 Here
the ‘strangeness’ of the enslaved subject is reflected in Hartman’s analysis of the ambivalent
humanity of the enslaved. Because enslaved subjects were not-quite-human, or rather, not fully
human, they were ‘strange’ enough—to use Patterson’s term—to be used as property. Familiarity
would, in this context, be expressed through their humanity. Enslaved subjects, unable fully to
express their humanity under chattel slavery, were not only cut off from ethics, but also, as
Patterson explains, excluded from the community.
In his 2018 interview, Patterson argues that contemporary Black Americans are largely
segregated in the private sphere, though this is not the same as being socially dead. Patterson’s
concept of ‘social death’ is distinctly sociological; it refers to the isolation of enslaved subjects
from the public sphere. He explains, “I don’t think we’re in a situation of social death, because
one of the elements of social death is that you’re not recognized as an integral member of the
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civic community, the public sphere, and we certainly are.”65 Through a liberal political analysis,
Patterson argues that Black Americans have been integrated into the public sphere, which for
him is proof that they are not alienated from society as socially dead. Furthermore, he argues
that the racial segregation that continues to persist is in the private sphere; according to
Patterson, contemporary Black Americans ‘self-segregate’ in their private lives.
While I am sympathetic to Patterson’s critique that Afropessimism has failed to
distinguish between the concrete conditions during slavery and those of today, I am less
concerned with how concepts travel beyond the limits intended by an author. It is clear that
theorists in Afropessimism reject the liberal conceptualization of freedom as ‘freedom to join
public society.’ Even Hartman, who does not identify as an Afropessimist, although others have
identified her as such, argues that Black liberation is more than a political matter. For
Afropessimists, the ontological existence of Black subjects would not be fundamentally altered if
allowed to work in the military, for example. Thus, at least in the context of Patterson’s ‘social
death,’ I think one could rightly use the concept to describe contemporary Black subjects, though
this would require an analysis of the distinct socio-political conditions of the contemporary US. I
am not concerned here with authorial intention, but rather contextual and historical accuracy.
While I recognize the potential to used Patterson’s concept ‘social death’ in contexts for
which he did not intend, this is not true of Spillers’ concept ‘flesh.’ ‘Social death’ refers to the
socio-political exclusion of enslaved subjects, but Spillers’ concept ‘flesh’ refers to their
ontological existence. Afropessimists require a new analysis of contemporary Black existence in
order to make claims about the ontology of Black subjects today, since these are no longer
subject to the violence of chattel slavery that transformed the enslaved subject into flesh. In other
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words, an analysis of contemporary concrete conditions must precede claims about Black
existence and not the other way around. In my view, such an analysis would demonstrate that
contemporary Black subjects produce meaning, which, in turn, demonstrates their ontological
being rather than the nonbeing that Afropessimists claim for them.
In the next chapter, I will explore the lived experience of contemporary Black subjects
when they are before the racializing gaze, which I identify as a phenomenological structure of
white supremacy. I examine how the racializing gaze inhibits the Black phenomenal body under
white supremacy. In his 1952 text, Black Skin, White Masks, Frantz Fanon famously argues that
the Black and/or colonized subject “has no ontological resistance in the eyes of the white man.”
66

However, this is only true within the Manichean anti-Black world of white supremacy. As this

dissertation contends, Black subjects exist as ontologically present and freely create meaning in
fugitive spaces, places where they are not directly surveilled by white supremacy and anti-Black
techniques of power.
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Chapter Two: An Account of White Supremacy and the Racializing Gaze
This chapter examines the phenomenological structures of white supremacy that
condition the contemporary US. Drawing upon Merleau-Ponty’s existentialist phenomenology, I
examine how a racializing gaze affects the lived experience of Black subjects. I argue that a
racializing gaze inhibits the Black subject’s ability to cultivate what I refer to as a ‘robust habit
body’, which would allow for spontaneous and creative acts. As a result, Black subjects are
closed off from freely producing meaning under white supremacy. However, as I demonstrate in
the final chapter of this dissertation, Black gestures are indications of meaning produced by
Black subjects despite guards against such meaning production under white supremacy. In the
space of fugitivity, Black subjects gain access to a robust habit body, which allows them to freely
produce meaning independent of white supremacy. The focus of this chapter, however, is
identifying the various ways in which the Black phenomenal body is inhibited under white
supremacy in order to establish the lived experience from which Black subjects flee into the
space of fugitivity.
The first section of this chapter outlines the key features of Merleau-Ponty’s
phenomenological theory as developed in his 1945 text, Phenomenology of Perception, and his
1963, The Structure of Behavior.1 In this process, I define the following concepts: ‘body image,’
‘body schema,’ ‘habit body,’ ‘sedimentation,’ ‘routinized habituation,’ and ‘robust habituation.’
I introduce a distinction between habitual acts and habituated acts in order to distinguish between
two kinds of habituation by differently characterizing Merleau-Ponty’s concept of ‘habit body’
as ‘routinized habituation’ and ‘robust habituation’. Implicit to Merleau-Ponty’s theory of
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habituation is a distinction between routinized and unroutinized acts. Walking, for example,
would be considered a routinized movement, according to Merleau-Ponty, because it
traditionally involves the mere repetition of movements one has previously performed. As an
able-bodied adult, I can walk without a concerted effort because I have walked many times
throughout my life and have, therefore, become habituated to the movements. I refer to
routinized acts such as walking as ‘routinized habituation’. In contrast to routinized habituation,
Merleau-Ponty’s discussion of habituation includes unroutinized acts, such as dancing. What
characterizes these acts is their potential to include new movements that are creatively and
spontaneously performed. Dance can involve a mere repetition of the same movements, but a
good dance is one that does not follow a script. I refer to these unroutinized acts as ‘robust
habituation.’ The distinction between ‘routinized habituation’ and ‘robust habituation’ is
important for my purposes because it allows me to clearly differentiate between the Black lived
experience as it unfolds before the racializing gaze and in contrast to Black lived experience as it
occurs in fugitive space. I will argue that when the Black subject is before the racializing gaze,
she is restricted to routinized habituation and closed off from acts of robust habituation. In order
to advance this claim, I make a further distinction between the Black phenomenal body that is
before the racializing gaze and the Black phenomenal body in fugitivity. Accordingly, I refer to
the phenomenal body corresponding with ‘routinized habituation’ as the ‘routinized habit body’
and the phenomenal body corresponding with ‘robust habituation’ as ‘robust habit body.’ This
section is intended to prepare the reader for claims made in sections II of this chapter, regarding
the effects on the Black subject’s phenomenal body produced by the racializing gaze.
In section II, I draw upon Linda Martín Alcoff’s 2006 text, Visible Identities: Race,
Gender, and the Self, as well as Alia Al-Saji’s 2010 article, “The racialization of Muslim veils: A
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philosophical analysis” to elucidate the perceptual habits underlying the racializing gaze. 2 I next
turn to Helen Ngo’s analysis concerning the effects of the racializing gaze for the lived
experience of non-white subjects. In her 2017 book, The Habits of Racism: A Phenomenology of
Racism and Racialized Embodiment, Ngo argues that the contemporary non-white subject
experiences her phenomenal body as i) a distorted body image, ii) a discontinuous body schema,
and, as a result, iii) an un-synthesized habit body. 3 Because the non-white subject is unable to
cultivate a habituated habit body, as Ngo argues, she is unable to move in spontaneous and
creative manners. I will argue that the Black subject’s inability to cultivate a robust habit body
impedes Black subjects from producing independent meaning under white supremacy.
Merleau-Ponty’s Theory of Perception
In his 1945 text, Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty critiques both empiricism
and intellectualism for presupposing the existence of an objective world and for reducing our
perception of that world to either representation, as in the case of empiricism, or structures of
consciousness, as in the case of intellectualism. Merleau-Ponty groups together empiricism and
intellectualism based on their shared understanding of the objective world as self-enclosed,
external to the subject, and explainable according to laws governing objects within the world.
These traditions assume that events in the world be explained according to universal and
objective laws—hence the term ‘objective world’—which vary depending upon the discipline in
question. As Merleau-Ponty explains, empiricism might define perception according to “the
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physical and chemical properties of the stimuli able to act upon our sense organs.” 4 In this
framework, objects of perception have sensations that correspond to various stimuli in my
organism, which reproduce in me the appearance of the object. When I perceive a wooden chair,
for example, the sensations of shape, texture, color, etc. independently act upon my organism
and are combined together in a coordinated manner to stimulate my retina to create my
perception of the chair as a coherent unity. In general, empiricism assumes “that the world
confides messages to the sense organs that thus must be carried, then decoded in such a way as to
reproduce in us the original text. From this it follows that there is, in principle, a point-by-point
correspondence and constant connection between the stimulus and the elementary perception.” 5
Empiricism treats the subject of perception as a passive recipient of information about the world
gained through various stimulations upon the subject’s organism. Perception is thus understood
as the act of decoding sensations and the re-presenting these sensations in a coordinated unity as
a perceptual object.
Merleau-Ponty is also critical of empiricism and intellectualism because, he argues, their
respective theories of sensation are constructed according to reflections upon previous
perceptions without first accounting for ‘original perception.’ ‘Original perception’ here refers to
the experience of perception, which is prior to a reflection upon perception. For Merleau-Ponty,
reflection presupposes a distinction between perception given in our experience and perception
as an object that can be studied independently of our experience. I understand Merleau-Ponty’s
concept of ‘original perception’ to be similar to Edmund Husserl’s notion of life-world, which
Husserl develops at length in his late work such as, The Crisis of European Sciences and
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Transcendental Philosophy, originally published in 1954.6 Husserl critiqued the natural sciences
throughout his career for claiming an ‘objective’ position from which they can study the world.
In opposition to this, Husserl argued that science, as is true of all forms of human knowledge, is
relative to one’s life-world:
the propositions, the theories, the whole edifice of doctrine in the objective sciences are
structures attained through certain activities of scientists bound together in their
collaborative work […] And we see further that all these theoretical results have the
character of validities for the life-world, adding themselves as such to its own composition
and belonging to it even before that as a horizon of possible accomplishments for
developing science. The concrete life-world, then, is the grounding soil [der gründende
Boden] of the ‘scientifically true’ world and at the same time encompasses it in its own
universal concreteness. 7
Merleau-Ponty, like Husserl before him, adopts the phenomenological position that our
experience of the perceptual world cannot be understood adequately if we assume that this world
exists independent of our experience it. I introduce Husserl here in order to contextualize
Merleau-Ponty’s theory of ‘originary perception.’ Originary perception refers to the subjective
experience of perception, which empiricism and intellectualism abstract away from in their
respective theories of sensation.
Merleau-Ponty first introduces his concept of ‘originary perception’ in his 1942, The
Structure of Behavior. In this text, he argues that in original perception one does not perceive “a
mosaic of sensations”8 brought together by some external or internal force to act upon one’s
organism and represent a unified object of perception; “there are melodic unities, significant
wholes experienced in an indivisible manner.”9 He holds that empiricism and intellectualism do
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not have an account of sens [meaning and significance] revealed in original experience of
perception.10 Instead they seek to explain the significance of perception and sensation according
to what is given in reflection, which, according to Merleau-Ponty, wrongly assumes the
possibility for consciousness to distance itself from the world and experience. In contrast to this,
Merleau-Ponty states: “We are caught up in the world and we do not succeed in detaching
ourselves from it in order to shift to the consciousness of the world.” 11 Therefore, a
phenomenology of perception must analyze how the world appears to us in experience. That is to
say, our experience of the world is what Merleau-Ponty calls ‘original perception,’ and this, as
opposed to reflections we have about previous perceptual experiences, is the necessary point of
departure for an accurate theory of human perception. Given this, Merleau-Ponty critiques both
empiricism and intellectualism for their shared understanding of an objective world as well as
their disregard for original perception. In both Phenomenology of Perception and The Structure
of Behavior, Merleau-Ponty provides detailed engagements with empiricism and intellectualism
separately, in order to establish the particular failings of both traditions.
I first outline Merleau-Ponty’s grounds for rejecting empiricism, before turning to his
critique and rejection of intellectualism. According to Merleau-Ponty, empiricist theories of
perception are incorrect for four reasons. First, empiricism assumes that the sensations of
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perception are the most basic unit of experience; they are regarded as the building blocks of
perception. Merleau-Ponty refers to this position as the ‘constancy hypothesis’ and cites Gestalt
psychologist Köhler Wolfgang as a proponent of this hypothesis.12 For example, red is
understood as a stimulus that acts upon my retina and reproduces the appearance of red.
However, as Merleau-Ponty explains, there are exceptions to the rule of this hypothesis that
sensation is the most basic unit of experience: “When red and green presented together give a
resulting gray, it is conceded that the central combination of my stimuli may immediately give
rise to a sensation different from what the objective stimuli would require.” 13 The gray I perceive
when presented with red and green together is not a mixture of individual sensations, but an
entirely new sensation. So, if sensation is defined by empiricism as the “immediate effect of an
external stimulus,” and if the appearance of gray is the result of the objective stimuli red and
green, as opposed to a gray stimulus, then, at least in this case, perception is not a direct
correspondence between objective stimuli and my sensation. Here, the point for Merleau-Ponty
is that empiricism does not have a coherent account of sensation. There is no one-to-one
correspondence between stimuli and how things appear to me through sensation. Red and green
stimuli produce the sensation of gray, rather than the sensation of red and green. Thus, for
Merleau-Ponty the attempt to base a theory of perception on this ill-conceived notion of
sensation is bound to fail because there are exceptions to the rule of direct correspondence that
occur in experience. Empiricism either attempts to extend its explanatory laws of perception to
account for these experiences or disregards these experiences as exceptional. According to
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Merleau-Ponty, a theory of perception must be able to account for these exceptional instances
because, quite simply, they do occur in experience. Later in this section I explore MerleauPonty’s claim that the very notion of sensation must be reimagined in order to sufficiently
account for normal and abnormal perceptions.
The second critique of empiricism developed by Merleau-Ponty is intimately tied to the first.
Empiricism wrongly conceives of sensation as an indivisible unit of experience. In fact, we do
not perceive sensations as indivisible units of experience, but as physiognomies. 14 Empiricism
wants to explain how we perceive the world, which presupposes the possibility for stepping back
from the world of experience and treating it as an object of knowledge. Instead, Merleau-Ponty
focuses upon the original moment of perception. In this un-reflected act of perception, we do not
experience various sensations, we experience physiognomies—entire wholes: faces, trees,
houses. When exploring Merleau-Ponty’s theory of embodied intentionality later in this section,
we will see that in original perception, the world is experienced as a milieu of ‘melodic unities’
that we interact with, make use of, and only later reflect upon.
Third, Merleau-Ponty rejects the empiricist assumption that the one who perceives is merely
a passive organism that exists as an object among other objects. Empiricism assumes that the
sensible—the sensations or qualities of an object—act upon the sensing subject who receives and
represents the sensible in the intellect. John Locke’s theory of sensation represents this particular
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form of empiricism. For Locke, the subject’s perceptive organs, e.g., retina, are stimulated and,
therefore, acted upon by a perceptual object. Our ideas regarding perception are, therefore, not
innate to our consciousness, but the result of various stimuli we receive through perception. This
view assumes a clear delineation between the sensing subject and the sensible object. MerleauPonty rejects this Lockean division between subject and object as this division does not occur in
our original moment of perception:
The sensing being [le sentant] and the sensible are not opposite each other like two external
terms, and sensation does not consist of the sensible invading the sensing being. My gaze
subtends color, the movement of my hand subtends the form of the object, or rather my
gaze pairs off with the color and my hand with the hard and the soft. In this exchange
between the subject of sensation and the sensible, it cannot be said that one acts while the
other suffers the action, nor that one gives sense to the other. Without the exploration of
my gaze or my hand, and prior to my body synchronizing with it, the sensible is nothing
but a vague solicitation. 15
The sensible does not act upon the retina to unilaterally produce a representation of an object.
Rather, my eye gazes upon the object. Both sides of sensation—the sensible and the sensing
subject—are active. My eye acts upon the sensible which itself acts upon my eye. My gaze
completes the object because the object is not self-enclosed; it does not exist entirely
independent of my gaze. This critique of empiricism will become clearer later in this section
when I explore Merleau-Ponty’s theory of embodied intentionality; but, it is important to
understand at this point that my gaze of the perceptual object is active precisely because my gaze
emerges from an embodied and intentional subject. However, I do not act upon the perceptual
object in a manner that transforms the appearance of the object. Rather, I have an attitude about
the object; this attitude is active as a mode of my directedness—my intentionality—which
involves both my consciousness and my body. Thus, perception requires something of me. It
requires that I am more than a mere perceiver qua receiver. I am a perceiver who has feelings
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about the world, who inhabits the world, and whose body synchronizes with the world and the
perceptual objects therein.
Merleau-Ponty’s fourth major critique of empiricism is that it misses the importance of
the subject’s spatiality in the act of perception. The subject’s gaze has a spatio-temporal location.
It emerges from a body that is embedded in the world. By attributing all activity to the sensible,
empiricism not only neglects the activity of the subject, but it also disregards the subject almost
entirely. More precisely, empiricism cannot account for a subject’s consciousness as it operates
within and in relation to the world. In contrast, intellectualism over-corrects to the side of
consciousness. Merleau-Ponty praises intellectualism for recognizing that the subject is active in
the process of perception. However, according to Merleau-Ponty, intellectualism merely inverts
the empiricist model and restricts all activity to consciousness.
Kantian transcendental idealism is representative of the kind of philosophy MerleauPonty refers to as intellectualism. According to Kant, we do not perceive phenomena as ‘thingsin-themselves,’ but according to the categories and form of intuitions belonging to the subject. A
Kantian account of perception explains perception according to the structures of the intellect.
Consciousness perceives itself in the objects of perceptual experience: “If consciousness finds
the geometrical circle in the circular physiognomy of the plate, this is because consciousness
already put it there.”16 My perception of the circle in the plate is shaped by the structures of my
intellect; in this case, my intellect perceives the plate according to the synthetic a priori
judgements of geometry belonging to the intellect. Rather than assume that objects act upon us,
as empiricism asserts, intellectualism assumes that the subject acts upon the object of perception.
According to Merleau-Ponty, this tradition understands the intellect as replacing the object with
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its own structures of understanding. So, while empiricism argues that the sensible object
reproduced itself in the sensing subject, intellectualism does just the opposite: it argues that the
sensing subject reproduces itself in the sensible object.
For Merleau-Ponty, intellectualism may take into account the activity of the subject in the
act of perception, but similarly to empiricism, is does not delve into the ‘thickness’ of that
subject’s unique spatiality and temporality. The intellect perceives according to pure forms of
intuition of space and time, but these forms of intuition remain abstract. In this model, I do not
perceive an object according to my space and my time. That is, I do not carry with me the history
of my existence that brought me to this space and this time, such that the object before me
becomes perceptible. Merleau-Ponty explains:
when I contemplate an object with no other worry than to see it exist and to display before
me its riches, it ceases to be an allusion to a general type and I realize that each perception—
and not merely perceptions of scenes that I discover for the first time—begins anew for
itself the birth of intelligence. 17
According to Merleau-Ponty, the subject of perception, for Kant, is placed in a vacuum. Its
spatio-temporal history is not explicitly accounted for in the act of perception. For this reason,
we are left with an abstract conception of a consciousness that must re-constitute the world and
perceptual objects again and again. Kant’s attempt to account for self-identity through his
concepts of apperception and the unity of consciousness remain undeveloped in his own work,
according to Merleau-Ponty.18 However, even if we chose to develop these Kantian concepts of
self-identity, we would still be left with an abstract self-identity. This is because, according to
Merleau-Ponty, the Kantian subject, and in fact all subjects conceived of by intellectualism, fail
to consider the existential component of perception. For Kant, the transcendental synthetic unity

17

Ibid., 45-46.

18

Ibid., 63.

57

of apperception guarantees my identity over time and across different perceptual experiences.
But nothing in Kant’s theory of perceptual experience guarantees that I am invested in or care
about the world. Though Merleau-Ponty does not explicitly define self-identity, he does argue
that a sense of self is achieved through the synthesis of our past, present, and potential
investments in and care about the world. Importantly, this synthesis is never complete, which is
perhaps the reason Merleau-Ponty avoids the language of self-identity in favor of ‘unity of
experience’ and ‘sense of self.’ It is through a philosophical description of original perception, as
opposed to reflections upon our perceptions, that we discover ourselves as synthesized subjects
who are always already invested in the world.
Hence, empiricism neglects the activity of the sensing subject in perception, and
intellectualism neglects the activity of the sensible in perception. For Merleau-Ponty, perception
is not an exclusive alternative between the senses and the sensible. Rather, the act of perception
is “a communication or a communion” between the sensing subject and the sensible object;
neither the sensible nor the sensing subject are self-enclosed. The subject and the object come
together in order to co-constitute the world of perception: “the miracle of the real world is that in
it sense and existence are one, and […] we see sense take its place in existence once and for
all.”19 Sensing is not an activity of the subject, it is the very existence of the subject. In other
words, the notion of sense requires re-conceptualization, not as a concept related to experience,
but as experience itself. Sense does not stand apart from the sensible. Rather for Merleau-Ponty
the sensing subject and the sensible object are brought together in experience. In his 1988 text,
Merleau-Ponty’s Ontology, Martin C. Dillon provides a clear summary of Merleau-Ponty’s
efforts to reconceive and unite the phenomena of sense and the sensible:
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If there is a relation of reversibility between perceiver and perceived—between the body
as sensing and the body as sense, between my body and yours, between the phenomenal
body and other worldly phenomena—then the ontological wedges traditionally driven to
split these pairs and force the members of the sundered couples into mutually exclusive
domains of being must be withdrawn, and the language of subject-object disjunction
replaced with that of communion and reciprocity. The fundamental relatedness of seer and
seen must be made conceivable. 20
Sense, subject, and the phenomenal body—a concept I discuss later in this section—do not exist
independently of the sensible or the phenomenal object. As Dillon explains in the above quote,
there is no ontological wedge between the two spheres in Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology.
Merleau-Ponty rejects a subject-object dualism and instead focuses on existence, which for him
already includes the communion of sense and sensibles that constitute the world and experience.
This is precisely why Merleau-Ponty’s account of perception is an existential philosophy.
Perception always already entails our existence. The two cannot be disarticulated.
This new account of sense as existence also requires that we re-understand the subject of
existence. The subject is both consciousness and embodiment, and the two cannot be conceived
independent of one another without abstracting from real perceptual experience. MerleauPonty’s theory of embodied intentionality speaks precisely to this point. Traditional
phenomenologies of intentionality, as represented in early Husserlian phenomenology for
example, situate intentionality within conscious experience at the expense of embodiment. 21
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Drawing upon Husserl’s theories of intentionality, Merleau-Ponty develops an alternative theory
of intentionality, one that stitches together the body and consciousness to develop a theory of
meaning and signification.
Before elaborating upon Merleau-Ponty’s theory of embodied intentionality, we must define
his two key terms related to the body: body image and body schema. The subject’s body is
importantly not simply an object among other objects for Merleau-Ponty. The subject has an
awareness of their body that is distinct from the awareness a subject has of other bodies or other
objects. Body image characterizes the experience a subject has with their own body. Specifically,
body image refers to the position and perspective from which the subject necessarily experiences
and perceives the world. The subject cannot step back from their body to gain other viewpoints
of it as one could view, for example, a mug. Merleau-Ponty writes: “I observe external objects
with my body, I handle them, inspect them, and walk around them. But when it comes to my
body, I never observe it itself.” 22 I can manipulate objects in the world in order to acquire
different perspectival positions. In contrast, my body is the source of my gaze. I cannot perceive
my body in its entirety because my body is itself the possibility for my perspective. Not even a
mirror can resolve this issue. Merleau-Ponty explains that the mirror’s image “refers me back to
an original of the body that is not out there among things, but on my side, prior to every act of
seeing.”23 My body is my own; it is not for me an object out in space among other objects. My
body is always perceived by me from ‘my side.’ That is, the gaze made possible by my body is
restricted to viewing my body from the position of my gaze.
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While my body image concerns my own perception of my body—my ability to reflect upon
my body—my body schema concerns how my body can potentially move. Specifically, my body
schema concerns my motor and perceptual capacities. What is within my reach, what I can grasp,
what I can move over or move around is all conditioned by my body schema. Referring to the
differences between normal and pathological cases of body schemas, Merleau-Ponty defines his
concept of body schema accordingly: “the normal subject has his body not only as a system of
current positions, but also, and consequently, as an open system of an infinity of equivalent
positions in different orientations. What we call the ‘body schema’ is precisely this system of
equivalences, this immediately given invariant by which different motor tasks are instantly
transposable.”24 Here we see that the body schema entails not just where the body is located in
space, but how the body potentially moves through space. My immediate understanding of how
my body can move, and my proprioceptive awareness of my body as it moves through space, is
my body schema. The body’s spatiality is what Merleau-Ponty refers to as a ‘situational
spatiality.’25 When I move one part of my body, I am aware of the other parts that trail behind in
my movement.
If I stand in front of my desk and lean on it with both hands, only my hands are accentuated
and my whole body trails behind them like a comet’s tail. I am not unaware of the location
of my shoulders or my waist; rather, this awareness is enveloped in my awareness of my
hands and my entire stance is read, so to speak, in how my hands lean upon the desk. 26
The body schema is my proprioceptive awareness of how my body moves as a whole without
direct attention paid to each part of my body in the movement. Because of this proprioception, I
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need not calculate the movement of my shoulders or waist if I want to move my hands. At least,
this is true of the so-called ‘normal subject.’ This is because my body is not simply a place in
space; my body entails a unique spatiality. According to Merleau-Ponty, “the body’s parts relate
to each other in a peculiar way: they are not laid out side by side, but rather envelop each
other.”27 Unlike objects that exist in space, I experience the spatiality of my body as a whole. My
arm is not next to my torso in the way that my arm is next to my computer. My arm is an
extension of my entire body; it is a part of a whole that is irreducible to individual coordinates of
each limb. Merleau-Ponty’s account of body schema lays the foundation for his theory of
embodied intentionality.
Merleau-Ponty’s theory of intentionality draws upon previous phenomenologies, most
explicit in his references to Husserl, though he makes two new and important distinctions: 1)
intentionality is necessarily embodied and therefore situated in space and time, and 2)
intentionality that can involve a directedness that does not necessarily include aboutness. I
address these one by one. With respect to the first distinction, in the Preface to Phenomenology
of Perception, Merleau-Ponty adopts and alters Husserl’s ‘operative intentionality,’ which
Merleau-Ponty defines as “the intentionality that establishes the natural and pre-predicative unity
of the world and our life, the intentionality that appears in our desires, our evaluations, and our
landscape more clearly than it does in objective knowledge.” 28 Intentionality here describes our
encounter with the world as it is given to us in perception. It concerns meaning as it is produced
in the embodied subject’s experience of the world within which it is already situated. It concerns
how the world appears to us through perception and motor engagement. Merleau-Ponty’s

27

Ibid., 100.

28

Ibid., lxxxii.

62

concept of ‘embodied intentionality’ is an extension of Husserl’s operative intentionality. For
Merleau-Ponty, embodied intentionality concerns the embodied subject as she is perceptually
and motorically directed toward the world in experience. In her 1999 article, “Merleau-Ponty’s
Notion of Pre-Reflective Intentionality,” Martina Reuter explains that the body is the “agent” of
intentionality: “this intentionality is essentially intentionality of the body-subject. […]
intentionality is the body-subject’s concrete, spatial and pre-reflective directedness towards the
lived world.”29 Merleau-Ponty’s embodied intentionality is, therefore, distinct from early
Husserl’s operative intentionality because he includes the body in his definition of intentionality.
Recall that the second major distinction between Merleau-Ponty’s theory of intentionality
and Husserl’s operative intentionality is his emphasis on the directedness of intentionality
without regard to the aboutness of intentional content. Merleau-Ponty’s embodied intentionality
is one of directedness that is not restricted by the aboutness of phenomena. 30 What do we mean
by this emphasis on the directedness of embodied intentionality instead of on its aboutness? And
what is aboutness? It is the idea of the content of consciousness that raises the issue of the
aboutness of a consciousness. For example, if one stressed the aboutness of a consciousness, one
could focus on the reference a consciousness makes to a practical object as a positing of that
object. But Merleau-Ponty prefers to stress the directness of such a consciousness, and in fact to
draw our attention to the directedness of originary perception, with its pre-reflective status. In
this case, his concern is with a directedness of being-in-the-world that may not even have an
intentional content that is posited. That is, consciousness’s being directed is a prerequisite for an
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intentional act with content, but that directedness itself is not an aboutness such as would be
found in a positing of an object.
Reuter explains that, according to Merleau-Ponty, “consciousness should not be
understood as explicit positing of its objects, but as a more ambiguous reference to a practical
object; as being-in-the-world. […] Being directed is a necessary condition for an intentional act,
while this act may or may not have a distinguishable intentional content.” 31 In our earlier
discussion of Merleau-Ponty’s reconceptualization of sensation, we saw that he rejected
empiricism and intellectualism for, among other reasons, their assumption of an objective world
and their respective neglect of original perception. Reuter describes this directed intentionality as
“a pre-reflective intentional act in the sense that it is directed without allowing for a reflective
understanding of either the manner in which it is directed or the objects towards which the
unspecific awareness is directed.”32 The object of consciousness need not be considered, for
Merleau-Ponty, in order to attend to the directedness of intentionality. This is not to suggest that
Merleau-Ponty’s theory of embodied intentionality cannot allow for the structure of aboutness—
Husserl’s noesis-noema structure. I understand Merleau-Ponty as allowing for a distinction
between intentionality as directedness and intentionality as aboutness in order to investigate
directedness, not to dismiss or reject aboutness. This allows Merleau-Ponty to understand how
embodied intentionality is pre-reflectively directed toward the world.
Merleau-Ponty’s re-conceptualization of intentionality as embodied intentionality
ultimately allows him to argue that bodily gestures can be both immanently meaningful and prereflective, as I will discuss in chapter IV of this dissertation. Because the body is the site of
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intentionality, it is also, at least in part, the source of meaning. Reuter explains that “meaning is
produced in the encounter between the subject and the already given world.” 33 Merleau-Ponty’s
subject is embodied and it encounters the perceptual world as one that it already inhabits and as
one that is already given. Because the body is our “anchorage in the world,” it is the position
from which signification and meaning emerge for me.34 The body is not, by itself, the source of
meaning. It is not like a transcendental ego that bestows meaning onto an objective world. 35
Rather, in the body-subject’s communion with the world, meaning springs forth. Meaning is born
in the relation between the embodied subject and the world. We do not discover meaning within
or bestow meaning onto a world that exists independently of us. Our embodiment—our physical
comportment—is a site of signification as meaning; we perceive things in the world as
meaningful according to the signification things have for us.
For Merleau-Ponty, meaning is not an abstract concept, but a mode of expressiveness and
signification that occurs in and through my embodied perceptual encounters with the world.
Examining the case of Schneider, a patient with a cerebellar injury, Merleau-Ponty develops a
distinction between abstract and concrete movements of the body, in order to demonstrate 1) that
the body is a source of significant expression, and 2) how the body is significantly expressive.
According to Dillon, Merleau-Ponty’s account of embodied intentionality is built upon abstract,
as opposed to merely concrete, movements of the body. Abstract movements are defined by
Merleau-Ponty as “movements that are not directed at any actual situation.” 36 Considering the
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case of Schneider, Merleau-Ponty lists “moving his arms and legs upon command, or extending
and flexing a finger” as examples of abstract movement.37 These movements are contrasted with
concrete movements, which Merleau-Ponty describes as habitual movements. 38 Movements such
as blowing one’s nose or lighting a match are considered concrete movements, according to
Merleau-Ponty. Dillon explains that the significance of a movement for Merleau-Ponty is not
determined according to whether it is abstract or concrete, but according to whether the
movement is practical as opposed to merely concrete. A practical movement, as I will
demonstrate shortly, is characterized by the subject’s purposive engagement with the world in
their bodily movement. For Merleau-Ponty, only abstract movements entail the purposiveness of
practical movements, which is why they are significant expressions of an embodied
intentionality that is itself the source of and the means by which signification is expressed. By
first examining why empiricism and intellectualism both fail to adequately account for the
differences between abstract and concrete movements, we shall see how Merleau-Ponty
understands bodily movements as significant.
According to Merleau-Ponty, empiricism lacks the necessary tools to accurately identify
meaning and meaning-production because they regard concrete, as opposed to abstract,
movements as meaningful. How the subject walks, grabs an object, turns their head, etc. are
strictly concrete actions for empiricism. The meaning of a concrete movement is physiologically
and/or causally determined. I walked from my living room to my kitchen because I desired a
glass of water. There is a direct correlation between cause, my desire for water, and effect, my
walking across the room. The meaning of my action is simply the fulfillment of my desire. This
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means for empiricism meaning and causes are functionally equivalent. However, Merleau-Ponty
argues, empiricism’s causal and physiological explanations of movement miss the significance in
the movements of subjects, like Schneider, who suffer from a cerebellar injury.
Merleau-Ponty discusses an experiment performed by gestalt psychologist Adhémar Gelb
and neuroscientist and psychiatrist Kurt Goldstein, which includes an unnamed subject who, like
Schneider, suffers from ‘psychic blindness’ resulting from a cerebellar injury. When asked to
touch his nose, the subject is only able to do so by grabbing his nose. This is an example of a
concrete movement, according to Merleau-Ponty, because the subject achieves his goal. The
subject acts with a purpose: he is instructed to touch his nose. However, because the subject
grabs, rather than lightly touches his nose, he demonstrates a lack of full control over his motor
skills, which makes his action an abstract movement. Merleau-Ponty’s distinction between
abstract and concrete movements rests on his critique of empiricist and intellectualist analysis of
these movements. An empiricist analysis, according to Merleau-Ponty, would explain the
subject’s action—grabbing rather than touching or pointing—as a breakdown in his
physiological structures. On this view, the movement is significant only insofar as it
demonstrates an abnormal physiology. For empiricism, then, the concrete movement of the
abnormal subject lacks meaning. However, because this analysis is limited to the subject’s
concrete movements, without consideration of his failure to perform an abstract movement, it
overlooks the significance of the movement. By contrast, Merleau-Ponty describes this patient as
having performed a concrete movement—grasping—rather than an abstract movement—
pointing. It is not simply that the patient failed to point rather than grab, but that his inability to
point is indicative of his specific being-in-the-world. In other words, the patient’s movements are
analyzed by empiricism in strictly concrete terms, neglecting the purposiveness of his action in
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relation to the world, which would be revealed if his practical movements were considered. His
actions are performed with a purpose, though they are not purposeful in a manner that is
intentional in the phenomenological sense. The purposefulness of practical movement is the
subjects’ “I can,” of Merleau-Ponty’s embodied intentionality. When the subject grabs rather
than points to his nose, he is implicitly demonstrating the “I cannot” of his intentionality. His
body schema has been impaired, which affects his field of possible actions, his “I cans.” What
empiricism misses, according to Merleau-Ponty, is the significance expressed in the subject’s
inability to perform a purposive movement as an expression of his embodied intentionality. The
“I cannot” of the subject itself is significant—it is an immanent expression of the subject’s
being-in-the-world, which I later consider in my discussion of Merleau-Ponty’s concepts
‘habituation’ and ‘habit body.’
In contrast to an empiricist analysis of the psychically blind subject, intellectualism
provides an inadequate account of a subject’s actions because it regards only abstract, as opposed
to concrete, movements as significant. Evaluating the subject’s movements, an intellectualist
would conclude that the subject lacks an intentional structure. Intentionality, in this context, is
understood as a meaning-bestowing act of consciousness. Dillon provides the intellectualist
analysis of the abnormal subject: “lacking the necessary condition, the intentional sense-giving
presupposed by abstract movement, the patient can only respond to stimuli insofar as they trigger
conditioned reflexes in a practical and concrete domain.” 39 In intellectualism, only abstract
movements are significant because only these movements, in contrast to concrete movements,
involve intentionality. The subject lacks the ability to project meaning into the context of his
movement, which means he lacks intentionality.
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After identifying what is missed in an empiricist and intellectualist assessment of the
abnormal subject’s movements, Merleau-Ponty formulates an alternative account of significant
movements drawing on his own notion of embodied intentionality. The abnormal subject has an
intentionality, according to Merleau-Ponty, precisely because the subject has a practical as
opposed to merely concrete engagement with the world. Dillon explains:
In performing his concrete movements, the diseased subject displays a purposiveness in
the rhythm, coordination, and flow of the various actions constituting the whole gesture
[i.e., touching his nose]. He is, indeed, limited to the concrete and practical, but the practical
is practical only by virtue of its teleological structure or purposiveness, and purposiveness
is incompatible with the absence of intentionality. 40
Concretely, the subject fails to fulfill the aim of their action since that subject grabs instead of
touches their nose. Practically, however, the subject acts with purpose. Here purpose is not a
goal, but an engagement with the world, which constitutes the origin of meaning for MerleauPonty. Any act the subject performed in response to the request to touch his nose is
demonstrative of his purpose since it reveals his particular being-in-the-world. The abnormal
subject’s purposiveness is expressed as an “I cannot” in his efforts to perform a practical action.
Thus, the subject has intentionality, but this intentionality is different in degree from ‘normal’
subjects. That is, subjects have differing intentional structures, which differ depending upon their
body schema. We can understand how the differences in degree of embodied intentionality occur
through an analysis of Merleau-Ponty’s theory of habit and habituation.
Returning to Merleau-Ponty’s theory of body schema, we see that habituation involves
the sedimentation of the subject’s acquired habits. Dillon defines the process of sedimentation as
follows:
“movements which are initially deliberate choices of thematized possibilities may
subsequently become automatic. The gesture, for example, of lifting an eyebrow, originally
40
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a difficult, forced, and artificial affection, may become sedimented in one’s repertoire of
expressions; it is then performed easily and automatically thereby taking on the natural
grace of familiar acquisition.” 41
Merleau-Ponty refers to the process by which our perceptual and motor habits become ingrained
in our body schema, such that they may be automatically called upon as ‘sedimentation.’
However, my past perceptions are not set in stone. Sedimentation of perception is not, for
Merleau-Ponty, “an inert mass at the foundation of our consciousness.” 42 As I will further
explain in the context of Merleau-Ponty’s theory of habituation, sedimentation is the retention
and synthesis of our perceptual and motor engagements with the world. Eric Matthews explains
sedimentation in his 2002 text, The Philosophy of Merleau-Ponty, as follows: “Our past is not
something that we merely contemplate as a spectacle, but something that is ‘sedimented,’
through our bodies, in the background to the selves that we are now. The longer established a
behaviour or response is, the more it gains a kind of ‘favoured status’ in our sense of ourselves,
and the harder therefore it is to change.” 43 Sedimentation is the synthesis of past motor and
perceptual experiences that have become ingrained in our body schema, and which can be called
upon depending on the level to which the experience has been ingrained. The expression “it’s
like riding a bike” speaks to this point. The more frequently I engage in an activity, for example
riding a bike, the more sedimented that experience becomes. The experience of riding a bike is
so deeply ingrained in my body schema that I can call upon it with ease even when I have not
actually ridden a bike in years. In contrast, if I have only gone skiing once when I was child, that
experience remains within my body schema—it is part of my perceptual and motor history—but
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it cannot be called upon without great effort. Essentially, sedimentation entails the accumulation
of our perceptual and motor experiences, though it allows for varying levels of familiarity. Some
experiences are more sedimented in our body schemas than others.
Merleau-Ponty’s concept of ‘body schema’ includes more than the reservoir or medium
through which perceptual and motor experiences becomes synthesized. In addition to this,
Matthews explains that ‘body schema’ is “not merely an experience of my body, but rather an
experience of my body in the world.”44 Importantly, I experience my body in the world as
temporally continuous. I carry my past perceptual and motor experiences with me into my
present, though some of these past experiences become less sedimented within my body schema,
which is to say, some past experiences are lost to me at present. My past experiences are
sedimented within my body schema, which influences both my future possible movements as
well as what may appear to me at present as significant. For example, I have never been
especially interested in cars. As a result, I could not say the make or model of cars that I had
never personally owned, which have been only a few. A few years ago, however, I began to
notice tan Toyota Camrys even though I have never owned one. This was the result of a shift in
my field of perception that occurred after a friend passed away; my friend owned an old, tan
Toyota Camry. It was not until after he died that I unconsciously found myself noticing the make
and model of his car. Tan Toyota Camrys became significant to me because they reminded me of
my friend. The experience of his loss has been sedimented into my body schema, which means
that I literally see the world differently. I now notice things that, before his passing, would have
otherwise gone unnoticed by me. The body schema is “that fundamental function that
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simultaneously delimits [my] field of vision and [my] field of action.” 45 My body schema
conditions, with great flexibility, my potential movements and my field of signification. My
perception of the world is structured by the perception of my field of significations. My field of
signification is conditioned by my body schema, which is shaped in and through habituation.
Exploring the nature of perception, according to Merleau-Ponty will make clear how habit,
habituation, and signification are related since perception is altered in habit and habit acquisition
leading to the expansion of one’s field of signification.
Perception is an active process, one that involves my body’s motor capacities and my
perceptual perspective. My perception of blue, for example, involves the stimulation of my
retina; this stimulation is an example of what Merleau-Ponty refers to as ‘motor capacities’
because it is a function of the body. And I neither perceive blue as a self-enclosed object, nor as
an abstracted bit of sensuous data. Recall that the sense and the sensible coincide in perception,
blue is paradoxically present before the subject and yet incomplete without the subject’s gaze:
“Blue is what solicits a certain way of looking from me.” 46 Merleau-Ponty explains:
[A] sensible that is about to be sensed poses to my body a sort of confused problem. I must
find the attitude that will provide it with the means to become determinate and to become
blue; I must find the response to a poorly formulated question. And yet, I only do this in
response to its solicitation. My attitude is never sufficient to make me truly see blue or truly
touch a hard surface. The sensible gives back to me what I had lent to it, but I received it
from the sensible in the first place. 47
The difficulty of Merleau-Ponty’s theory of perception is that it requires us to think beyond
traditional ontological and linguistic structures. Because he rejects the subject-object dualism, we
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have to conceive of perception anew. Blue solicits my gaze, but it does not fully exist
independent of my gaze. I am aware of blue’s partial existence at the edges of my perception
before I direct my gaze at it. The original moment of perception occurs as ‘a poorly formulated
question’ because the object of the question and the one who asks the question coincide.
Merleau-Ponty often invokes the language of ‘haunting’ when describing this original perceptual
experience: “They [perceptual objects] are not presented directly to perception, they circumvent
it and haunt it through a preconscious operation whose results appear to us as ready-made.”48
Perceptual objects are available to the perceptual subject, though neither the object nor subject is
self-enclosed. The perceptual objects haunt us as poorly formulated questions because they
surround us, though we are not fully aware of them until the act of perception. In the process of
sedimentation, the poorly formulated question of original perception becomes increasingly clear.
For instance, the first time I came across a poppy plant, it appeared to me simply as a weed. The
poppy plant was visible to me, but its significance was as a weed rather than a flower. Recently,
a friend filled her front yard with various seeds of wild plants, including poppy seeds. As I
watched her yard grow into a meadow over the span of a few weeks, my field of signification
expanded: I no longer saw the poppy plant as a weed, but a flower that blossoms into a brilliant
orange. My attitude toward the plant had altered along with my field of signification. Not only
could I recognize a poppy flower, but the plant itself no longer retained the significance as weed.
The shift in my attitude is, for Merleau-Ponty, an alteration or a ‘dilation of my being-in-theworld.’49 At times, Merleau-Ponty uses the notion of ‘attunement’ to express his use of ‘attitude’:
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“A stimulation is not perceived when it reaches a sensory organ that is not ‘attuned’ to it”50 I
cannot hear sounds that my ears are not attuned to, just as I saw the poppy plant as a weed before
becoming attuned to its significance as a flower. This process of ‘attunement,’ of adopting the
attitude necessary for new significance to emerge within my perceptual experience, is precisely
what is meant by Merleau-Ponty’s concept of ‘habituation.’
Because my perceptual experiences are, at the same time, motor experiences, we must
add to the above example concerning the poppy plant, the manner in which my body is altered
through habituation. In other words, habituation is not simply a matter of learning to look at
something with a different perspective. It is also a matter of learning to move in new and
different manners. Thus, we must consider how the historical sedimentation that accrues in habit
affects the phenomenal body. The process of learning to move differently entails the cultivation
of what Merleau-Ponty calls ‘habit body.’ And, as I will discuss further, the degree to which
motor experiences become sedimented into our body schema determines whether we cultivate
what I refer to as a ‘routinized habit body’ or a ‘robust habit body.’ To understand the difference
between these two types of habit body, it will help to consider the following two examples.
Identifying how my habit body is expressed through routinized movements in contrast to my
habit body as expressed through more robust movements, will then allow us a concrete point of
entry into Merleau-Ponty’s more theoretically dense work related to habit, habitual acts, and
habituation.
The habit body is expressed in one’s every day, routinized movements, which one often
performs pre-cognitively. For instance, I know that I cannot reach the back of the cupboard
without having something to stand on. I know this because I have tried and failed to reach back
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there. I do not have to try and fail to reach every time I approach the cupboard. I am guided by
my previous efforts because the experiences have sedimented within my body schema. This
retention of past perceptual and motor experiences is the process of acquiring routinized habits.
My body schema is altered in this process because I retain what Merleau-Ponty refers to as the
‘habit memory’ of my previous efforts. I will discuss the concept of ‘habit memory’ shortly, but
first, I continue this example in order to provide a concrete distinction between habitual acts and
habituation. Habitual acts involve a mere repetition of previous experiences or actions. They are
neither creative nor are they spontaneous. As I will explain, habitual acts are essentially passive
movements of the body. They are passive because I can perform them without much, if any, real
cognitive work. This process of habitual action is made possible through the cultivation of what I
call the ‘routinized habit body.’
In contrast to this more passive mode of habit acquisition, Merleau-Ponty develops the
notion of habituation, which is active because it requires a that a subject remain open to its own
creative and spontaneous actions. Before learning the martial art Muay Thai, for example, I
would not have noticed things that now appear to me as significant or available for certain styles
of movement. Now, however, when I walk past a tree, my mind is drawn toward thoughts of
where a low kick would fall on the tree in contrast to a teep, a defensive kick. My body schema
has been altered after having practiced Muay Thai for years. This is the process of habituation,
which is performed by what I refer to as the ‘robust habit body.’ There is nothing routine in my
performance of Muay Thai. I can choose to perform the same series of jabs and, thus, depend
upon the ‘routinized habit body’ cultivated in the process of learning the martial art. However, I
can also choose to try out new routines and new movements; I have become open to creative and
spontaneous movements related to Muay Thai because the habits related to this performance are
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deeply ingrained within my body schema. Thus, the difference I draw our attention to here is
between habitual acts performed by the ‘routinized habit body’ and habituated acts performed by
the ‘robust habit body.’ Merleau-Ponty refers to both routinized and robust habit bodies as
habituated. However, given the distinction he makes between routinized habits as compared to
creative and spontaneous habits, I provide the distinction between the two habit bodies required
for each movement. This will be especially important for the second section of this chapter,
which concerns the processes of habituation available for the Black subject under white
supremacy.
Keeping in mind the above distinction between habitual and habituated actions, we can
now examine how sedimentation conditions what Merleau-Ponty calls ‘habit memory.’ The
process of sedimentation, which establishes our familiarity with the world, is ongoing. Whenever
we perceive or move in the world, we add to or detract from our sedimented history of
experiences. We are never entirely closed off from perceptual or motor experiences accruing
within our body schema; this is true, at least, so long as we are alive and have an intact body
schema. Habit acquisition is more or less robust depending upon how fixed, how sedimented,
certain experiences are within our body schemas. Furthermore, just as habits can become ‘fixed’
in our body schema, so too can they be lost or forgotten. The ability to fix or lose habits is, as
Edward S. Casey explains in his 1985 essay, “Habitual Body and Memory in Merleau-Ponty,”
the paradox of habituation as both active and passive:
[I]f habit memory is a main means of effecting sedimentation, and thus of giving a depth
that is not objectively determinable, it cannot be through the working of the strictly habitual
in the sense of the routinized: a routine is nothing but an inert pattern of behavior. The
working of such memory must be accomplished by an active habituating. And this is
precisely what the body effects, thanks to its sedimentary powers. […] the habituation
which such inhabitation accomplishes involves a delicate dialectic between the implied
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passivity of enclosure (for space and time undeniably act to contain us) and the activity of
getting to know our way around in a given circumstance. 51
According to Casey, Merleau-Ponty’s theory of habituation implies a distinction between bodily
passivity and bodily activity. For Merleau-Ponty, space and time produce a bodily passivity and,
in contrast, navigating a circumstance implies bodily activity. In the above quote, Casey draws
upon Bergson’s concept of ‘habit memory’ in order to flesh out a distinction between Bergson’s
concepts of habit memory and image memory and Merleau-Ponty’s theory of habit. Casey
describes Bergson’s habit memory as a prelude to Merleau-Ponty’s theory of the habitual body.
While Bergson indicated that habit is situated in the body, he does not explain just how habit and
the body are related. Merleau-Ponty fulfills this claim, according to Casey, by expressing the
temporal and spatial transformations the body schema undergoes in the process of habituation.
To begin to understand these transformations, recall that Merleau-Ponty’s theory of
embodied intentionality rejects the subject-object dualism of empiricism and intellectualism. The
body is not an object in the world, but a thing that inhabits the world; “we must not say that our
body is in space, nor for that matter in time. It inhabits space and time.”52 To conceive of the
embodied subject as in space or in time would presuppose a division between subject and world,
sense and sensible. As we have already demonstrated above, Merleau-Ponty rejects such a
division in his conception of original perception. Again, we find ourselves at the limit of
traditional ontological and linguistic concepts. Saying that the subject inhabits space and time is,
in my view, a reiteration of the previously established point regarding the communion of subject
and world. Space and time are completed by the subject who is also completed by space and
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time, just as blue was completed by the gaze of the subject who was herself completed by the act
of gazing. The key point is that the temporality of the body is not contained in the body, nor does
the body simply exist in time.
When Merleau-Ponty says that perceptual and motor experiences are sedimented in the
body over time, I do not take him to mean that the temporal history of these experiences are
contained within the body as a kind of body memory. To put it simply, sedimentation is not a
matter of body memory. To suppose that it is, would be to conceive of memory, Casey suggests,
in terms of “the brain as a storage place for engrammatic traces; or muscle as a concourse of
repeated patterns.”53 Nor does the subject intellectually remember past experiences, if by that we
mean cognitively recalling some past experiences. Rather, a subject’s body schema is altered in
sedimentation. This alteration of the body schema in sedimentation characterizes MerleauPonty’s unique notion of ‘habit memory,’ also referred to as the ‘habit body.’ Habit memory, like
perception, is an activity. Merleau-Ponty writes: “To remember is not to bring back before the
gaze of consciousness a self-subsistent picture of the past, it is to plunge into the horizon of the
past and gradually to unfold tightly packed perspectives until the experiences that it [the horizon]
summarizes are as if lived anew in their own temporal place.”54 Memory involves living
previous perceptions within the present.55 I can ride a bike with ease, not because I recollect in
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an ideal manner previous experiences of bike riding. Nor is my ability to ride a bike somehow
built into my body, functioning as a kind of reflex. I ride can ride a bike because I have become
habituated to the experience; I am at home with the structure of the experience. Habituation
operates as a unique kind of memory for Merleau-Ponty, though, as Casey described in the quote
above, it is memory that operates according to a dialectic of active-passivity.
Habituation alters our existence in the world because the acquisition of habits affects the
very spatiality of my body. My familiarity with an instrument, for example, entails a habituated
coordination with the world. Merleau-Ponty describes a woman walking through a door mindful
of the need to bend slightly to avoid catching the feather in her hat.56 Perhaps when she first
wore the hat, she had to consciously think about adjusting her movements. She had to think
about how the space she inhabited was altered. However, after becoming habituated to wearing
the feathered hat, the woman’s body schema expanded to anticipate these adjustments without
having to stop and think before entering every door. In his 2017 article, “Process, habit, and
flow: a phenomenological approach to material agency,” Tailer Ransom describes this process of
habituation as “an embodied pattern that is both part of the way that the motoricity [sic] of the
body […] becomes coordinated with and responsive to an ecological situation. A habit is the
ability to take up residence in the world, as well as envelop things into the voluminosity of the
body.”57 The more habituated one becomes to an act over time, the more at ease one becomes in
the execution of that act. In the case of the woman who wears a feathered hat, we should say that
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the feather becomes an appendage of her body and requires no greater consideration than, for
example, having to account for her shoulder-width when entering a door. The feather is
‘enveloped’ in the body schema, as Ransom describes, such that it is already accounted for in her
movements. This explains why Merleau-Ponty describes habit as “dilating our being in the
world, or of altering our existence through incorporating new instruments.” 58 Our body schema
expands and alters according to the instruments, tools, places, etc. to which we have become
habituated.
Returning to the larger context in which this dissertation is situated, namely white
supremacy and racialized embodiment, I will extend Merleau-Ponty’s analysis to consider how
the racializing gaze effects the Black subject’s lived experience under white supremacy. In so
doing, I described how, under white supremacy, the Black subject experiences her body image as
distorted, her body schema as fragmented, and her ability to cultivate a habit body as restricted to
the routinized habit body. As a result, I will argue, the Black subject is not only closed off from
the creative and spontaneous movements available to a subject who has acquired a robust habit
body, but she is also unable express meaning freely because her embodied intentionality is
inhibited under white supremacy. The flight into fugitivity is, therefore, a flight toward the
uninhibited Black phenomenal body capable of creative, spontaneous, and free expressions of
meaning.
The Racializing Gaze and the Phenomenal Black Body
The section begins with an outline of Linda Martín Alcoff’s account concerning race as selfevidently visible developed in her Visible Identities. Here, Alcoff argues that in the
contemporary US, we have a naturalized assumption that race is identifiable primarily through
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visible features of one’s body. The notion that races are self-evidently manifest through visible
markers of the body is important for understanding why, as I will argue, the racializing gaze
constitutes a fundamental phenomenological structure of white supremacy. This is based, in part,
on Alcoff’s claim that the dominant racial ideology of the contemporary US is conditioned by
what she refers to as an ‘uninterrogated white common sense.’ Combining this account of racial
ideology with a Merleau-Pontian phenomenology, Alcoff argues that ideology is not simply
imposed upon subjects but learned through habituated practices of perceiving race. Alcoff
develops a preliminary account of the racializing gaze as a habituated practice of perceiving race
from the perspective of dominant racial ideology. In order to expand Alcoff’s preliminary
phenomenology of the racializing gaze, I next turn to Helen Ngo’s phenomenological analysis of
the racializing gaze and its effects on the non-white phenomenal body as developed in her text,
The Habits of Racism. Ngo reads Fanon’s account of the Black lived experience through a
Merleau-Pontian phenomenological framework to identify the multiple ways in which the Black
phenomenal body is inhibited. Because, as Merleau-Ponty argues, meaning is inherently
expressive of embodied intentionality, I argue that Black subjects are prevented from cultivating
creative and spontaneous meaning insofar as their phenomenal bodies are inhibited under white
supremacy. In order to advance this claim, I distinguish between a ‘routinized habit body’ and a
‘robust habit body.’ Such a distinction is necessary in order to track the changes in the
phenomenal body that coincide with the changes between Merleau-Ponty’s notions ‘routinized
habituation’ and ‘creative and spontaneous habituation’. Routinized habituation, such as driving
a car, does not entail sophisticated movements of a habit body. After much practice, one
becomes habituated to driving such that driving requires little to no conscious thought. In
contrast, what I refer to as ‘robust habituation’, such as playing an instrument, may include such
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things as riffing, which does entail sophisticated movements of a habit body. In the remaining
chapters of this dissertation, I argue that Black subjects flee into the space of fugitivity in order
to cultivate a robust habit body, which allows them to produce creative and spontaneous
meanings.
In Visible Identities, Alcoff describes vision as the primary sense through which
contemporary racial and gender identification are constituted and verified in the US. Adopting
what she refers to as a ‘contextualist approach’ to race, Alcoff defines race accordingly:
Race is socially constructed, historically malleable, culturally contextual, and reproduced
through learned perceptual practices. Whether or not it is valid to use racial concepts and
whether or not their use will have positive or negative political effects depends on the
context.59
Thus, according to Alcoff, race is socially constructed and differently understood according to
one’s historical and cultural context. Because of this, our racial concepts—our means of
understanding and verifying racial identification—also differ according to our historical and
cultural context. For example, I would not identify as a ‘negro’ in 2021, though this would have
been a socially and culturally acceptable term of racial identification before and during Jim
Crow. Instead, I identify as ‘Black,’ and am often identified by others as either ‘Black’ or
‘African American.’ The terms we use in racial identification are not constant; as I will discuss,
they are conditioned by further background assumptions and ideologies within our respective
historical and cultural context. The historical malleability of the contextualist definition of race is
important, for Alcoff’s purposes, because it does not treat race as a metaphysically substantive
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identity.60 That is, racial identity is not a Kantian ‘thing-in-itself’; rather, it is a social identity
that is interpreted according to one’s historical, cultural, and, in turn, socio-political context.
In her analysis of the socio-political structures of the contemporary US, Alcoff considers
the dominant racial ideology and naturalized common sense particular to our historical and
cultural context. Alcoff draws on Gramsci’s concept of ‘common sense’ which, as she explains
“is made up of that which seems obviously true and enjoys consensus or near consensus
[although it] is ‘culturally constituted’.”61 Common sense is thus a form of naturalized cultural
knowing wherein certain things appear self-evident according to our cultural context. Alcoff
describes our common sense as including our “tacit knowledge about racial identity,” which we
un-reflectively draw upon in our everyday experiences because it “seems obviously true and
enjoys consensus or near consensus.”62 In the contemporary US, we simply see race; we do not
have to reflect upon the associations we make between racial identities and the perceived visible
bodily features. We simply see race, according to Alcoff, because the visibility of racial social
identities is part of our ‘common sense.’ Thus, in our naturalized ways of seeing race, what
Husserl would call our ‘natural attitude,’ we simply regard racial identification as self-evidently
visible, or visibly verifiable. However, because race is not a metaphysical substance that remains
constant and unchanging, then our racial common sense cannot be formed through a process of
pure perception. That is, racial identity does not itself require that we perceive it as visibly self-
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evident; therefore, the apparent truth of race must come from elsewhere. Alcoff identifies this
‘elsewhere’—the source of our common sense—as grounded in the dominant ideology
governing the contemporary socio-political and cultural contexts in the US.
Alcoff draws from Stuart Hall, among others, to characterize our contemporary racial
ideology. In his 1985 article, “Signification, representation, ideology: Althusser and the poststructuralist debates,” Stuart Hall extends an Althusserian analysis of interpellation and ideology
to the context of race in the UK.63 Althusser uses the concept ‘ideology’ to refer to the interests
of dominant society that come to structure society as a whole. Following, Althusser, Hall defines
ideology as the “work of fixing meaning through establishing, by selection and combination, a
chain of equivalence.”64 Hall explains that meaning is ‘fixed’ by the state according to political
discourses and social practices of our society. Fixing meaning, in this context, is the reification
of meaning such that we experience our social and political practices as natural, rather than
historically and culturally constituted. As a result, Hall explains, we “experience ideology as it
emanates freely and spontaneously from within us, as if we were its free subjects, ‘working by
ourselves.’ Actually, we are spoken by and spoken for in ideological discourses which await us
even at our birth, into which we are born and find our place.” 65 We are born into a culture/society
with structures of power relations and socio-political discourses that precede our arrival.
Through interpellation, we are “summoned” to our “place” within these networks. 66 For
example, I was born into my nuclear biological family wherein I occupy the position of daughter
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and sister; but I was also born into a gendered, racialized, and class position according to my
historical, cultural, and socio-political context. The positions precede my birth and are fixed for
me upon my birth. However, Hall does not go so far as to claim that my position within these
networks of power is reified such that I cannot alter my position. It is possible, to varying
degrees, for me to change my socio-political and/or cultural position through either resistance or
adherence to the socio-political practices and networks of power, which assigned me my position
at birth.67 There are important nuances to be made within an Althusserian theory of ideology as
related to race, work that Alcoff pursues in Visible Identities. However, for our purposes, we
need not fully replicate either Alcoff’s or Stuart Hall’s account of racial ideology in its entirety.
The important point is that we do not determine our own socio-political, historical, or cultural
position. We find ourselves already embedded within the socio-political world, just, in MerleauPonty’s phenomenology, we found ourselves already embedded within the world of perception.
The point for our present purposes is that our commonsense beliefs regarding race are
ideologically constituted by dominant interests of what Alcoff calls “an uninterrogated white
common sense.”68 We are not bound by this uninterrogated common sense, but, as the dominant
ideology of our culture, we are born into it. In the US, we are simply assigned the belief that race
is self-evidently visible just as we are assigned our various socio-political positions. Alcoff
writes: “The realm of the visible, or what is taken as self-evidently visible […] is how the
ideology of social identities naturalized their [i.e., social identities’] specific designation.” 69 Our
perception of race is naturalized in the sense that we automatically see race when we see the
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body. Our automatic recognition of race is not merely an identification of a difference in skin
tones, but also a range of beliefs and opinions about the kind of person one is by virtue of their
racial identity. We can learn to identify races through different means, as we have in the past, but
in the contemporary US, we simply accept that race is self-evidently visibly identifiable. The
visibility of race is given as self-evident within the contemporary US because this association—
between racial identity and visible bodily features—is ideologically fixed as common sense and,
thereby, as naturalized perception.
Alcoff adopts Gadamer’s theory of the life-world and horizon to investigate the
background assumptions containing the values and meanings we come to associate with race.
Gadamer’s concept of horizon allows Alcoff to consider not just that we see race, but how we
see race. Unlike Husserl’s account of life-world, Gadamer emphasizes the historicity of our
respective-life worlds, which condition what does and does not emerge as meaningful for us.
Alcoff defines Gadamer’s life-world accordingly: “the life-world is simply the lived or
experienced world, a world that is intrinsically meaningful but whose meanings can change as
they are interpreted within the lives of historically situated persons.” 70 Because race is defined by
Alcoff as historically malleable, then it follows that the apparent truths regarding race must
themselves be historically situated. Furthermore, we, as subjects, are historically situated, and
therefore, our own histories as subjects also condition how we see race. The interpretive horizon,
is therefore, the historical, cultural, and socio-political position from which subjects perceive
race:
The horizon is a substantive perspectival location from which the interpreter looks out at
the world, a perspective that is always present but that is open and dynamic, with a temporal
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as well as physical dimension, moving into the future and into new spaces as the subject
moves.71
When we see race, we see it from a specific perspectival location People see race from their
perspectives, which includes “background, framing assumptions” about meanings and truths
associated with race.72 Combining this account of the interpretive horizon with Merleau-Ponty’s
theory of habituation, Alcoff considers how subjects become habituated to perceiving race
according to the background, framing assumptions of a dominant ideology constituted by an
uninterrogated white common sense. Though Alcoff does not use the term ‘racializing gaze,’ she
does explicitly align her phenomenological account with theorists, such as Fanon and Lewis
Gordon, who do us the language of the racializing gaze. Thus, I will refer to the habituated
perspective of dominant racial ideology in the contemporary US as the ‘racializing gaze.’ By
focusing on the racializing gaze, we can explore racist ideology and common sense as they
unfold in lived experience.
As I discussed in section I of this chapter, according to Merleau-Ponty, our motor and
perceptual experiences become sedimented within our body schema, which conditions what does
and does not emerge as meaningful for us. Analyzing the motor and perceptual habits
sedimented in/as the racializing gaze, we may consider the pre-reflective and reflective ways of
seeing that include more than our cultural background assumptions. We can see that it is not only
perspectival position that is important for this analysis, but subject position, as well. That is, the
‘racializing gaze’ is not only a perspectival position informed by background assumptions and
histories; it is also, as Alia Al-Saji explains, a subject position wherein one’s manner of being-in-
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the-world includes meanings that are associated with and projected onto others who also inhabit
the world. In her article, “The racialization of Muslim veils: A philosophical analysis,” Al-Saji
describes the interpretive horizon and phenomenology as mutually implicated in racial and
racialized perception:
Vision is not a mere neutral recording of the visible. As Merleau-Ponty notes, we learn to
see. This means that vision not only makes visible, it does so differently according to
sedimented habits of seeing—according to the tacit ways the body relates to and moves in
the world, allowing certain aspects of that world to be foregrounded. 73
Al-Saji extends Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of perception to consider the socio-historico
structures of seeing race and/or racialized subjects. Whereas Merleau-Ponty restricted his
analysis to habits that are prime facie value-neutral, such as playing an organ, Al-Saji explores
how the perceptions of racialized subjects are habituated—learned—according to the values and
meanings that constitute one’s perceptual field of signification. In other words, Al-Saji is
concerned with the process by which one learns to see race through habituated perception. Thus,
one learns to see Black subjects as dangerous or threatening when one allows these ways of
seeing to become sedimented and, eventually, habituated into one’s body schema. Al-Saji’s
analysis of sedimented perception is a phenomenological parallel to Alcoff’s notion of
uninterrogated common sense. The racializing gaze is a habituated perception of non-white
subjects according to the background assumptions and past perceptions, which, I argue, are
conditioned by white supremacy and anti-Blackness.
My interest in this section is not in how the racializing gaze is habituated, but with what
effects the racializing gaze has for the Black subject who is on the receiving end of this gaze.
Here, Helen Ngo’s analysis of the effects the racializing gaze has for the lived experience of non-
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white subjects is especially insightful. Extending Alcoff’s account of the visibility of race, as
well as Al-Saji’s analysis of the habituated perception underlying the racializing gaze, Ngo
examines how the non-white phenomenal body is altered by the presence of the racializing gaze
in lived experience. In this vein, Ngo explains that the Black body image becomes distorted by
the multiple perspectives she is forced to internalize before the racializing gaze; additionally, the
Black body schema is experienced as fragmented in lived experience because of the racializing
gaze; and finally, the Black subject is unable to cultivate what I call a ‘robust habit body’ under
white supremacy. As I will explain below that the inhibited Black phenomenal body is not only
the result of the racializing gaze, but a phenomenological structure of white supremacy itself.
That is, the racializing gaze is not, in my view, restricted to individual subject(s) or even groups
of subjects; rather, the racializing gaze is a phenomenological structure of white supremacy. It is
a phenomenological perspective habitable by subjects because this gaze is fundamental to the
maintenance and reproduction of white supremacy.
Reading Fanon’s account of the Black lived experience under twentieth century French
colonial rule through a Merleau-Pontian phenomenological framework, Ngo explains that both
overdetermination and pre-determination prevent Black subjects from experiencing their body
image as a stable perspective—a perspective from which one’s body is experienced as ‘one’s
own.’ Unlike the uninhibited body schema described by Merleau-Ponty, Ngo describes the Black
subject as unable to experience her body as her own: “My body is not, in that moment [before
the racializing gaze], on the ‘margins of my perception’ as Merleau-Ponty writes […], but
visually foregrounded, both for myself and for others.”74 One’s Black body is overdetermined
because there are multiple racial scripts co-constituting how Blackness is perceived from the
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perspective of the racializing gaze. Black racial identity represents lack of civilization,
criminality, a threat; all of these racial scripts condition the perception from the racializing gaze
such that Blackness is multiply determined as inferior. Additionally, Black racial identity is predetermined. The racial scripts related to Blackness pre-exist any individual Black person. The
Black subject is perceived as already uncivilized, criminal, and a threat before she speaks or acts
in front of the racializing gaze. Overdetermination and pre-determination presents the Black
subject with a third person perspective, as a view of her racialized body from the outside. Ngo
explains that this perspective is then internalized by the Black subject, thereby distorting her
body image perspective. Her body image is increased and distorted such that she inhabits
multiple perspectives of her body. Ngo writes, “as a racialized body, one stands in multiple
relations to and perspectives upon the self, in a way that disrupts the spatial cohesion of the body
schema.”75 The racializing gaze produces multiple perspectives for and of the Black subject,
which are internalized as one’s own perspective: her racialized body as overdetermined, her
racialized body as pre-determined, her perspectival position—the ‘my own’ view from the
body—and the perspective of her body from the position of the other. In non-racialized
perception, the perspective of one’s body as ‘my own’ is dominant—it is the perspective that
orients and secures all other perspectives. One may become aware of another’s perspective of
one’s body or self, but the perspective of the other remains distinct from one’s own perspective.
Rather than internalize the perspective of the other in non-racialized perception, the subjects of
perception engage in a reciprocal exchange of perspective. I will discuss the reciprocity of
intersubjectivity for Merleau-Ponty in chapter IV of this dissertation in the context of gestures.
For now, however, we should say that the distorted body image of racialized perception is
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characterized by the internalization of multiple perspective emerging from others rather than
reciprocated. This is because the content of the other perspective makes claims upon one’s own
body image—the racializing gaze knows the Black subject according to overdetermined and predetermined racialized scripts. The subject of the racializing gaze knows the Black subject just as
well, perhaps even better, than the Black subject knows herself. Thus, in racialized perception,
the Black subject not only internalizes, rather than reciprocates, multiple perspectives, but she
also loses the primacy of her own perspective. The ‘my owness’ of the body image becomes ‘my
own’ and ‘other’ perspectives before the racializing gaze.
Because of this distorted body image, Ngo explains, the Black subject begins to
experience her body as a phenomenal object among other objects. The Black subject is made
hyper-visible for another whose gaze makes her own body visible to her as an object. Objects
can be viewed from multiple perspectives; it is simply part of the phenomenal structure of
objects that they admit of multiple viewing points. We can walk around a tree to gain different
perspective of it to discover new things about the tree before us. However, the body image is
described by Merleau-Ponty as fixed. It is an inescapable position whence we view the world. As
I discussed in the previous section, it is Merleau-Ponty’s position that we cannot gain other
viewpoints of our bodies because we are fastened to our body as our perspective. However,
because the perspective of the racializing gaze is internalized by the Black subject, she becomes
unfastened to her body image. Her own perspective is no longer the primary position from which
she perceives the world, but the position in which she perceives and is perceived by others
according to racializing scripts. The racializing gaze does not perceive the Black subject as
another subject with whom it may engage in a reciprocal exchange of perspectives. It views the
Black subject as a phenomenal object. Thus, when the Black subject internalizes the perspective
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of the racializing gaze, she internalizes the perspective of herself as a phenomenal object. The
body image of the Black subject is extended from ‘my own’ perspective to include the multiple
viewpoints of her body as it is perceived from outside. Her awareness of her body as the point
from which she perceives the world is unfixed, and as a result, she experiences her body from the
perspective of another who stands before her. According to Ngo, by internalizing the racializing
gaze, the Black subject “edges toward the threshold” of the phenomenal object, which, unlike the
phenomenal body, admits of varying perspectives. 76 Thus, the racializing gaze distorts the body
image of the Black subject in two ways: her perspective of her body as her own is no longer
fixed, and, as a result, she edges toward the status of the phenomenal object.
The displacement of one’s body image results in a fragmented and, therefore,
unsynthesized body schema. We see the relation between an unfixed and distorted body image
and the corresponding fracturing of the Black body schema in Fanon’s often cited account of his
racialized encounter on a train. In chapter five of Black Skin, White Masks, “L’expérience Vécue
du Noir,” Fanon describes his consciousness as tripled in response to the interpolating call of the
white child on the train who cries “Mama, see the Negro! I’m frightened!”77 Fanon writes:
I could no longer laugh, because I already knew that there were legends, stories, history,
and above all historicity […]. Then, assailed at various points, the corporeal schema
crumbled, its place taken by a racial epidermal schema. In the train it was no longer a
question of being aware of my body in the third person but in a triple person. In the train I
was given not one but two, three places. […] I existed triply: I occupied space. I moved
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toward the other…and the evanescent other, hostile but not opaque, transparent, not there,
disappeared. Nausea…78
I think it important that Fanon refers to his body schema as “the corporeal schema.” It suggests
that his body image is already displaced before, or perhaps during, the moment his body schema
crumbled into three perspectives. Otherwise, we would expect Fanon to refer to ‘my’ corporeal
schema. Fanon’s perspective is expanded to include the perspective of himself as from outside.
He is not merely aware that he is perceived by another, but he incorporates this other perspective
as part of his own. Ngo writes: “Fanon is not just seen; he experiences himself being seen,
anticipated himself being seen, and finally, sees himself being seen.”79 These multiple
perspectives distort the body image, as previously discussed, and also fragment the body schema
by creating a spatial distance between oneself and one’s body. In non-racialized perception, the
body image secures the coordinated and synthesized motility of the body schema. The subject
experiences her body as her own—there is no distance between one’s body and one’s
perspective—and the primacy of one’s own perspective enables a synthesis of experience.
Synthesis, in this context, means coordinated movements and perception in experience. For
example, in non-racialized perception, I may approach my desk. I may focus upon the various
movements of my body in the act of approaching my desk, but in everyday experience, these
movements are performed with such ease that I do not have to think about them. My whole body
is coordinated in its movements and my movements are harmoniously performed.
In contrast to the coordinate body schema involved in non-racialized perception,
racialized perception creates a distance between one’s own perspective and one’s body leading to
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an uncoordinated and, thereby, unsynthesized and fragmented, set of movements. That I can see
my body as an object before me, means that I experience my body as at a distance from me. And
it is this distance, Ngo explains, that renders the Black body schema fragmented. Ngo writes:
“Insofar as the body schema is that which coordinates and supports intentional (or conscious)
bodily activity, the experience of racism and racialization intrudes into this coordination,
straining the fluidity of the experience of the body.”80 The Black subject is aware of herself from
her own perspective and the perspective of others. Her movements are, therefore, not merely
performed in an effort to, for example, approach a desk; her movements are also performed with
the effort to disrupt, comply, or even disregard the perspective of the other. The Black subject
cannot simply approach a desk with ease when before the racializing gaze. The racializing gaze
is internalized and strains the otherwise fluid movements of the Black subject. If she moves too
quickly, her racialized body may pose a threat. If she sways her hips a bit too much, her
racialized body may be perceived as hyper-sexualized. In this sense, her movements, just as her
perspective, are not simply her own. They are guided by her desire to move from here to there
and they are performed with the weight of the racialized perspective and its racializing scripts in
mind. As a result, her movements are fragmented into a series of isolated acts, which must be
individually managed in order to manage the racializing gaze itself. Thus, in racialized
experience the Black subject does not experience her body as a unified and coordinated totality.
The racializing gaze makes the Black subject feel self-conscious of her race; it is
experienced as hyper-visible and full of meanings that she must navigate. Aware of the
overdetermined and pre-determined racial scripts that precede her, the Black subject’s
movements in the world are inhibited by what Ngo calls the ‘work’ of managing the racializing
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gaze.81 When the Black subject goes out in public, when she is vulnerable to the racializing gaze,
she becomes hyper-aware of her movements as racialized. The Black subject is, therefore,
already on guard for a racializing encounter and, therefore, adopts what Alcoff calls a ‘defensive
posture’:
For a non-white [subject] called back from a normative postural image to a racialized
‘epidermal schema’, as Fanon put it, the habit-body one falls into at such moments, I would
suggest, is protective, defensive. Double layers of self-awareness must interrogate the
likely meanings that will be attributed to every utterance, gesture, action one takes. The
available options of interaction seem closed down to two: combative resistance without
hope of persuasion, or an attempt to return to the category of non-threatening other, perhaps
through the place of the not-really-other.82
The means by which the Black subject can experience her body schema as coordinated under
white supremacy are either through adopting the defensive habit body or a conciliatory and nonthreatening habit body. In either case, the Black body schema is discontinuous because the Black
subject is hyper-aware that her every movement means more than she intends in each moment.
Because, under white supremacy, the Black body image is distorted and the Black body
schema is discontinuous, the Black habit body is, as Alcoff explains in the above quote, inhibited.
It is useful here to distinguish between what I call a ‘routinized habit body’ and a ‘robust habit
body.’ While Merleau-Ponty identifies two kinds of habituation, he does not identify the
corresponding kinds of habit body. The first kind of habituated movement includes everyday
habituated act we engage in without deliberate consideration. For example, when I drive to
campus, a route I take several times a week, I already know in what direction I will drive,
approximately how long it will take to arrive, the average speed of my route, etc. In the act driving,
I am so habituated to this route that I often “zone out” and find myself accelerating, braking,
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changing lanes without necessarily being aware of each act. In the process of learning to drive, my
phenomenal body altered; I cultivated a phenomenal body that can extend to fit the dimensions of
my car, just as the woman with the feathered cap extends her phenomenal body to include the
dimensions of the feather. As a result, I accelerate, brake, and change lanes without having to pause
and deliberate about each movement. In addition to routinized habituation, there is a creative and
spontaneous form of habituation. This latter kind of habituation is what Merleau-Ponty describes
in his example of the skilled organist. According to Merleau-Ponty, a skilled organist does not
merely repeat notes already familiar to them. Rather, the skilled organist communes with the
instrument to produce new and expressive music. Merleau-Ponty writes: “There is no place here
for a ‘memory’ of the location of the stops, and the organist does not play within objective space.
In fact, his rehearsal gestures are gestures of consecration: they put forth affective vectors, they
discover emotional sources, and they create an expressive space.” 83 The skilled organist does not
play music from memory, which would assume that the musical notes already exist in the organists
mind and are merely repeated in the act of playing the instrument. Habituated to the instrument,
the organist produces no significance through playing their instrument. New affective expressions
are produced; unfamiliar emotional sources are discovered; and the field of expression available
for the musician and their instrument is expanded. Familiarity with the instrument in this case is
more than past exposure or routine movements. This more sophisticated kind of habituation
involves a familiarity that makes use of the instrument and the organist’s skills to spontaneously
and creatively produce new sounds and, in turn, new significance. I refer to the phenomenal body
involved in this more sophisticated form of habituation as ‘robust habit body.’ And it is the robust
habit body, which I will argue, that is inhibited under white supremacy.
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Exploring the habit body of the Black subject before the racializing gaze, Ngo describes
the Black habit body as unhabituated. This has two consequences: the Black subject is uneasy in
lived experience and she is constantly engaged in the ‘work’ of interrupting, anticipating, and
managing the racializing gaze. Analyzing Fanon’s encounter on the train, Ngo writes: “The
racialized body here is not the habitual one—at ease or at rest in its holding of itself—but the one
disturbed, destabilized, unsettled.” 84 Aware of existing as fragmented, the Black subject does not
feel at home under white supremacy. She is always “on guard,” in a defensive posture, or in retreat
from the racializing gaze. Drawing upon the distinction I made above between the ‘routinized habit
body’ and the ‘robust habit body,’ we can understand Ngo’s claim that the Black phenomenal body
is not habitual in the sense that it is restricted to the routinized habit body and unable to cultivate
the robust habit body. Because both a synthesized body image and synthesized body schema are
necessary for the cultivation of a robust habit body, the Black subject cannot achieve the kind of
spontaneous and free movements involved in the sophisticated kind of habituation in the presence
or anticipation of the racializing gaze.
However, to say that the Black body is not habituated under white supremacy is not to
say that the Black body does not accrue habits. Rather, the Black body is habituated as a
routinized habit body under white supremacy. Ngo explores the everyday routinized gestures and
movements Black subjects engage in, without having to be aware of such movements, in order to
interrupt, anticipate, and/or manage the racializing gaze. The linguistic practice of codeswitching is an example of the Black routinized habit body under white supremacy. For example,
code switching would include the practice of switching from AAVE to ‘SAE that Black subjects
regularly adopt when switching from the private to the public sphere, or the casual to the
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professional sphere. Ngo describes the routinized habit movements performed by Black subjects
as intended, consciously or unconsciously, to manage or interrupt the racializing gaze. If, in the
example of code switching, the pre-determined script of the racializing gaze, i.e., the position of
anti-Blackness, anticipates that the Black subject “can’t speak proper English,” then such a script
is unfulfilled or disrupted by the Black subject who, in fact, proves capable of stringing together
coherent and grammatically correct statements. While these routines are habituated for the Black
subject, they are not constitutive of a robust habit body. In fact, the Black subject is closed off
from cultivating a ‘robust habit body’ because her movements are overdetermined and predetermined, which means that everything she does is either perceived by the racializing gaze as
pre-ordained and always already defined.
According to Al-Saji, pre-determined scripts related to non-white subjects also lead to an
experience of one’s movements as restricted. In her 2013 article, “Too Late: Racialized Time and
the Closure of the Past,” Al-Saji examines Fanon’s description of racializing encounters
structured by pre-determined scripts to describe the racialized subject’s inhibited habit-body. 85
Al-Saji writes: “The past is no longer lived at a distance, as past, but is experienced as a fixed
and overdetermining dimension of the present.”86 However Fanon responds to the frightened
child on the train, he is destined to fulfill a pre-determined and, therefore, pre-ordained script as
determined by the racializing gaze. If he laughs, he will be considered mad. If he tries to comfort
the child, he will be considered a “respectable Black man.” If he retreats to another cabin, he will
have recognized his position as inferior to the white child. And thus, exhaust the possibilities for
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“action.” Thus, there is no spontaneity or creativity afforded Fanon before the racializing gaze.
He is closed off from what I have been calling the ‘robust habit body.’
I agree with Al-Saji’s claim that racialized subjects experience their habit body as
inhibited before the racializing gaze and in the ways she details. However, since they do not
situate this claim within the context of white supremacy, Al-Saji, Ngo, and Alcoff fail to
recognize expressions of Black meaning that we do find in the world. For when Black subjects
enter the space of fugitivity, they acquire a robust habit body capable of producing meaning. To
suggest that racialized subjects are restricted to the routinized habit body without qualification,
implies that these subjects are permanently cut off from an immanently expressive embodied
intentionality. Or, at the very least, it suggests that the lived experience of the racialized subject
is fundamentally reduced to the routinized habit body. This is true within the Manichean world
of anti-Blackness with which Fanon is concerned. However, this world of anti-Blackness
characterizes white supremacy and does not represent the fullness of Black lived experience.
In chapter IV of this dissertation, I develop my account of fugitivity to describe the
loopholes Black subjects move into when they move out of white supremacy. In so doing, I shift
our focus away from the Black lived experience under white supremacy to Black lived
experience as it unfolds away from the surveillance of the racializing gaze. In fugitivity, we see
the released musculature of Black subjects who express meaning through an uninhibited
embodied intentionality. Additionally, in chapter IV, I will explore concrete examples of Black
gestures to demonstrate that Black meaning has been produced by Black subjects. That is, Black
gestures are evidence that Black meaning-making is not only possible but has already occurred
and continues to occur in the space of fugitivity. Furthermore, these Black gestures are expressed
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when Black subjects are within white supremacy, which demonstrates that the Black lived
experience under white supremacy also includes Black meaning.
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Chapter Three: Historicizing Blackness
This chapter examines the history of anti-Black violence as it conditions contemporary
Black subject formation in the US. I say only that contemporary Black subjects are conditioned
by this history, and not that we are determined by this history to indicate that Black
subjectivity—Black life—has always included more than trauma and suffering. I begin by
explicating Saidiya Hartman’s concept of the ‘afterlives of slavery’ in order to establish that this
concept is only ambiguously defined. This ambiguity allows theorists to make use of Hartman’s
concept in a way that flattens the historical differences between chattel slavery and the
contemporary US situation/context. Next, I outline Sylvia Wynter’s historiography and political
ontology of Man in order to later consider how some advocates of Afropessimism use Wynter’s
political ontology, to make claims concerning the contemporary Black subject. As a result, these
theorists of Afropessimism—in particularly Frank Wilderson III, Jared Sexton, and Calvin
Warren—analyze the ontological status of the contemporary Black subject according to an
anachronistic political ontology. Finally, I develop my concept of the ‘Black archive’ as an
alternative to Hartman’s ‘afterlives of slavery,’ so as to characterize how the history of antiBlackness conditions contemporary Black subject formation. By “the Black archive,” I intend an
assemblage of multiple discursive regimes that are similarly regulated by anti-Black disciplinary
and regulatory techniques. I explain that contemporary Black subjects live in, through, and as
the Black archive.
Hartman’s ‘Afterlives of Slavery’
In chapter I of this dissertation, I examined philosophical accounts of the history of the
dehumanization of enslaved subjects in the US during chattel slavery. My intention in that
chapter was to identify both the history of anti-blackness in the US and the historical origin of
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what Calvin Warren has called “Black nonbeing,” and what others, including Jared Sexton and
Frank Wilderson III, following the work of Sylvia Wynter, have referred to as Blackness’
exclusion from humanity—or exclusion from what Wynter calls ‘Man.’ 1 In this chapter, my
interest lies in identifying the historical discontinuity between enslaved existence under chattel
slavery and contemporary Black life in the US. I argue that often times theorists working in
Afropessimism too quickly collapse the historical conditions of slavery with the conditions of
contemporary anti-Blackness in an effort to analyze the ontology of the contemporary Black
subject. Reading Frank Wilderson III’s and Jared Sexton’s interpretations and uses of Saidiya
Hartman’s concept of the ‘afterlives of slavery,’ I examine their identification of enslaved
suffering with contemporary anti-Blackness in the US; such an identification fails to produce an
adequate characterization of the contemporary conditions of white supremacy and anti-Blackness
in the US. Both Wilderson and Sexton claim to develop a political ontology of slavery and its
afterlives. However, through a kind of sleight-of-hand, they extend that ontology in assertions
about the metaphysical ontology of contemporary Black existence. In other words, Wilderson
and Sexton identify the enslaved subject of chattel slavery with the contemporary Black subject
in the US through the concept of a ‘fungible commodity;’ they hold that both subjects are such
‘fungible commodities.’ However, these theorists fail to analyze the political ontology of the
contemporary US and, instead, merely extend the historical specificity of the enslaved subject as

In his 2018 article, “Afro-Blue Notes: The Death of Afro-pessimism (2.0)?,” Greg Thomas points out that, while
Afropessimists often cite Wynter, either directly in their articles or when describing authors who have influenced
their own thought, but they do little to actually engage with her work. As Thomas notes, Afropessimists often use
the term ‘Human’ in reference to Wynter’s concept ‘Man,’ which misrepresents Wynter’s notion of Man as a
descriptive statement rather than an ontological one. Greg Thomas, Afro-Blue Notes: The Death of Afro-pessimism
(2.0)?, Theory & Event 21, no.1 (2018): 282-317. Sylvia Wynter, “Unsettling the Coloniality of
Being/Power/Truth/Freedom: Towards the Human, After Man, Its Overrepresentation—and Argument,” The New
Centennial Review 3, no.3 (2003): 257-337; Calvin Warren, “Onticide: Afro-pessimism, Gay Nigger #1, and Surplus
Violence,” GLQ: A Journal of Lesbian and Gay Studies 23, no. 3 (2017): 391-418; Jared Sexton, “Afro-Pessimism:
The Unclear Word,” Rhizomes: Cultural Studies in Emerging Knowledge 29 (2016); Frank Wilderson III,
Afropessimism (New York: Liveright Publishing Corporation, 2020).
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fungible commodity to characterize the contemporary Black subject as nonbeing. In contrast to
these analyses, I develop a ‘Black archive’ in order to examine the historical lines of descent that
begin in chattel slavery and which, I describes as conditioning without determining the
contemporary Black subject in the US.
In her 1997 work, Scenes of Subjection, Hartman explains that the enslaved subject was
neither mere property, nor merely exploited in their labor but, rather, was rendered a “fungible
commodity.”2 As fungible, enslaved subjects lacked individuality; they were interchangeable. Of
course, they were exchangeable with other enslaved subjects, but this was not all that this
fungibility entailed. For this interchangeability meant in addition that enslaved subjects occupied
a position that white subjects themselves could psychically occupy and could employ to reflect
upon their own desires and humanity. According to Hartman, post-Abolition the Black subject
was free from slavery, but not free from the position of a fungible commodity. For Hartman, the
physical and psychological pain endured by the enslaved subject remains “a still-unfolding
narrative of captivity, dispossession, and domination that engenders the black subject in the
Americas.”3 Here, Hartman’s use of ‘engendering’ and “still-unfolding,” suggests that she
characterizes the contemporary Black subject as conditioned by captivity, dispossession, and
domination. Notably, she does not specify in what way the Black subject remains captive or
dispossessed or dominated, nor does she explain what she means by ‘narrative.’ Does narrative
mean ‘history’ in the sense that contemporary Black subjects are haunted by the history of
chattel slavery? Does narrative mean ‘discourse’ in the Foucauldian sense, which would suggest
that contemporary Black subject formation occurs in and through the discursive regimes and
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disciplinary techniques of captivity, dispossession, and domination? Hartman’s ambiguous use of
‘engendering’ and ‘narrative’ leave her claims regarding the relationship between the enslaved
subject and the contemporary Black subject open to interpretations, some of which might
collapse these historically situated subjects. That is, if Hartman claims that contemporary Black
subjects are engendered by the still-unfolding narratives of chattel slavery, then one may
interpret her work as identifying the enslaved subject with the contemporary Black subject in the
US.
We find a slight qualification to the above claim in Hartman’s 2007 text, Lose Your
Mother: A Journey Along the Atlantic Slave Route. Here, Hartman introduces her now famous
concept ‘the afterlife of slavery’ which she characterizes accordingly:
If slavery persists as an issue in the political life of black America, it is not because of an
antiquarian obsession with bygone days or the burden of too-long memory, but because
black lives are still imperiled and devalued by a racial calculus and a political arithmetic
that were entrenched centuries ago. This is the afterlife of slavery—skewed life chances,
limited access to health and education, premature death, incarceration, and
impoverishment. I, too, am the afterlife of slavery. 4
The afterlife of slavery is not, for Hartman, merely a historical narrative that contemporary
subjects can reflect upon. Nor is it merely a memory of the violence endured by enslaved subject
under chattel slavery. Rather, it is the devaluation of Black life that originated in chattel slavery
and continues to mark contemporary Black life as non-valuable in comparison to white subjects.
During chattel slavery, the racial calculus of enslaved subjects determined their value as a
fungible commodity. Today, Hartman explains, this racial calculus determines Black subjects
through a framework wherein Blacks are disproportionately vulnerable to death, poverty, and
incarceration. But what does it mean for Hartman to claim that she too is the afterlife of slavery?
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As a successful academic, we know that Hartman is educated, presumably she is not poor, and,
so far as I am aware, she is not incarcerated. Is she the afterlife of slavery because she is a
descendent of slaves; because her Blackness itself renders her vulnerable to skewed life chances;
or because, despite her success, her value is determined according to a racial calculus that
positions her as valueless or less valuable than white subjects? Again, Hartman’s claims
regarding the afterlives of slavery, like her claims concerning the still unfolding narratives of
slavery, are only ambiguously stated.
I believe the ambiguity of Hartman’s claims regarding enslaved subjects and
contemporary Black subjects allows other theorists to make use of her concepts in a variety of
ways, some of which are extreme in their lack of historical specificity. That is, Scenes of
Subjection is a book concerning the commodification and fungibility of enslaved subjects. It is,
in my view, importantly situated within the context of chattel slavery and the years following
Emancipation. However, Hartman does imply that the political ontology governing chattel
slavery persists in the contemporary US. I propose that Hartman’s account of the afterlives of
slavery requires historical nuance in order to distinguish between the effects of the racial calculus
and political arithmetic for enslaved subjects as compared to contemporary Black US subjects. In
other words, the racial calculus that determined enslaved subjects as fungible commodities may
still endure in the contemporary setting, but it is importantly different from the context of chattel
slavery. The skewed life chances of contemporary Black subjects in the US is not an identical
condition to the enslaved that determined African and African American life during chattel
slavery. The afterlife of slavery is different in kind than the life of slavery.
Afropessismists have failed to do the work required for theorizing the historical
continuity and discontinuity between enslaved subjects and contemporary Black subjects in the
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US. Instead, theorists including Wilderson, Sexton, Warren, and other theorists of
Afropessimism adopt Hartman’s concepts and treat them as transhistorical; they extend
Hartman’s claims from the context of chattel slavery to the contemporary context without
alteration. In so doing, Afropessimists map the political ontology of chattel slavery onto the
socio-political context of the contemporary US and, as a result, they analyze the contemporary
Black subject according to a previous historical context.
Before examining Afropessimist theories concerning contemporary Black subjects, I
want to define the term ‘political ontology.’ In his 2011 article, “Political Ontology,” Colin Hay
lists key questions that concern ontology: “what is it to exist, whether (and, if so, why) there
exists something rather than nothing, and whether (and, if so, why) there exists one logically
contingent actual world.”5 In general, ontology is the study of existence, the nature of being, and
the metaphysical structure of the world/reality. Political ontology is narrower than ontology in
scope; it is the study of specifically political being. Hay explains, “political ontology […] relates
to political being, to what is politically, to what exists politically, and to the units that comprise
political reality.”6 Questions asked in/of political ontology or in an ontology of politics, are:
What characterizes something as political as opposed to, for example, cultural?; what is the
polis?; what kind of being constitutes the political subject? Following this understanding of
political ontology, we could characterize Hartman’s concept of ‘fungible commodity’ as an ontopolitical claim about the enslaved subject’s position in relation to white subjects during chattel
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slavery. That is, Hartman’s analysis concerns the ontological structure of and the ontological
beings of chattel slavery.
But what, then, is the role of political ontology in Afropessimism? For Jared Sexton, for
instance, Afropessimism is distinctly characterized by its focus on the political ontology of antiBlackness. In his 2016 article “Afro-Pessimism: The Unclear Word,” Sexton describes
Afropessimism is a critical supplement to ethnic studies because it concerns political ontology:
Afro-Pessimism […] critically supplements the paradigm of critical ethnic studies […] by
moving conceptually from the empirical to the structural or, more precisely, from the
experiential to the political ontological, especially insofar as the question of differential
racialization—or the complexity of racial hierarchy—makes recourse to a comparative
history and social science. 7
For Sexton, the shift from the experiential to the political ontological that is characteristic of
Afropessimism is a modification of a critical ethnic studies approach to understanding antiBlackness. For the focus of critical ethnic studies, in Sexton’s view, is upon anti-Blackness as it
is expressed in institutions, lived experience, and aesthetics. Afropessimism, by contrast, shifts
the focus to an analysis of the underlying ontological structures that brought anti-Blackness into
being. The key question for Sexton, therefore, is about the historical origin of anti-Blackness and
the nonbeing of Blackness. As Sexton and others working in Afropessimism assert, Black
liberation is only possible by first identifying the political ontology of the modern world and
then, overthrowing this ontological order. In this vein, Sexton identifies Hartman’s argument that
enslaved subjects existed as fungible commodities as the historical origin of anti-Blackness and
the nonbeing of contemporary Black subjects. He reads out the fundamental ambiguity of
Hartman’s claims by shifting to the register of political ontology and thereby occluding the
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historical specificity of her thought. Still, political ontology itself need not be transhistorical, as
we will find in the work of Sylvia Wynter.
Wynter’s Political Ontology and Historiography of Man
Afropessimists identify the period of chattel slavery (1619-1865) as the era during which
Black subjects were excluded from the category Human—socially, politically, ontologically—by
white Europeans and, later, white Americans. This claim follows Sylvia Wynter’s historiography
of modernity and the humanist invention of what she refers to as ‘Man 1’. In her 2003 article,
“Unsettling the Coloniality of Being/Power/Truth/Freedom: Towards the Human, After Man, Its
Overrepresentation—An Argument,” Wynter draws upon Foucault’s account of the ‘invention of
Man’ as developed in Order of Things, to consider how Man and its Other developed in the
Americas.8 That is, Wynter theorizes the converse of Foucault’s ‘Man’ to consider the processes
by which Man was defined twice over—as ‘Man1’ and ‘Man2,’ in Wynter’s terminology—in the
Americas beginning in 1492. Accordingly, Wynter explains that during the Renaissance the
concept of Man underwent a redescription, from Man as fallen flesh to Man as a political subject.
She writes:
In order for the world of the laity, including that of the then ascendant modern European
state, to escape their subordination to the world of the Church, it had been enabled to do so
Wynter, “Unsettling,” 263; In her interview with David Scott, Wynter explains her project in relation to Foucault:
“there was, on the one hand, Man, as invented in the sixteenth century by Europe, as Foucault notes, and then, on the
other hand, Man’s human Others, as also invented by Europeans at the same time” (David Scott, “The Reenchantment of Humanism: An Interview with Sylvia Wynter,” Small Axe 8 (2000): 174). However, given her
historiography of Man as developed in her article “1492,” in addition to the decolonial theorists from which she
draws in support of her own claims, I think it more accurate to date her account of Man1 in the Americas as
occurring in the fifteenth rather than sixteenth century. This is because ‘Man 1’ is not identical with Foucault’s
working concept of ‘Man’ in The Order of Things. Foucault develops his concept of ‘Man’ within the closed geohistorical context of Europe during the Renaissance. Wynter, however, extends this context to examine the invention
of ‘Man’ that took place during the colonial encounter between European settlers and American Natives. Thus,
while Wynter draws on Foucault’s concept of ‘Man,’ her historicization of its invention will differ from Foucault’s
according to their different geo-historical contexts. See Sylvia Wynter, “1492: A New World Order,” in Race,
Discourse, and the Origin, ed. Vera Lawrence Hyatt and Rex Nettleford (Washington: Smithsonian Institution
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only on the basis of what Michel Foucault identifies as the ‘invention of Man’: that is, by
the Renaissance humanists’ epochal redescription of the human outside the terms of the
then theocentric, ‘sinful by nature’ conception/‘descriptive statement’ of the human, on
whose basis the hegemony of the Church/clergy over the lay world of Latin-Christian
Europe had been supernaturally legitimated. […] this redescription was effected by the lay
world’s invention of Man as the political subject of the state.9
Christianity represented the human as ‘Fallen Flesh’ because of ‘Adamic Original Sin.’ The
means of salvation for the European Christian was dictated by the church, which, Wynter argues,
required the subordination of the laity to the church. That is, Christianity defined the human as
always already fallen, always already corrupted by original sin, and humans’ only hope of
salvation was to repent for a fallen nature for which they were not responsible. This was equally
true of the poor European as it was of the monarch. While the monarch had power over her/his
subjects, both were ultimately beholden to the dictates of the Church for their salvation, which
made the Church itself a hegemonic institution. In this regard, Man was supernaturally predetermined by both God, Man’s creator, and the Church. Thus, Man could not define himself
because s/he was already defined by a cosmological order as ‘natural man,’ as I shall now
explain.
Wynter sees these developments as predicated on the prior rupture, occurring during the
Renaissance, between Man and the Church, by which Man re-defined himself from ‘Fallen
Flesh’ to political subject. The Renaissance succeeded in diminishing the hegemony of the
Church in two ways. First, Copernicus’s heliocentrism, which argued that the Earth moved
around the sun, challenged the Christian cosmology that characterized the Earth as the
immovable center of the universe. As Wynter explains, Copernicus’ discovery challenged the
Church’s position that knowledge of the world made by God was unknowable to humans.
Furthermore, by identifying the world as a moving body in the universe, Copernicus heretically
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contradicted the Church’s position that the Earth “had to be at the center of the universe […] and,
in addition, to be not only nonmoving as it is sensed by us to be, but to be so because divinely
condemned to be nonmoving in the wake of the Fall.” 10 The stability of the Earth, which was
said to exist at the center of the universe, was fundamental evidence for Christianity that God’s
perfection was witnessed in a perfect and harmonious universe. The motionlessness of the Earth
was also evidence for the Church of mankind’s “condemned enslavement to the negative Adamic
legacy.”11 Copernicus’ act of de-centralizing the Earth and, in turn, rendering the Earth itself
movable, called into question the monopoly on truth claimed by the Church, at least with regard
to the cosmos. This caused an opening for other intellectuals to devise new ways of learning
about the world—the Earth and the universe—which did not unquestioningly adopt the
cosmological truths given by the Church. The Renaissance, therefore, established a new
production of knowledge, one no longer beholden to the Church.
The second important rupture between Man and the Church created during the
Renaissance, was a re-conceptualization of Man’s nature from theocentric to secularist humanist
grounds. Wynter explains that Copernicus’ heliocentric discovery led others, specifically Pico
della Mirandola, to re-write the fallen nature of Man. According to Wynter, Mirandola rejected
the Christian doctrine that Man was fallen flesh and, instead, he argued that God created Man so
there would be someone to admire his own creation of the universe:
God, having completed his Creation and wanting someone to admire His works, had
created Man on a model unique to him, then placed him at the center/midpoint of the
hierarchy of this creation, commanding him to ‘make of himself’ what he willed to be—to
decide for himself whether to fall to the level of the beasts by giving into his passions, or,
through the use of his reason, to rise to the level of the angels. 12
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For Mirandola, Man was not constituted by an original sin, but as a participant in and admirer of
God’s creation. This meant that Man did not have to seek out salvation through the Church in
order to repent for his natural state as fallen flesh. Rather, Man could either through reason
‘make of himself’ an angel or give into his primal passions and live as a beast. Through
participation in the state, adhering to the laws, Man could define himself as “rational subject of
the state.”13 Man’s ability to define himself ‘degodded’ Man, as Wynter writes, which
dismantled the hegemony of the Church in both its production of knowledge and its
characterization of Man. 14 However, this degodded Man was still a Christian subject; Man could
define himself, but he was still made in the image of God. Wynter refers to this humanist
reformulation of Man during the Renaissance as ‘Man 1.’15 Thus, the theocentric grounds on
which Man was originally defined in Europe were replaced with a definition of Man according to
a rational-political matrix, although this new conception of Man was still “hybridly religiosecular,” according to Wynter. That is, by “hybridly religio-secular,” Wynter means to point out
that Man1 is a rational political subject, but nonetheless still a Christian subject.
According to Wynter, the redefinition of Man that took place in Europe during the
Renaissance also involved the colonial encounter between Europe and American Natives.16 In
her 2003 interview with David Scott, “The Re-Enchantment of Humanism: An Interview with
Sylvia Wynter,” Wynter explains “the West was to be able to reinvent its true Christian Self as
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Wynter argues that her historiography is a “correlative hypothesis” to Walter Mignolo’s ‘colonial difference’ and
Aníbal Quijano’s ‘Racism/Ethnicism complex.’ (Wynter, “Unsettling,” 260).
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that of Man only because, at the same time, Western discourses […] were also inventing the
untrue Other of the Christian self.” 17 As we have seen, the secularist humanism defining the
European Renaissance occurred, in part, as a battle internal to Europe between European subjects
and the hegemony of the Church. However, in addition to this Western Man reinvented himself
in the Americas by defining himself against the Other qua Native and enslaved African. Wynter
writes:
The large-scale accumulation of unpaid land, unpaid labor, and overall wealth expropriated
by Western Europe from non-European peoples, which was to lay the basis of its global
expansion from the fifteenth century onwards, was carried out within the order of truth and
the self-evident order of consciousness, of a creed-specific conception of what it was to be
human—which, because a monotheistic conception, could not conceive of an Other to what
it experiences as being human, and therefore an Other to its truth, its notion of freedom. 18
The invention of Man in Europe recognized the Church as an institution against which Man
could re-define itself. That is, the European Man was defined during the Renaissance in relation
to the Church even though this relation was one of transgression. In contrast, Europeans did not
recognize American Natives and enslaved Africans as Other—as a people with civilized belief
systems, political structures, culture. According to Wynter, this is because the European selfconception of Man was monotheistic. Man did not have proper Others; there was only Man and
the absence of Man. Thus, American Natives and enslaved Africans did not constitute an Other
in relation to European Man, because the category ‘Other’ suggests an independent conceptual
order of Man that, from the European perspective, did not exist. As a result, Native Americans
and enslaved Africans were conceived of in relation to European Man only as lacking the
defining features of Man itself. This monotheistic conception of Man led European colonizers to
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establish a new matrix to define the Other and, in turn, define themselves. Wynter explains, “For
the Europeans […] the only available slot of Otherness to their Norm, into which they could
classify these non-European populations, was one that defined the latter in terms of their
ostensible subhuman status.”19 Europeans defined themselves as the sole norm, the only
representation of Man, and non-Europeans would be defined in a negative relation to this norm
as subhuman and lacking the characteristics of Man, which was equal to non-human.
In this process of defining the Other, the European colonizers reflected upon that which
made them Human and used these features to assess whether or not American Natives or
enslaved Africans met these conditions. Seeking justification for the exploitation of Native
peoples and their land, European colonizers originally determined that the American Natives
were not eligible for ethical consideration because they were non-Christian. In other words,
American Natives were not Human because, to be Human one must be Christian. However, with
the reinvention of Man internal to Europe shifting from theocentric to ratiocentric grounds, the
exploitation of Natives based on their ‘secularity’ was replaced—beginning in the fifteenth
century—with claims regarding their rationality. To demonstrate their status as Human, Natives
had to demonstrate their capacity to reason. In reality, the colonizers merely compared the
religious practices of the Aztecs to their own Christian rituals and deemed the former clearly
“irrational.”20 Again, using their own socio-political and cultural context as the ideal
representation of Man, the colonizers identified Natives as irrational based on the differences
between their culture and European culture. Wynter writes “the vast difference that existed in
religion and culture between the Europeans and the indigenous peoples was clear evidence of the

19

Ibid., 292.

20

Ibid., 298.

113

latter’s clack of an ostensibly supracultural natural reason.” 21 Reason, insofar as it defines Man,
is here extended from purely theocentric grounds to include culture and reason. Because the
Native’s and enslaved Africans’ cultures did not mirror European culture, they were deemed
irrational and, in turn, Natives and enslaved Africans were themselves deemed irrational—nonHuman.
Wynter identifies a shift in episteme during the eighteenth century, when Man was
defined according to a new hierarchy. Beginning in the fifteenth century, Man was defined
according to a matrix of rationality and Christianity: the Human was rational and the irrational
non-human animal constituted the primary referent of Human’s opposite; Christianity was
further evidence of one’s rationality and, in turn, status as Human—Man 1. Conversely, the nonhuman was believed closer to the non-human animal and, therefore, irrational; and their
irrationality was further demonstrated in their ‘secularity.’ Within this matrix, however, there
was a hierarchy between the Human and non-Human. That is, the matrix ‘rational/irrational’ and
‘Christian/non-Christian’ was not a strict binary, but code along which people would be arranged
to determine their relation to Man. Wynter describes this hierarchy as “the status-ordering
principles generated from their respective codes—one based on ostensibly differential degrees of
enslavement to sin/redemption from sin, the other on ostensibly differential degrees of rational
nature/enslavement to the irrational nature.”22 Beginning in the nineteenth century, however, the
governing episteme shifted because of Darwin’s evolutionary theory. 23 According to Wynter,
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Wynter’s account of Darwinism constituting the shift in episteme from ‘Man 1’ to ‘Man 2’ seems to overlook
several important issues. First, Wynter’s historiography is primarily developed according to events in intellectual
history without regard for the political and economic shifts, which took place at the same time in history, that would
have also played a role in the transition from ‘Man ‘1 to ‘Man 2’. Furthermore, Wynter’s account of Darwin suggest
that his evolutionary theory constituted the emergence of racist and racialized discourse in the Americas and beyond.
23

114

Darwin’s evolutionary theory erased the sharp divide between the human and non-human animal
and it also challenged the Christian narrative of Man’s origin. Thus, the matrix according to
which the Human was defined had to be re-invented; this new order was based primarily on race.
The Human—Man 2—was defined as white and the non-human was defined as non-white.
Within this new matrix, however, Blackness constituted the ultimate referent of the nonHuman. 24 Wynter explains:
Then along comes the Darwinian revolution, with its new half-scientific, half-mythic
Origin Narrative of Evolution, and sweeps away this value difference between humans and
animals. It is in the wake of this that bourgeois intellectuals are going to redefine Man in
purely secular, because biological, terms. By placing human origins totally in evolution
and natural selection, they are going to be able to map the structuring principle of their now
bourgeois social structure, that of the selected versus dysselected, the evolved versus nonevolved.25
Darwin’s evolutionary theory placed Man on a scale with non-human animals. The non-human
animal was no longer the opposite of the Man because Darwinian theory held that humans
evolved from the non-human animal. The rational/irrational distinction, which previously
distinguished the Human from the non-human (animal) gave way to secular and biological

However, discourse on race pre-existed Darwin’s evolutionary theory. Darwin contributed to this theory a
mechanistic, as opposed to teleological, account of race. However, if we situate Wynter’s analysis in line with
Foucault, as she herself does, then the above issues may be reconciled. Wynter is here concerned with the
descriptive statement. Her focus on the history of Man does not necessarily imply that political and economic
conditions were irrelevant or secondary to the shifts in epistemes. In other words, Wynter is not providing a
historical materialist analysis, but an archaeology. Similar to Foucault, Wynter seeks to highlight shifts in discourse
and epistemes related to conceptions of life such that the evolutionary conceptualization of ‘Man’ would eventually
emerge. Additionally, Wynter’s analysis of ‘Man 1’ demonstrates that she does recognize that discourse on race
precedes Darwin’s evolutionary theory. Thus, Wynter’s historiography of Darwin does not treat racialized discourse
based on evolution as the origin of race discourse, but a transformation of this discourse from a secular to a biocentric and evolutionary conception of life.
Foucault introduces his concept of ‘episteme’ in his 1970 text, The Order of Things: “the epistemological field,
the episteme in which knowledge, envisaged apart from all criteria having reference to its rational value or its
objective forms, grounds its positivity and thereby manifests a history which is not that of its growing perfection, but
rather that of its conditions of possibility” (Foucault, The Order of Things, xxii). ‘Episteme’ refers to the emergence
of knowledge—the conditions of possibility for a claim to emerge and be regarded as true.
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claims concerning the Human. Evolution, as a guiding paradigm, was supplemented with biocentric claims regarding the nature of races and their respective relation to Man. Wynter explains
that “Evolution—was now to be mapped and anchored on the only available ‘objective set of
facts’ that remained. This was the set of environmentally, climactically determined phenotypical
differences between human hereditary variations.” 26 Where Man1 was characterized as a
political subject, Man 2, that of our contemporary order, is defined according to biological
features believed to be shared within a race and vary between the races. And, today, Black
people represent the “ultimate referent of the ‘racially inferior’ Human Other” according to
ostensibly biological truth of eugenics. 27 However, Wynter argues that the Native did not
magically gain the status of Human once Blackness was rendered the ultimate referent for the
non-Human. The previous hierarchy governing Man 1 was replaced with a new one: “the statusordering principle based upon ostensibly differential degrees of evolutionary
selectedness/eugenicity and/or dysselectedness/dysgenicity.” 28 Thus, under Man 2, whiteness
constituted the highest end of the Human, and Blackness the ultimate referent of the Other.
Among the non-human were included the Native, the Black Diaspora, Africa—African people
and the continent itself, dark-skinned colonized people, and poor Europeans are also relegated to
this position of Human Other.29 This is an important qualification because it means that Wynter’s
historiography and her political ontology do not cite chattel slavery as an event that radically
altered the ontology of humanity. Instead, the original tear in the world occurred during
colonialism; and, according to Wynter, the same system of defining Man as rational/irrational
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that originally rendered the American Native Other to the European Man reigned during chattel
slavery, altering only to include enslaved Africans into the category of Other.
Afropessimism
Drawing on both Hartman and Wynter, Afropessimists have made radical claims
concerning contemporary Black subjectivity in the US. Some, like Wilderson and Sexton, have
described Blackness as social death; Warren has claimed that Blackness is non-being, and exists
only as metaphysical functioning for the white world. In this section, I evaluate these claims
according to Hartman’s and Wynter’s political ontologies outlined above. Ultimately, I argue
that neither Hartman nor Wynter’s political ontology provides Afropessimists with the necessary
analysis to characterize the contemporary Black subject as one of nonbeing or socially dead.
In “The Social Life of Social Death” Sexton explains that Afropessimism, as a discipline,
returns to Patterson’s notion of ‘social death’ to articulate the contemporary condition of
Blackness, which, he argues, is still structured according what Sexton calls ‘racial slavery.’ 30

Sexton uses the term ‘racial slavery’ in reference what he calls the ongoing enslavement of contemporary Black
subjects, which finds its origin in chattel slavery. His reason for this is two-fold. First, in conversation with those he
refers to as ‘new abolitionists’ who characterize, for example, sex trafficking in the contemporary context as a form
of slavery, Sexton argues that the conditions of racial slavery are distinct. In a 2015 article written for Open
Democracy, Sexton argues that the used of the term ‘slavery’ to refer to contemporary forms of oppression,
including human trafficking, results in “a conflation of slavery with conditions of severe material deprivation,
including the conditions requisite for life itself.” According to Sexton, new abolitionists conflate the conditions of
oppression with the condition of enslavement. One is, thus, characterized by this discourse as a slave because one is
economically, politically, or socially oppressed. In contrast to this position, Sexton argues that Black people are
slaves no matter their economic, political, or social situation. This is Sexton’s second point for using the term ‘racial
slavery.’ Contemporary Black subjects are, according to Sexton, still subject to the mechanisms of slavery that were
introduced in the New World during chattel slavery. He writes: “The salient point has to do with the novel political
standing that racial slavery brought into the modern world: a null status ascribed to the essence of the enslaved and
to those thought to be eligible for enslavement by virtue of a social category, creating negative social ties along
horizontal and vertical axes to any and all contemporaries or to past and future generations” (my emphasis). Sexton
argues that Black people are slaves today because of their ties to previous generations of peoples who were enslaved
under chattel slavery. Sexton and other Afropessimists argue that the mechanisms of enslavement during chattel
slavery are distinct from the racial slavery we experience today; however, the essence of Blackness continues to be
defined in terms of the position of the enslaved because the alienation, exclusion, and commodification of
contemporary Black subjects was first made possible by the alienation, exclusion, and commodification of enslaved
subjects under chattel slavery. See Jared Sexton, “Don’t call it a comeback: racial slavery is not yet abolished,”
Open Democracy, June 17, 2015, https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/beyond-trafficking-and-slavery/dont-call-itcomeback-racial-slavery-is-not-yet-abolished/.
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Sexton writes: “In recent years, social death has emerged from a period of latency as a notion
useful for the critical theory of racial slavery as a matrix of social, political, and economic
relations surviving the era of abolition in the nineteenth century.” 31 Where Patterson intended his
concept of ‘social death’ to describe the alienated condition of the enslaved subject, Sexton
proposes a return to this concept in order to determine whether or not contemporary Black
subjects continue to exist as socially dead. Sexton explains that his interest in Black social death
is not to deny Black social life, but to determine whether or not the structures of chattel slavery
continue to condition contemporary Black life. That is, one may be socially dead, according to
Sexton, but this does not mean that one does not have some degree of social life.
Sexton argues that in the contemporary US, Black subjects do in fact exist as socially
dead because the US has not overcome the divide between “the Slave from the world of the
Human in a constitutive way.” 32 Two things are important to note here. First, Sexton draws upon
Hartman’s ‘afterlife of slavery’ to support this claim. However, as I discussed in section I of this
chapter, what this afterlife of slavery means remains, as yet, underdeveloped. Second, Sexton’s
capitalization of Human in this context is a clear reference to Wytner’s political ontology.
However, although Sexton argues that chattel slavery created a divide between the Human and
Black subjects, it is hard to see how Wynter’s historiography supports this. As I have already
explained, Wynter identified two historical ruptures in the ontological order of Man: the fifteenth
century, specifically with the colonization of the Americas, and the eighteenth century with the
introduction of Darwin’s evolutionary theory.
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Critics of Afropessimism, such as Fred Moten, have claimed that their focus on social
death neglects the reality of social life. 33 In other words, Moten and others argue that
Afropessimists treat Blackness as if it is reducible and, thus, identical with death itself. Sexton
defends Afropessimism against this charge and, in so doing, he provides a more developed
account of what he means by social death:
black life is not social life in the universe formed by the codes of state and civil society,
of citizen and subject, of nation and culture, of people and place, of history and heritage,
of all the things that colonial society has in common with the colonized, of all that capital
has in common with labor—the modern world system. Black life is not lived in the world
that the world lives in, but it is lived underground, in outer space.34
Here I understand Sexton’s use of ‘social death’ to refer to Black subjects as non-participants in
the codes of civil society insofar as they are subject to a law that is fundamentally anti-Black.
This might also include the skewed life chances Hartman defines as the afterlife of slavery, along
with Angela Davis’ work on mass incarceration as disproportionately targeting Black subjects is
testament to this.35 I would agree with Sexton’s characterization in this regard. I would even add
to this that Black subjects are not granted full citizenship as evidenced in, for example, the
constant changes in the law regarding voting, which are clearly meant to disenfranchise Black
voters. But what does it mean to say that Black life is not formed by a nation, history, people,
culture? I would agree with Sexton that Black subjects are largely excluded from dominant
culture. We are radically underrepresented in popular films, with the exception of those depicting
the history of anti-Blackness—12 Years a Slave, Green Book, The Help. But to claim that Black
people, Black life is not formed by a culture is, in my view, symptomatic of Afropessimism’s
For a full account of Fred Moten’s critique of Afropessimism, see Fred Moten, “Blackness and Nothingness
(Mysticism in the Flesh),” The South Atlantic Quarterly 112, no.4 (2013): 737-780.
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failure to attend to the concrete conditions of Black life. Black meaning is created in fugitive
spaces, what Sexton here calls an ‘underground,’ but Black culture is not limited to this space. If
anything, we should say that Black culture is often subject to appropriation by members of the
dominant culture who seek to claim it as their own.
Warren’s claims regarding the non-being of contemporary Black subjects is, in my view,
also representative of Afropessimism’s unhistoricized conceptual framework; or rather, their
transhistorical use of political ontologies concerning chattel slavery. In his 2017 article,
“Onticide: Afro-pessimism, Gay Nigger #1, and Surplus,” Warren discusses the 2000 murder of
Steen Keith Fenrich.36 As Warren explain, Fenrich’s body was found dismembered, stored in a
blue plastic tub, and on his flayed and bleached skull was written both his social security number
and “Gay Nigger #1.”37 Warren considers Fenrich’s death through the lens of Warren’s antihumanism, another feature constitutive of Afropessimism. Reflecting on “Gay Nigger # 1”
branded onto Fenrich’s skull, Warren writes:
The term Gay Nigger #1 carved into Steen’s skull is a philosophical conundrum, or
problem space, precisely because it carries the antagonism between humanism and
fungibility within its discursive structure. The term Gay indexes human identity, and
Nigger is the ‘thing’ void of human ontology—ontology’s mystery. 38
The antagonism that Warren identifies between humanism and fungibility is derived from his
reading of Hartman’s concept of the enslaved as a fungible commodity. For Warren, humanism
and fungibility are antagonistic because Blackness has remained a fungible commodity since its
origination in chattel slavery. But Warren goes further than Hartman here by characterizing
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Blackness as ‘void of human ontology.’ Where Hartman restricted her analysis of the enslaved
subject to its ambivalent relation to humanity, Warren tautologically argues that Blackness is
entirely outside of humanity because it is a void of human ontology. For Hartman, fungibility
indicated the exchangeability and interchangeability of the enslaved subject, as I have already
discussed in chapter I of this dissertation. However, Warren, understands fungibility’s
exchangeability to mean “the undifferentiated zone of blackness.” 39 For Warren, this means that
identity markers such as ‘gay,’ ‘woman,’ ‘child’ do not really qualify the Black subject because
it is inherently undifferentiated; “the undifferentiated space of black fungibility in which
differences are irrelevant, since violence is gratuitous (antiblackness).” 40
Other Afropessimists, such as Wilderson and Patrice Douglass, contend that violence
constitutes the very being of Blackness. 41 Following Spillers, Afropessimists argue that the
gratuitous violence that the enslaved subject was forced to endure transformed their being to
non-existence, though to be clear, Spillers does deny that flesh has existence. Thus, reading these
claims back into Warren’s comments regarding fungibility, we are left to conclude that
Blackness is fungible, undifferentiated, and non-being because violence constitutes the very
(non)being of Blackness. In other words, for Warren the ontological violence by which enslaved
subjects were excluded from the Human is the condition of Blackness itself. This includes
Blackness today, in his view. However, we are not told how the ontological violence forced upon
the enslaved subject has transferred through the years to remain a constitutive feature of the
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contemporary Black subject. Again, we are simply told that Blackness exists as nonbeing
through ontological violence without explanation.
I highlight Warren’s article because, for me, it exemplifies the most extreme iteration of
Afropessimism. Using Wynter’s concept of the ‘genre-of-Man,’ Warren argues that identities do
not accrue for Black subjects because their Blackness renders them fundamentally
undifferentiated. This is in contrast to non-Black subjects who, Warren claims, have the ontometaphysical presence capable of differentiated identities. Thus, a white person can be gay,
straight, poor, or rich only because they first have the onto-metaphysical presence around which
such identities can accrue. In contrast to his, Black subjects are what Warren calls a function of
metaphysics. Black subjects are the condition for the possibility for metaphysics and ontology
itself. For Warren, this means that Blackness is fundamentally outside of the category of being
and, in turn, outside of the differentiated identities according to which various beings may be
identified. Warren advances his claim regarding the undifferentiated existence of Blackness
using Wynter’s concept ‘genres of Man’, which he understands as equivalent to social identities:
“I would suggest that we think of the terms human difference, such as woman, man, worker, and
in this case Gay, as the discursive vehicles of differentiating violence, or the ‘genres of Man’
according to Sylvia Wynter.” 42 To understand this thought, we should must return to Wynter’s
concept of Man. The notion of Man, for Wynter, is not developed within a metaphysical nor an
ontological framework. She is clear that Man is a praxis and not a noun. Wynter writes
“humanness is no longer a noun. Being human is a praxis.”43 Combining Foucault and Fanon,
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Wynter explains that humans invent the concept of Man and reproduce it in a law-like fashion
through performativity, which, as she describes, functions similarly to Judith Butler’s account of
gender performativity. For Warren to suggest, for example, that ‘worker’ is a genre-of-man, is in
my reading a misrepresentation of Wynter’s theory. For he means that a genre of man does not
alter Blackness; this is not Wynter’s position. In her article “Human as Noun,” Wynter defines
genre accordingly: “The term genre […] is here being used to denote, different, always autopoetically instituted and fictively constructed kinds of being.”44 Genre is, thus, a type of
performative expression of Man according to various categories including class, gender, sexual
orientation, etc. Wynter’s performative account of the operation of “fictively constructed kinds
[or genres] of being” thus evades the ontological framework employed by Warren. The important
distinction here is between kinds of beings and being itself. Warren is concerned with ontometaphysical being and Wynter, in contrast, is concerned with performative expressions of the
kinds of being made possible within the governing order of Man.
The Black Archive
This section begins with an account of the archive as developed by Michel Foucault his
1969 text, The Archaeology of Knowledge and the Discourse on Language.45 I appropriate
Foucault’s concept of the ‘archive’ for my own purposes to characterize the historical
transformations of anti-Blackness in terms of discursive regimes that may be grouped together to
constitute a Black archive. I examine how the contemporary Black subject lives in, through, and
as the Black archive in four ways. First, drawing on Christina Sharpe’s 2016 text, In the Wake:
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On Blackness and Being, I consider how contemporary Black subjects ‘live in the wake’ of the
archive. 46 That is, contemporary Black subjects live with the conceptual awareness of the Black
archive, and this awareness of the past conditions what Black subjects experience as available to
them within the present. Second, I describe Black subjects living as the Black archives through
Hortense Spillers’ concept the ‘hieroglyphics of the flesh,’ as developed in her article “Mama’s
Baby, Papa’s Maybe.”47 I consider how Black subjects live as the Black archive since they
embody the hieroglyphics of the flesh, which symbolically mark the Black body as the fleshy
history of captivity. 48 Third, returning to Foucault, specifically his 1971 article, “Nietzsche,
Genealogy, History,” I describe contemporary Black subjects living as the Black archive insofar
as the lines of descent are traced within the physiology of the Black body. 49 And fourth, drawing
from both Michael Hanchard’s 2008 article, “Black Memory versus State Memory: Notes toward
a Method,” and David Scott’s article, “Archaeologies of Black Memory,” I explain that Black
subjects live through the Black archive as a form of body-memory. 50 Bodily movements such as
reflexes and mannerisms are performed differently among the Black community. However, as I
will discuss, these bodily movements are nevertheless similarly conditioned by the body-memory
of the Black archive itself.
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I give special attention in this section to the history of chattel slavery as it conditions
Black subject formation in the US in the present. The history of slavery in the US is one pole
around which Black group identity is formed. As Ron Eyerman argues in his 2001 text, Cultural
Trauma: Slavery and the Formation of African American Identity, the history of slavery has been
an especially salient feature of contemporary Black identity from the time of Emancipation
through today: “Whether or not they directly experienced slavery or even had ancestors who did,
blacks in the United States were identified with and came to identify themselves through the
memory and representation of slavery.” 51 Thus, my exploration of Black history in the US is
focused on the history of slavery, captivity, trauma, and terror as this history conditions
contemporary Black life in the US.
History conditions contemporary Black subject formation in the US as an archive of the
Middle Passage through the present. The concept of archive that I use in reference to Black
history is informed by Foucault’s theory of the archive as developed his text, Archaeology of
Knowledge. I use the term ‘archive’ to designate the assemblage of multiple historical events and
discursive regimes that are similarly regulated by anti-Black disciplinary and regulatory
techniques of power. In a 1977 interview, “Truth and Power,” Foucault describes discursive
regimes as “the effects of power peculiar to the play of statements.”52 The term ‘discursive
regime’ refers to how the statement is transformed or maintained according to the functioning of
power. What makes a statement verifiable or true as determined by power, thus, constitutes the
realm of the discursive regime. To understand my concept of the archive, let us first get clear on
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the concept from which I draw my own. In Archaeology, Foucault characterizes his concept of
the ‘archive’ as follows: “The archive is first the law of what can be said, the system that governs
the appearance of statements as unique events.”53 An archive is a system governing statements,
which allows certain statements to be said and leaves others unsaid. It is a system that constitutes
regularities between discursive regimes and historical epochs. According to Foucault, an archive
is a conceptual framework that orders discursive regimes according to their shared conditions of
possibility without reducing these shared conditions to a historical continuity. Foucault argues
that the system of regularities that constitute the archive are the ‘historic a prioris’ of discursive
regimes, which regimes he defines as “a condition of reality for statements.” 54 The ‘historic a
priori’ refers to the conditions of possibility—how certain statements, events, or things not only
emerge, but emerge as legible and verifiable within a given discursive regime.
Foucault’s ‘archive’ is, thus, developed in contrast to the traditional notion of the archive
as a formal institution of record-keeping in which documents are said to be related only if they
refer to the same historical era, person, or event. Foucault writes:
the archive is […] that which determines that all these things said do not accumulate
endlessly in an amorphous mass, nor are they inscribed in an unbroken linearity, nor do
they disappear at the mercy of chance external accidents; but they are grouped together in
distinct figures, composed together in accordance with multiple relations, maintained or
blurred in accordance with specific regularities. 55
Foucault’s archive does not group together all of history into an amorphous mass, but rather it
groups together historical events according to the specific regularities shared among discursive
regimes. For example, Foucault examines the communication between natural scientists Carolus
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Linneaus and Georges-Louis Leclerc, Comte de Buffon to identify the broader epistemological
field and conceptual field that constituted “the same field of battle” for both. 56 It is because of
arguments between Linneaus and Buffon, according to Foucault, that Linneaus’ taxonomy of
species could eventually emerge and win out over Buffon’s competing taxonomy. Thus, an
archive would expand Linneaus’ oeuvre to include the battle of ideas that were, for Foucault, the
condition of possibility for Linneaus’ claims to emerge as true.
In his 2014 chapter “Archive,” Richard A. Lynch distinguishes between Foucault’s
concept ‘episteme’ and his concept ‘archive’. Lynch explains: “The episteme reflects the
relations that exist between sciences or discourses, whereas the archive is the set that
encompasses these discourses (as well as the relations between them) and gives them their
regularity.”57 The archive is, therefore, a much broader conceptual framework for analyzing
history than Foucault’s ‘episteme’. It is an assemblage of various epistemological fields, the
fields of possibility for a statement to emerge, and their respective systems of rules. Identifying
the regularity between discursive regimes does not, however, render these regimes static. An
archive treats history as malleable and gathers together historical epochs and discursive regimes
according to a regularity, which is not the same as a transcendental or an ahistorical rule.
The Foucauldian concept of the ‘archive’ is important for my purposes for two reasons.
First, an archive groups together various discursive regimes according to their shared regularities
without eliding the distinct elements of each regime. To give an example from the contexts that
concern me here, the history of chattel slavery is distinct from the history of Jim Crow; however,
we may gather these histories together in an archive according to their shared disciplinary and
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regulatory techniques, assuming we identify them. Second, I am interested in identifying the US
Black history with which I am concerned with an ‘archive’ in order to contribute to a symbolic
restoration of the archival records related to US Black history that have either been lost or were
never recorded. As David Scott explains in his 2008 article, “Introduction: On the Archaeologies
of Black Memory,” developing a Black archive is, “the constructing of what might be called an
institution of memory and an idiom of remembering.”58 Following Foucault, Scott understands
the archive at the level of discourse and the statement. The archive is not a catalogue of what has
been said, but an assemblage of the conditions of possibility for statements to be made and others
to go unsaid. Scott refers to the archaeological act of recovering archives—recovering the
context in which statements were made both possible and impossible—as remembering. On the
archival approach I develop, I extend the archive to include subject formation conditioned by the
act of remembering of which Scott writes. I characterize the Black archive as a form of
remembering the history of Black trauma and violence from the Middle Passage to the present
which affects contemporary Black subject formation. However, I do not regard Black subject
formation to be analogous to the subject formation or ontological status of enslaved subjects.
Unlike claims made by Sharpe, Hartman, and by theorists working within Afropessimism, I
explain that contemporary Black subjects in the US are conditioned by the memory of anti-Black
history, that is, we are already Black archives.
I develop the notion of a Black archive in conversation with Foucault’s archeological
writings. Foucault is clear in his discussion of the ‘archive,’ that concept of ‘statements’ may
include events or things. 59 Thus, in my re-appropriation of the Foucauldian archive, my focus is
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not on enunciative statements, but rather various discursive regimes and historical events related
to Black life in the US, which are distinct and yet, share specific regularities. If we focus
primarily upon the archive as “that which differentiates discourses in their multiple existence and
specifies them in their own duration,”60 then we may attend to the multiple existences of Black
discursive regimes, which may be grouped together into a Black archive according to their
shared system of regularities. I use the term ‘Black archive’ to indicate the assemblage of
multiple discursive regimes and historical events related to Black life in the US, including chattel
slavery, Jim Crow, Black power movements of the 60s and 70s, and Black Lives Matter
movements. I do so because I recognize in these discursive regimes a distinct and, yet, shared
system of regularities, namely, the surveilling, anti-Black disciplinary and regulatory techniques
of biopower.
Accepting Foucault’s claim that an archive cannot be exhaustively described, I limit my
account of the Black archive to consider how it conditions contemporary Black subject
formation. 61 Christina Sharpe’s analytic of ‘wake work’ as developed in, In the Wake: On
Blackness and Being, allows us to think of an archive as it is both lived in and through by the
contemporary Black subject: “the conceptual frame of and for living blackness in the diaspora in
the still unfolding aftermaths of Atlantic chattel slavery.”62 That the aftermaths of Atlantic
chattel slavery are still unfolding, indicates that this history is not temporally behind us. Sharpe
describes living in this still unfolding aftermath as “living in the wake” of Black history. 63 And,
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playing on the multiple definitions of wake as vigil, celebration, tracks left on the water’s
surface, and wakefulness, Sharpe describes living in the wake of Black history as occupying this
history within the present: “Black being in the wake [is a form of] consciousness and […] to be
in the wake is to occupy and to be occupied by the continuous and changing present of slavery’s
as yet unresolved unfolding.”64 Living in the wake of Black history is, thus, living with the
awareness of the past as it unfolds within the present to condition present possibilities of and for
Black life. Stated otherwise, living in the wake is living in the Black archive as both temporally
past and as it continues to unfold in the present to condition Black subject formation.
But what does “still unfolding” mean here? The history of the wake that conditions
contemporary Black life is described by Sharpe as a conceptual awareness of a history of
exclusion, abjection, terror, and trauma. Sharpe writes: “Living in the wake means living the
history and present of terror, from slavery to the present, as the ground of our everyday Black
existence; living historically and geographically dis/continuous but always present and endlessly
reinvigorated brutality in, and on, our bodies.” 65 The forms of terror experienced by Black
subjects in the US have transformed throughout history and across geographies, and these
transformations are reflected in distinct discursive regimes. Sharpe’s description of living the
‘historically and geographically dis/continuous’ terror induced by anti-Black oppression and
violence bolsters my claim that Black history ought to be treated as an archive. However,
because these discursive regimes are connected according to specific regularities—techniques
aimed at creating terror for Black subjects—they may be grouped together to constitute a living
archive. I characterize the Black archive as ‘living,’ because, as Sharpe explains, the temporality
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of this archive is both past and present. The Black archive is thus, both an assemblage of
historical events as discursive regimes related to Black life and a manner of living Black history
as both past and present.
To live ‘as’ the Black archive is also to live with what Hortense Spillers refers to in her
article, “Mama’s Baby, Papa’s Maybe,” as the “hieroglyphics of the flesh.” 66 As discussed in
Chapter One of this dissertation, Spillers argues that the violent practices and instruments used to
enslave Africans and (re-)enslave African Americans, transformed their being into flesh: “If we
mean ‘flesh’ as a primary narrative, then we mean its seared, divided, ripped-apartness, riveted to
the ship’s hole, fallen, or ‘escaped’ overboard.”67 In the acts of being seared, divided, and ripped
apart, Spillers explains, the captive’s body was transformed into flesh. The body and flesh qua
biological material, were wounded through the violent practices of enslavement. However,
according to Spillers, in this process of wounding, the enslaved was transformed from subject to
object, person to commodity, and from body to flesh. Flesh designates the ‘thingliness’ to which
Black persons were reduced in the process of enslavement: “the captive body reduces to a thing,
becoming being for the captor.”68 ‘Being for’ here indicates the enslaved subject’s dispossession
of body and the corresponding dispossession of self. A being reduced to flesh is described by
Spillers as an existential ‘being for’ another. Stated otherwise, flesh lacks the capacity to occupy
the existential position that is for-itself, and instead flesh is restricted to the position of being-foranother, namely the captor. Spillers explores this position of ‘being for’ in terms of its particular
effects for the female captive turned flesh. That is, female flesh became “the source [i.e., being]
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of an irresistible, destructive sensuality” for the captor’s sexual and sensual pleasure. 69 Without
seeking to abstract race from gender in my adoption of Spillers’ concept of ‘flesh,’ I want to
attend to the symbolic characteristic of the hieroglyphics of the flesh in order to explore how
these hieroglyphics are both inherited and lived by the contemporary Black subject. In so doing,
we may continue to expand upon the contemporary Black subject formation as it is conditioned
by the Black archive.
According to Spillers, during Emancipation Black subjects became embodied
personhoods, and were, thus, no longer flesh. However, Black body is marked by the history of
wounds and wounding that once produced flesh. Symbolically, the hieroglyphics of flesh
represent alleged “visible truths” about Black subjects. Spillers describes these hieroglyphics as
visually depicted in skin tone, what she calls a ‘cultural seeing by skin color.’ The hieroglyphics
of the flesh symbolize the production of values and meanings—"ocular truths”—and the
corresponding associations of these values and meanings to races according to visible
differences, such as skin tone. Thus Black/Brown skin symbolically represents the alleged
“truth” of a Black subject’s inferiority to whiteness, or of hypersexuality, or criminality, or any
number of anti-Black characterizations of Blackness.70
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The fleshy history represented in Spiller’s hieroglyphics is “transferred,” according to
Spillers, through “various symbolic substitutions in an efficacy of meaning that repeat the
initiating moment.”71 The captive flesh is, therefore, substituted for the Black body within the
dominant symbolic order that transfers the status of cultural vestibulary from the captive to the
Black subject. Again, we see that the history of the Black archive is lived by the contemporary
Black subject. Drawing upon Sharpe, we could see history lived as a conceptual awareness of the
Black archive as both past and present. And drawing upon Spillers, we see the Black archive is
lived as the embodiment of the Black archive.
What is important, for both Spillers’ purposes and my own, is that the symbolic order
which produces values and meanings represented in the visible features of the Black body today,
originated in the symbolic order that previously governed practices of captivity and the reduction
of Black subject to flesh: “dominant, symbolic activity, the ruling episteme that releases the
naming and valuation, remains grounded in the originating metaphors of captivity and
mutilation.”72 Thus, dark skin is not a value-neutral visible truth about Black people. The visible
truths associated with, projected onto, and internalized by Black subjects are determined by the
ruling episteme. This episteme characterizes the visible truths seen from the position of the
racializing gaze, which I considered in the previous chapter. Ultimately, we should say that the
hieroglyphs of the flesh symbolize the history of “depravation and deprivation.” 73 That is, these
hieroglyphics symbolize the historical wounding of the Black body turned flesh. The
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contemporary Black subject, thus, lives as the Black archive in her dark/darkened skin tone,
which is marked by hieroglyphics that symbolize anti-Black “truths” and the historical
wounds/wounding of Black captives.
Having considered the formation of the contemporary Black subject as living the Black
archive qua consciousness of living in the wake, and living the Black archive qua inheriting
bodily symbols of Blackness’ fleshy history, I now want to focus on the Black archive as it is
physiologically inscribed into the Black body. Extending Spillers’ concept of hieroglyphics of
the flesh beyond the symbolic realm, I describe these hieroglyphics as traced in the physiology of
the Black body as lines of descent. The claim I seek to advance here, is that the history of antiBlackness is sedimented into the organism of the contemporary Black subject, which, as I will
later discuss, creates a body-memory that influences the styles, gestures, and reactions of
contemporary Black embodiment.
The project of interpreting the embodiment of historical Black trauma is both
archaeological and genealogical in scope. First examining the genealogy of embodied Black
trauma, I draw upon Foucault’s description of genealogy as developed in his article, “Nietzsche,
Genealogy, History.” In this article, Foucault provides an interpretation of Nietzschean
genealogy, which he identifies as “effective history” in opposition to traditional history. 74
Foucault describes traditional history as the search for origins such as, for example, the origins of
values or traditions. In this search, the traditional historian (re-)constructs continuities between
historical events. In contrast, genealogy, as ‘effective history,’ rejects this search for origins in
favor of ‘points of emergence’—when and how values came into being—by tracing the
discontinuities and accidents underlying the emergence of values, etc. Thus, a genealogy of
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Black history and the Black body, would trace the discontinuities and errors from which, among
other things, ‘Black’ as a racial category eventually emerged. Rather than attempt this much
larger genealogical task of identifying points of emergence, what Foucault calls ‘Enstehun’, I
want to instead trace the lines of descent carved onto the biological organism of the Black body
using the genealogical method referred to by Foucault as ‘Herkunft’.75 To be clear, my concern
with the body here is not a reduction of Black subjects to their biological organism; nor do I
claim that all Black bodies share the same lines of descent, physiological or otherwise. Rather, I
aim to extend the symbolic register of Spillers’ ‘hieroglyphics of the flesh’ to analyze the depth
to which the Black archive is embodied by Black subject, which extends beyond the ‘cultural
seeing by skin color.’ In other words, I am interested in identifying how the Black archive is
lived in the body and expressed through modes of embodiment.
In order to do so, however, I need to further specify the Foucauldian conception of
genealogy I am drawing upon. Herkunft, translated by Bouchard and Simon as ‘descent,’ is the
method of tracking the discontinuities in traits, described by Foucault as “the subtle, singular,
and sub individual marks that might possibly intersect in them to form a network that is hard to
unravel.”76 In contrast to this method, traditional history identifies the continuities (i.e., shared)
traits, understood as blood lines and physical characteristics, among social categories such as
class or race. For example, phenotypical traits—the observable traits of an organism—have long
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been used in the US to distinguish between and categorize races. 77 The genealogical task as
Herkunft, however, identifies “the accidents, the minute deviations—or conversely, the complete
reversals—the errors, the false appraisals, and the faulty calculations that gave birth to those
things that continue to exist and have value for us.”78 Thus, genealogy identifies how racial
divisions based on, for example, phenotypical traits continue to function as a purportedly
“valuable” method for classifying racial groups; understanding why phenotypical traits are still
commonly considered accurate measures of racial difference or sameness, despite evidence to
the contrary provided by social and biological scientists, is the task of genealogy.
Herkunft is especially relevant for our purposes because, as Foucault explains, it concerns
how history is physically manifest in the body: “The body—and everything that touches it: diet,
climate, and soil—is the domain of Herkunft. The body manifests the stigmata of past experience
and also gives rise to desires, failings, and errors.”79 Here, Foucault is explicitly interpreting
Nietzsche’s genealogy, and not providing an account of his own unique genealogical method.
Foucault’s own genealogical method concerns the processes through which the body is
disciplined, and, in turn, how the body is molded through these disciplinary practices. Rather
than attempt to reconcile Foucault’s definition of genealogy as provided in the above quote with
his own genealogical work, I am instead concerned with how we may think of the ‘stigmata of
past experience’ manifested in the Black body. That is, how is the Black archive, the trauma of
historical anti-Black oppression and violence, today manifested in or on the Black body?
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Recalling Spillers’ claim that the body of the enslaved subject was transformed into flesh
through practices and instruments of wounding, we could say that these practices are marked as
‘lines of descent’ in the physiology of the contemporary Black body. I do not mean marked in
the symbolic sense as I have already considered above. Rather, I want to describe the Black body
as physiologically inscribed by the events and instruments of wounding. While the anti-Black
disciplinary techniques used to dominate enslaved subjects are distinct from those used in the
domination and oppression of contemporary Black subjects in the US, we can identify between
them a shared regularity with our concept of the Black archive. Foucault writes:
The body is the inscribed surface of events (traced by language and dissolved by ideas), the
locus of the dissociated self (adopting the illusion of a substantial unity), and a volume in
perpetual disintegration. Genealogy as an analysis of descent, is thus situated within the
articulation of the body and history. Its task is to expose a body totally imprinted by history
and the process of history’s destruction of the body. 80
The body is the inscribed surface of events because it is affected by its environment. Foucault
explains that “diet, climate, and soil” touch the organic material of the body. 81 For example,
someone living in the Caribbean is exposed to stronger ultraviolet sun rays than someone living
in Norway. Exposure to sun might cause one’s skin color to appear tan; it might also lead to skin
cancer. In this sense, the history of one’s exposure to a certain climate is inscribed on the skin of
the body and in one’s very cells. In addition to one’s environment, the body is also affected by
various activities taken up by a subject. For example, truck drivers often suffer from chronic
back pain because their job requires them to sit for hours at a time, which strains the joints.
Carpenters who work without adequate protection might be exposed to asbestos in old insulation,
which can lead to lung cancer and other respiratory illnesses. The lines of descent carved into the
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body are historical traces of the body’s exposure to its environment and participation in certain
activities. Tan skin, skin cancer, back pain, and lung cancer are all examples of the processes of
history’s destruction on the body. In keeping with the genealogical commitment to identifying
discontinuities, Foucault characterizes the self as an illusory substantial reality. However, the
body in Foucault’s description, even in its perpetual disintegration, is a substantial unity; and it is
in the body that the history of destruction is imprinted. I want to extend Foucault’s claim further,
to consider how the history of destruction, a history that is both past and present, is imprinted
upon the Black body to condition the movements of the contemporary embodied Black subject.
In other words, I am interested in exploring how the history of destruction inscribed in the Black
body constitutes something like a ‘body-memory’ for contemporary Black subjects. In this vein,
I will explore Black archaeologies of the Black body as it has been theorized by contemporary
thinkers in Black studies.
I understand Black archaeology to be a methodological and conceptual framework that
emphasizes the body, history, and memory. In his article, “Archaeologies of Black Memory,”
Scott explains that an archaeology of Black history requires the work of memory, or
remembering, to reclaim what has been lost or never recorded in an archive understood in the
traditional sense as a collection of records, bodies of work, etc. Scott develops the notion of “an
archaeology of black memory” to emphasize the role of memory in the constitution of a Black
archive. 82 Drawing upon Foucault’s theory of archive, as I have likewise sought to do throughout
this section, Scott makes a distinction between ‘memory-thinking’ and ‘body-memory.’ That is,
he argues that in addition to ‘memory-thinking,’ where memory re-constructs the archive as
social practices, narratives, and records, there is also a kind of body-memory or, as Scott writes,
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“body [as] a memory-machine.”83 Body’s habit-memory, as described by Scott, is the archival
sedimentation of Black history into the Black body:
The [concept of the] body’s ‘habit-memory’ […] re-orients our attention to the ways we
preserve the past without explicitly re-presenting it to ourselves in words and images, to
the social disciplines and rituals and techniques by which the body (in its distinctive
postures and gait and modes of adornment) learns to be—and acquires the memory of
being—a body of a certain kind: a black body, for example. In habit-memory, the past is
not ‘pictured’ as such but sedimented into the body.84
I understand the point that the past is sedimented into the body, as described by Scott, to refer to
the inscriptions of history on and in the body. The process of sedimentation mirrors Foucault’s
account of genealogy, rather than his account of archaeology. In chapter II of this dissertation, I
provided a phenomenological account of sedimentation in the context of ‘body schema,’ ‘body
image,’ and ‘habit body,’ which I understand as distinct from ‘body-memory.’ However, Scott
does not describe his archaeology according to a phenomenological framework. Rather, he draws
upon sociology to describe postures and gaits that become sedimented in the habit-memory of
the body through traditions and learned ‘techniques of the body.’ This last expression is an
explicit reference to the work of sociologist Marcel Mauss who wrote about habits as techniques
of the body.85 Re-orienting our attention from archives as formally constructed spaces in which
historical documents are preserved, Scott asks us to consider how the body itself preserves the
past. My interest at this point is not with habits or habit-memory, though I do return to these
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concepts throughout this dissertation. Rather, I want to ask if the contemporary Black subject is
conditioned, at least in part, by a collective Black body-memory of the past. Is the Black body
itself a Black archive qua collective Black body-memory?
Exploring this question of collective Black body-memory, I now consider whether, as
Black subjects, our gestures, reflexes, and other bodily movements are shaped by a ‘collective
body-memory’ of the Black archive. In his article, “Black Memory versus State Memory,”
Michael Hanchard explains that memory and history are “documented” in modes of
embodiment. He writes:
memory shares with history the space between the documentation of events, practices, and
presences in visual and literary form, and life itself, which eludes total capture; the gestures,
speeches, modes of dress, acts of solidarity and betrayal, furtive projects and open conflicts
are lost if not recuperated and documented in either memory or history. 86
Hanchard is here concerned with collective, as opposed to individual, memory of Black subjects.
Collective memory is the documentation of history, for Hanchard, which does not simply mean
physical documents or museum artifacts, but memory and history as documented in life itself.
Styles of embodiment, speech, etc. are transmitted across generations through storytelling and
tradition, and these styles are either adopted, altered, or lost in their transmission. Defining the
parameters of Black memory as “the phenomena of a collectivity rather than the practice of an
isolated and disparate array of individuals,” Hanchard allows us to consider how embodiment is
remembered in collective Black memory as a form of life itself. 87 That is, for Hanchard, memory
includes the memory of past expressions of embodiment, such as gestures. As these memories
are transmitted through generations, we must consider how the memory of modes of embodiment
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is re-embodied, remembered, by Black subjects. However, as Eyerman discusses in his text,
Cultural Trauma, collective memory is mediated through history, which means that what is
transmitted through generations are not direct experiences.88 When I see visual images of slaves
working in the field, I do not re-embody the posture of working in a field. The point is not that
history is repeated in memory as a re-enactment of the past, but that history is embedded within
our bodies as memories. Given the collective body memory that is Black memory, Eyerman asks
us to consider how “the past becomes present through the embodied reactions of individuals as
they carry out their daily lives.” 89 How does the collective memory of historical anti-Black
violence condition our contemporary expression of Black embodiment under white supremacy?
Eyerman sees in rap music, the legacy of Black resistance to anti-Black violence and oppression:
“The legacy of slavery and the heroes and values of the black power era are especially present in
rap lyrics, performance style, body language, and […] in recorded image.” 90 The rap group
N.W.A, active in the late eighties and early nineties, became famous for lyrics that overtly
expressed resistance. Their 1988 sound “Fuck the Police” included lyrics protesting the police
brutality of contemporary Black subjects in the US. N.W.A’s acts of resistance were so powerful
in fact, that their music was ultimately banned from most mainstream US radio stations.
According to Eyerman, the spirit of resistance in rap music is informed by the history of Black
struggle and resistance dating back to chattel slavery. While the forms of resistance differ
between the contemporary setting and chattel slavery, the expression of resistance itself is shared
between these historical periods. The collective memory of Black resistance has been transmitted
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across generations and expressed in unique styles of embodiment, style, art, and other features of
Black life.
I offer these reflections on collective Black body-memory in order to consider how the
history of anti-Blackness is corporeally manifested in the contemporary Black body. I want to reemphasize that I do not argue that all Black subjects or Black bodies shared the same bodymemory. It is also important that we acknowledge that the distance we have from an original
event, such as chattel slavery, affects the degree to which our body-memories are shaped by the
remembered event. But, if we consider the collective body-memory of Black subjects, then we
may say that many of us inherit the body-memory of anti-Black history, though, again, we do so
in distinct ways. And if we consider history in the context of contemporary Black formation,
then I think it likely that many of us who are Black and living in the US, have some kind of
collective Black body-memory of slavery sedimented into our modes of corporeality. 91 If our
bodies are sedimented by a history of trauma, then how are our modes of embodiment altered or
freed in the space of fugitivity? I will explore this question further in chapter IV of this
dissertation.
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Chapter Four: The Crucible of Black Gesture
This goal of this chapter is to establish an account of Black gestures as immanent
expressions of Black meaning that are not about white supremacy or anti-Blackness; Black
gestures and Black meanings are, in my account, created in fugitive spaces and produce new
meaning. Rather than provide a strict definition of gesture, I explicate two distinct theories:
Vilém Flusser’s symbolic theory of gesture and a theory of gesture based upon Maurice MerleauPonty’s phenomenological. Taken together, Merleau-Pontian and Flusserian theories of gesture
allow us to recognize a variety of gestures in contrast to mere movement; so too do they provide
us multiple ways to register the meaning expressed in a gesture. There are gestures that we
intentionally perform and are fully conscious of (e.g., waving hello); there are also gestures that
may be sufficiently explained through physical causation (e.g., a reflex); and there are gestures
that are both developed within and characterized by our socio-political contexts (e.g., avoiding
eye contact)., Black gesture or Black gesticulation.
In section one of this chapter, I examine Vilém Flusser’s theory of gesture. For Flusser,
gestures are deliberate acts performed by a subject who seeks to represent and express an
underlying symbolic meaning. In this account, gestures are tools of the body and, as such, they
are not immanently meaningful. That is, Flusser’s theory of gesture is not rooted in a specifically
embodied subjectivity. Rather, Flusser adopts the Kantian position of the subject as primarily a
consciousness that experiences the world through categories and pure intuitions. By conceiving
of subjectivity primarily as a consciousness, Flusser neglects the body’s own potential to produce
meaning. It is for this reason that gestures, as bodily movements, are not regarded by Flusser as
immanently meaningful—meaningful in themselves, independently of others, and not as the
product of a non-embodied consciousness.
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In section two, I draw upon Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s existential phenomenology to
develop a theory of gesture rooted in embodied intentionality. I explore linguistic and bodily
gestures within Merleau-Ponty’s work to examine how and what gestures immanently signify. I
explain that, because linguistic and bodily gestures emerge from an embodied intentionality, they
are meaningful in themselves. This is in contrast to gestures conceived of as signs of meaning,
where the meaning remains external to the gesture itself.
In the third section, I explicate my concept of fugitivity in two ways. First, I draw upon
Saidiya Hartman’s concept of the ‘loophole of retreat’ to identify fugitivity as a retreat from
white supremacy and anti-Blackness. Second, I explore the places in which Black queer
ballrooms were held in the early nineties to provide a concrete example of fugitive territory.
In the fourth, and final section of this chapter, I work through three examples of Black
gesture: i) the Black Nod, ii) Tommie Smith’ and John Carlos’ raised fists at the 1968 Olympics,
and iii) Black queer ballroom performances. I characterize the Black Nod as an empty signifier
that does not itself have meaning, but points toward fugitivity and Black meaning. In the case of
the Nod, the gesture is a sign of meaning that exists elsewhere, namely in fugitivity. Next, I
examine Smith’s and Carlos’ gesture(s) through the Flusserian model of gesture to characterize
the deliberate and symbolic meaning expressed in their gestures. I extend this analysis by
exploring meanings expressed in Smith’s and Carlos’ gesture(s) that they do not deliberately
intend to express. And finally, I examine immanently meaningful Black gestures and meaning
created in Black queer ballrooms through an uninhibited embodied intentionality.
Flusser’s Theory of Gesture
What kind of phenomenon is gesture? What does gesture communicate and how do we
interpret it? While these questions are not entirely new to philosophy, they have traditionally
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been considered only in relation to another, more central, philosophical aim. Semioticians, for
example, have examined gesture as one kind of sign among others, including words, images,
sounds, and objects.1 In this context, the philosophical investigation is primarily concerned with
signs, and gesture is bracketed within this larger framework. Phenomenologists, as I will
demonstrate in the next section of this chapter, have examined gesture as a kind of signification.
Again, we see gesture as one kind of another concept, i.e., signification, which constitutes the
philosophical focus. Philosopher and media studies theorist, Vilém Flusser’s 1991 text, Gestures,
inverts this model: his primary philosophical aim is understanding what gestures are and how
they communicate. For the first time, we discover a theory of gesture where gesture is not an
example of another, more central, concept; gesture is the central concept.
Flusser’s goal in Gestures is defining gesture in order to establish what he calls ‘a
phenomenology of gesture.’2 As I will demonstrate later in this section, Flusser’s emphasis on a
phenomenological investigation of gesture is best understood as an attempt to interpret, as
opposed to explaining, gesture.3 Thus, while Flusser does offer a brief definition of gesture, his
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concern with the interpretation of gestures allows him to pursue two aims: 1) determining an
appropriate disciplinary approach and method for understanding the importance of gesture and,
2) establishing what and how gestures communicate. Ultimately, for Flusser, because the
humanities seek to interpret phenomena, they provide the appropriate methodological tools to
understand the significance of gesture by contrast to what he refers to as the ‘information
sciences’. Drawing upon these humanistic traditions, with special emphasis on semiotics and
phenomenology, Flusser defines gesture as the free and willful act of a subject who wishes to
communicate a codified meaning for another who is familiar with the code to interpret.
Because gesture constitutes the central theme of Flusser’s work, at least in the case of
Gestures, I regard his work as important for the project at hand. However, because his theory of
gesture fails to consider a more robust phenomenology of embodiment, one that would include
the social, political, and historical significance of gestures, I do not heavily rely upon his work to
establish my own concept of Black gestures and Black gesticulation. Flusser’s classification of
gesture as a deliberate act of a subject neglects those gestures that result from unconscious
processes of habituation.
Flusser provides several tentative descriptions of gesture that themselves require
interpretation. First, he describes gestures as “movements of the body that express an intention,”
before immediately casting aside this account for its lack of imprecision. 4 In order to avoid what
he calls the ‘ontological trap’ of defining intention, Flusser switches gears, so to speak. 5 Rather
than begin with a definition of gesture, Flusser proposes we first consider what method is best
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suited for a theory of gesture. In this vein, Flusser explicitly rejects what he refers to as ‘causal
explanations’ of gesture in favor of an interpretive theory of gesture. Thus, while gestures may
have a causal explanation—physiological, psychological, economic, etc.—this explanation
proves unsatisfactory for Flusser. The first serviceable definition of gesture he provides reflects
just this:
‘a gesture is a movement of the body or of a tool connected to the body for which there is
no satisfactory causal explanation.’ And I define satisfactory as that point in discourse after
which any further discussion is superfluous. 6
Of course, this definition of gesture tells us more about what gesture is not than it does about
what exactly gesture is. Gesture is a movement of the body, but not just any movement of the
body. Gesture must contain something that exceeds causal analysis. If we look to Flusser’s other
work on communications, though, we can establish the importance of and reason for his rejection
of a causal definition of gesture.
In his 1973-74 article, “What is Communication?,” Flusser introduces a distinction
between the humanities and information sciences, which he later reiterates in Gestures.
Information sciences include psychology, sociology, economics, historical area studies,
linguistics, and any discipline that seeks to understand objectively either human nature or the
nature of reality. Flusser explains that these disciplines are concerned with explaining
phenomena as opposed to interpreting them. Explanations of phenomena yield useful
information, but these explanations necessarily miss something significant: the meaning of those
phenomena. In the context of communication, for example, information sciences might explain
communication as the “development of the communication of mammals, [or] as a consequence
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of human anatomy, or a particular method of transferring information.” 7 In this case,
communication can be satisfactorily explained according to its function, purpose, evolutionary
role, etc. Gesture, as one mode of communication, may be similarly explained according to
physiology, evolutionary psychology, etc. For example, if someone punches me in the arm and I
react by clasping my arm, then I can be said to have moved as a reflex or the result of some other
physiological process. This explanation tells us how the body moves or why the body moves
according to my physiological functions. However, this causal, physiological analysis (i.e.,
information science) can only tell us what a gesture is—it is a movement of the body—whereas
the humanities can tell us what a gesture means. To be more precise, only those movements that
are the result of an intention are gestures because only those movements are meaningful. In the
example of being punched, my physiological reaction is a movement and not a gesture. If,
however, I intend to represent my feeling of pain in my movement, then I have advanced to the
level of gesture.
We know that a gesture contains meaning, according to Flusser, because it is the result of
intention. That is, the gesture is neither accidental nor necessary—it is, what Flusser calls ‘an
artificial constructed’. In this model, only that which humans intentionally construct or
accomplish is meaningful. Thus, Flusser distinguishes between what I will refer to as ‘mere
movement’ and a gesture; the former is a movement of the body caused by external or internal
forces, and the latter is the result of human intention—a free act of a subject. In the Appendix to
Gestures, Flusser describes the three categories of movement in order to make explicit that, of
those three, only gestures are meaningful:
Gestures can be seen as a kind of movement. For this purpose, movements can be classified
as (1) those which can be adequately explained through an understanding of the effects of
external forces on the moving bodies; (2) those which require an understanding of the effect
7
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of forces within the moving body to be adequately explained; and (3) those that can be
explained as in class 2, but for which such an explanation is unsatisfying. An example of
class 1 would be an object in free fall; of class 2, the swimming movements of an amoeba;
of class 3, the movement of the hand in writing. 8
An object in free fall moves according to the rules of physics; the movement is the result of
necessity. Flusser argues that these causal analyses provide satisfactory accounts for necessary
and accidental movements. Similarly, the swimming movements of an amoeba can be
satisfactorily explained as the result of an internal compulsion. The amoeba moves not because
of an external force acting on it, but as the result of an internal force, what Flusser calls its
‘nature’. By contrast, gestures are intentional movements of the body; they are neither necessary
nor accidental, rather they are unconstrained and therefore free movements. Because gestures are
free, as opposed to necessary or accidental, they are ‘unnatural.’ In fact, all human
communication is unnatural, according to Flusser, because it is an artificial construct of human
intention: “Human communication is an artificial process. It relies on artistic techniques, on
inventions, on tools, and instruments, that is, on symbols ordered in codes.” 9 Again, the
unnatural and artificial character of gesture is due to its free, as opposed to necessary or
accidental, movement. Communication is freely constructed through subjective intention and
rendered meaningful through a system of symbols and codes.
The distinction between mere movement and gesture can help us understand Flusser’s
claim that only the latter represents an affect. We represent a meaningful ‘affect’ (Gestimmtheit)
through gestural codes.10 The Flusserian concept ‘affect’ does not mean ‘emotional state’ as
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would traditionally be the case. Rather, by affect Flusser means the purposeful representation of
a state of mind. 11 As we have already established, mere movement is defined by Flusser as a
movement resulting from either necessity or accident, and gesture is defined as the free
movement of a subject. In the context of affect, mere movement passively expresses a state of
affairs, whereas gesture actively expresses a state of affairs. The active expression of a state of
affairs would require the intention of the subject, and it is this intention that transforms the state
of affairs that are expressed in gesture into an affect, that is, into a purposeful representation of a
state of mind. In other words, according to Flusser, all bodily movements may express a state of
mind, but only the bodily movements we actively intend to perform have the potential to express
a higher-order state of mind, namely affect. So any reaction I have to being punched in the arm
can be said to express a state of affairs. If my reaction is determined entirely by necessity, as in
the case of reflex, then it only passively expresses a state of affairs: “The reactive movement of
my arm announces pain, and in this sense, it is to be understood that pain comes to expression

experiencing’ a mood or feeling” (Flusser, Gestures, 177). Stimmung, on the other hand, is translated by Roth as
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understand the importance of emphasizing ‘the condition of experiencing a mood’ as opposed to merely ‘the
experience of a mood.’ Rather than attempt to make explicit the otherwise implicit phenomenology at play in his
discussion of gesture, I will restrict my own interpretation of Flusser’s theory to his claims regarding causal versus
interpretive analyses and passive versus active representations of meaning.
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through the movement.”12 My movement expresses my experience of pain to another who can
then understand that I am in pain. There is nothing unnatural or artificial about this, however. It
is not until I express and articulate my state of affairs (i.e., pain) through the symbolic movement
of gesture, such as yelling “ouch”, that I express a state of affairs that reaches the level of affect.
I would express and articulate not just ‘pain,’ but ‘the condition of experiencing pain.’ Given his
concern with phenomenology, we can infer that the expression and articulation of my pain
represents something significant about my subjective experience. However, in what is an
apparent pattern for Flusser, we are not told how or why the active expression and articulation of
a state of affairs represents a phenomenal condition that is not similarly represented in the
passive expression of pain. We simply learn that mere movements passively express a state of
affairs, in contrast to gestures, which actively express and articulate the state of affairs called
affect.
Here we may finally begin to thread the needle of Flusser’s overarching claims regarding
gestures. First, only intentional as opposed to necessary or accidental movements are gestures.
We know that a movement is intentional, and therefore a gesture, if it is freely expressed by a
subject. Second, gestures are unnatural and artificial. And, because information sciences are
concerned with what is natural, they cannot properly attend to the unnatural expression of
gesture. Information science would seek to explain a gesture. In contrast, the humanities are
positioned to satisfactorily interpret the unnatural character of gestures. And third, gestures are
interpreted according to the symbols and codes expressed therein. These symbols and codes
express the ‘meaning’ of a gesture. Before we can explore Flusser’s understanding of symbols
and codes, we must first follow his elliptical line of thought: we must understand how and why
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humans create meaning before we can properly assess how and why symbols and codes express
meaning.
Returning to his article, “What is Communication?” we find something of an
existentialist theory of meaning in Flusser:
the purpose of the codified world [i.e., the world of codes] is to make us forget that it is an
artificial texture that imbues our essentially meaningless, insignificant nature with
significance according to our needs. The purpose of human communication is to make us
forget the meaningless context in which we are completely alone and incommunicado, that
is, the world in which we are condemned to solitary confinement and death: the world of
‘nature.’13
The Heideggerian influence is quite clear in this passage, though Flusser never explicitly
references Heidegger. Indeed, Flusser characterizes human’s ‘natural’ state as ‘being-towardsdeath.’ Our existence is, therefore, inextricably bound up with our death. According to Flusser,
we search for ways to create meaning within our lives because we cannot bear to face our death.
We “spin a veil” around ourselves “in the form of the codified world.” 14 Understood in this
manner, human communication is not natural so much as it is the result of our existential human
condition. Through communication, we can escape our solitude and take up residence in
community. In our community, we construct increasingly complex systems of communication
and meaning in order to ‘spin a veil’ around ourselves, which creates distance between ourselves
and our ‘natural state’ of being-towards-death.
Flusser’s existentialism, taken together with his semiotics, provides the backdrop against
which we can understand his theory of gesture. We make meaning by artificially constructing
symbols and codes in order to deny our natural state. This is why gestures must be freely and
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deliberately performed in contrast to ‘mere movements,’ which are necessary or accidental.
Meaning is only possible if it is the result of an unnatural and artificial construct. If
communication in general, and gestures in particular, are meaningful, it is neither because of
evolutionary necessity nor due to some other explanatory theory provided by sciences of
information rather than the physical sciences. Instead, communication is meaningful precisely
because we have freely created it.
Nonetheless, Flusser falls short in specifying the meaning expressed in a gesture. According
to Flusser, we recognize and interpret gestures through intuition. In fairness to Flusser, I
understand the nature of gestural interpretation to be an unresolved issue (or unsatisfactorily
explained) within semiotics and linguistics in general. Structuralist semioticians, such as Swiss
linguist Ferdinand de Saussure, argue that we interpret gestures through convention. Before
concluding this section with an account of Flusser’s theory of our intuitive interpretation of
gestures, it is important to first understand why philosophers have difficulty accounting for our
ability to interpret symbols, codes, and meaning in general.
In his 2007 text, Semiotics: The Basics, philosopher Daniel Chandler identifies the major
debates in semiology concerning how signs signify. While we can trace elements of semiotics
back to Ancient Greece, it is not until Saussure that we find a rigorous and fully developed
semiotic theory. For semiotic discourse, meaning is not contained in the world. Rather, meaning
is artificially constructed, transmitted, and interpreted by humans using signs and codes. 15 A sign
is meaningful, according to Saussure, if it contains two parts: the signifier and the signified.
Chandler describes the distinction accordingly: “the signifier [is] the form that the sign takes and
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the signified [is] the concept to which it refers.”16 Waving, for example, is frequently used as a
sign of greeting. The movement of my hand is the signifier; the greeting is the signified. What is
important here is that there is no necessary relation between the sign and the meaning expressed
therein. Saussure describes the relation between the signifier and the signified as arbitrary.
Chandler explains, “Although the signifier is treated by its users as ‘standing for’ the signified,
Saussurean semioticians emphasize that there is no necessary, intrinsic, direct or inevitable
relationship between the signifier and the signified. Saussure stressed the arbitrariness of the
sign.”17 There is nothing intrinsic to the movement of my hand when I wave that means ‘hello.’
It is a matter of convention, with varying levels of arbitrariness, that links the two. It does not
follow, however, that each individual can make arbitrary signifiers to represent a signified. I
cannot simply choose to shake my leg at someone and hope that they understand it as my
personal expression of greeting. While there is nothing in nature that determines which signifier
will be linked with which signified in communication, the meaningful expression of a sign is
bound by convention. Again, Chandler explains, “while the relationships between signifiers and
their signifieds are ontologically arbitrary […], this is not to suggest that signifying systems are
socially or historically arbitrary.”18 Meaning is established through conventions that result from
social and historical practices. Thus, if I hope to successfully express (to mean) ‘hello’ to
another, I must adhere to the systems already established through convention.
The notion of convention as developed within semiotics allows for a more robust
interpretation of Flusser’s meaning of intuition. In his discussion of how we interpret gestures,
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Flusser writes, “we have no theory of the interpretation of gestures and are restricted to an
empirical, ‘intuitive’ reading of the world of gestures, the codified world that surrounds us.” 19
For Flusser, we cannot exactly pinpoint the rules governing our interpretations of gestures.
‘Reading’ gestures is simply something we already know how to do. Drawing upon Saussure,
however, we could understand gestures as interpreted according to convention, which is itself
socially and historically constituted. Some gestures are so common to us that we do not even
realize when or that we have interpreted their meanings. Waving hello, for example, is such a
conventional gesture of greeting that I am likely to forget that the relation between the gesture
and its meaning is artificial. Other gestures, a sideways glance, for example, allows various,
though not infinite, interpretations. A glance might be a flirtatious gesture or a gesture of
shadiness depending upon the context. Thus, we may supplement Flusser’s brief discussion of
our intuitive interpretations of gesture with the Saussurean theory of semiotic convention.
A final point on Flusser’s notion of intuition before we conclude this section. According
to Flusser, not only do we interpret the meaning of a gesture through intuition, but we also
recognize a gesture through intuition. He writes:
When I observe another person and see gesticulation, I do in fact have a criterion for
deciding between reaction and gesture, between the expression of a state of mind and its
codified representation. This criterion is the fact that I recognize myself in others and that
I know from introspection when I am expressing a state of mind passively and when I am
representing it actively. 20
We can intuitively distinguish between a mere movement and a gesture as performed by another
subject by drawing upon our own experience. Though Flusser does not develop his claims about
recognition-based intuition, if we continue to supplement Flusser’s own position with Saussure’s
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theory of conventional codes, we may argue that our ability to recognize a gesture in another is
due to the conventional code expressed in the gesture. That is, if we are familiar with the
gesture’s code, then we might work back from the code to the underlying distinction between
mere movement and gesture. If, for example, I come across someone crying, my first reaction
might be to ask the person if they are okay or ask if something is bothering them. I have
recognized the gestures associated with crying and I intuitively interpret the code as signifying a
state of sadness. Flusser might say that I recognize in the other the expression of the condition of
experiencing sadness. In either case, I intuitively perceive the significance expressed in the
gestural code. If, however, the other explains that she is not crying but that her eyes are watering
because they are dry, then I would re-calculate my assessment and determine that her watering
eyes were not in fact a gesture. Our intuitions are not objective criteria that unerringly allow us to
distinguish between mere movement and gesture. Intuitions are developed in relation to social
and cultural convention. Thus, if we were to develop Flusser’s recognition-based account of
intuition, we have to further explore the relation between intuition and familiarity with
convention. We can simply conclude that, for Flusser, there is no objective method by which we
identify a gesture. We must simply rely upon our intuitions to guide us.
Turning now to a Merleau-Pontian phenomenology of gesture, I explore a theory of
gesture as immanently meaningful in contrast to the Flusserian gesture, which relied upon an
external code for its meaning. In Flusser, we have discovered that some gestures are deliberate
acts of signification that express a subject’s affect. However, this theory neglects the crucial fact
that some gestures occur as a result of pre-cognitive processes of habituation; a Flusserian
account might wrongly class these as mere reactions or reflexes, but a richer phenomenology
will offer us a third option for this kind of meaning-making. A more robust account of
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subjectivity than that offered by Flusser, one provided to us by phenomenology, will account for
the kinds of gestures that occur as a result of pre-cognitive processes of habituation. Those are
best exemplified by such gestures as a woman who unconsciously avoids making eye contact
with a man passing by in order to signal lack of interest, or someone who unconsciously rolls
their eyes in response to someone arguing that their workplace has sexist policies, or even an
animal lover who unconsciously smiles and greets a dog walking by before greeting the person
walking the dog. While Flusser may provide us with the theoretical tools to identify a gesture as
opposed to a meaningless movement, Merleau-Ponty allows us to go further to understand the
pre-cognitive processes of habituation that condition the possible meaning expressed in gesture.
Merleau-Ponty’s Gestures
Merleau-Ponty shares with Flusser the belief that the significance represented in a gesture
exceeds the explanatory laws of causal and/or mechanistic theory. Flusser rejects causal
interpretations of gestures in favor of a quasi-existentialism that grounds the interpretation of
gesture in intuitions of resemblance. For Flusser, I recognize a gesture because I can recall
having previously performed a similar gestural expression within my own subjective history. I
have waved and, thus, I recognize the symbolic expression of another’s wave. Merleau-Ponty’s
theory of gesture is similarly based in an existentialism. However, for Merleau-Ponty, gestures
are not mere vehicles of symbolic communication for another who shares knowledge of the
symbol and code to interpret. Rather, gestures are immanently meaningful; the meaning of
gesture neither stems from, reflects, nor relies on a prior and different phenomenon. The
meaning of gesture is internal to the gesture itself. Gestures are living expressions of our
existence, our being-in-the-world, our attitude of and toward the world, and the nexuses of
significance that inhabit us as we inhabit the world. Merleau-Ponty’s analysis of gesture is

157

developed within the context of his account of perception. This means that he does not examine
gesture as a concept—something that may be abstracted from the world and reflected upon by
consciousness—but as it is performed and perceived within the world.
This section develops a theory of the Merleau-Pontian gesture, a theory that does not
culminate in a definition of gesture as such. I focus on the communicative character of gesture,
both linguistic and bodily gestures, to identify gesture’s existential dimension. I examine how
linguistic gestures, specifically ‘speaking speech,’ along with bodily gestures are communicative
in three ways: They i) express the particular way one inhabits the world, ii) alter one’s being-inthe-world, and iii) affect another’s being-in-the-world. Next, I analyze gesture’s immanent
significance by identifying them as expressions of an embodied intentionality that produces
meaning in the world by virtue of being in and having an attitude toward the world. The body
produces meaning, not by standing apart from the world and projecting meaning onto objects.
Rather, the embodied subject is in communion with the world; together, embodied subjectivity
and the perceptual world produce meaning.
Gestures communicate an individual’s being-in-the-world. Communication here is not akin
to the transmission of information. Rather, communication is an expression of meaning. Thus,
we should say that bodily and linguistic gestures express one’s being-in-the-world, which can be
interpreted by another who is also affected through witnessing another’s gestures. In this regard,
Merleau-Ponty’s theory of gesture is fundamentally intersubjective, not only in its understanding
of communicative expression, but in its view of the existential alteration of one’s own and
another’s very being-in-the-world.
In the process of developing his own theory of linguistic and gestural expression, MerleauPonty follows the familiar pattern of identifying the limits of intellectualism and empirical,
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mechanistic theories of speech. Intellectualism assumes that linguistic expression is a tool used
by a subject to relay ‘verbal images.’ Flusser’s theory of semiotics and gesture would, according
to Merleau-Ponty’s account, fall under the intellectualist linguistic tradition. For intellectualists,
ideas themselves have sense, and the word is a mere envelope for this sense. That is, words are
not regarded by intellectualism as containing any sense—as having immanent meaning.
Empiricism similarly assumes that words are vessels for sense; words are external
representations of inner cerebral stimulations. In order to disprove the assumption that speech is
either a tool of consciousness or the result of physical stimulation, Merleau-Ponty explains that
speech is immanently meaningful—it is not a vehicle for meaning, but the expression of meaning
itself. According to Merleau-Ponty, speech expresses one’s way of being-in-the-world; so too
does it affect another’s being-in-the-world. The speaker and the listener are affected by speech;
the writer and the reader are affected by the word. The subject is penetrated, as Merleau-Ponty
would say, by signification in the acts of speaking, listening, writing, and reading.
A communicative theory of gestures holds that gestures are immanently expressive and the
proof of this lies in our immediate ability to understand that signification is expressed in
another’s gesture.21 That a gesture is immanently meaningful, however, does not entail that an
observer adequately grasps its meaning in all case. For Merleau-Ponty, meaning is immanent to
the gesture itself, which means that the observer will not discover its meaning through reflection,
de-coding it as a sign, or any other process that entails turning away from the gesture in search of
its significance. We may be mistaken in our understanding the meaning expressed in a gesture.
Even in those cases where we misperceive the meaning expressed in a gesture, Merleau-Ponty

In the final section of this chapter, I will argue that there are instances in which a gesture’s significance is
imperceptible to another. In the case of the Black nod, for example, I argue that its significance is perceptible for
those who recognize Black meaning/significance.
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explains that we nonetheless recognize that meaning is present in the gesture itself. MerleauPonty considers the example of a child who has not yet reached the age of maturity.22 According
to Merleau-Ponty, the child will recognize a sexual scene as unusual or a spectacle even though
the scene may not make sense to her. Without registering the meaning of the act, the child still
notices the unusual nature of a sexual scene in a manner that is distinct from, for example,
noticing the color of a rug. The sexual scene, just as all gestures for Merleau-Ponty, is
immanently expressive of meaning whether or not the child understands or properly grasp its
meaning. In support of this claim, Merleau-Ponty considers an example of gestures of anger.
When I see someone turn red and stamp their foot, I recognize the expression of anger. “The
gesture does not make me think of anger, it is the anger itself.” 23 The gesture is not a symbol of
anger, it is anger itself. I recognize that the gesture is meaningful and I grasp its meaning by
opening myself to the intention of the other. Merleau-Ponty argues that when I perceive a
gesture, I fit my intentionality to the other’s intentionality, and I become attuned to the
signification driving their movements. He writes, “Communication or the understanding of
gestures is achieved through the reciprocity between my intentions and the other person’s
gestures, and between my gestures and the intentions which can be read in the other person’s
behavior.”24 Merleau-Ponty characterizes our ability to understand gesture as a process of
reciprocity because, as he argues, we have only limited knowledge of anger, for example. We are
familiar with our own experiences of anger and our own gestures expressive of anger; it would
be insufficient, according to Merleau-Ponty, to simply analogize my understanding of anger onto
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another. For, analogization would miss the significance expressed in the other’s gesture. The
gesture is not a sign of anger, as smoke is a sign of fire. Rather, the gesture emerges from the
body of another, and I recognize the intentionality present in the gesture. Thus, I must become
attuned to the other’s gesture, as I do in perception in general, in order to register the significance
of the gesture. This attunement requires that I inhabit the field of signification present in the
gesture displayed by another. When I see the intentional directedness of another through
witnessing their gesture, I experience “a change in my existence provoked by another.”25
Intersubjectivity here involves a communion between my intentionality and another’s intentional
directedness, which alters us both; both sides engage in a reciprocal relation, which leaves both
sides exposed to an alteration in their being-in-the-world.
Consider the case of reflection. When I reflect upon my own existence as an embodied
subject with perceptual and motor capacities, I discover that my world is already given to me. In
this sense, I discover myself in a world that precedes me. This means that my perception of the
world is limited, or rather, that the world exceeds me. Merleau-Ponty explains, “I have the world
as an unfinished individual through my body as a power for this world.”26 Insofar as I am
unfinished, insofar as the world precedes my existence, and insofar as I am not entirely
transparent to myself, I recognize that I am not the originating source of the world. This humility
in the face of the world allows for the possibility to experience another as not only another
embodied and intentional subject, but as a participant in the world that we both share. MerleauPonty writes, “There is, between my consciousness and my body such as I live it, and between
this phenomenal body and the other person’s phenomenal body such as I see it from the outside,
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an internal relation that makes the other person appear.”27 Since Merleau-Ponty characterizes the
subject and world as co-constituted—neither are self-enclosed, they both come into existence
through a communion with one another—he understands the subject as always already open to
the world and to others who inhabit it. The other is not perceived as an object because I witness
in their gestures and other behaviors an expression of embodied intentionality. Instead, without
reducing the other’s intentionality to my own, I recognize an internal relation between us,
namely that we are both embodied intentionality, rather than phenomenal objects in the world.
Furthermore, the presence of the other assures me that my experience of the world is not
solipsistic; the other is proof that world does not belong to me. Preester explains that the external
world functions as a mediation between my existence and that of the other: “The ego meets his
counterpart in an alter ego if both share an object (in the very broad sense). The mediating term
between me and other is the external world, the intended action to which ego and alter ego are
equally directed.”28 I recognize the other as an embodied intentionality through their behaviors—
gestures, gazing, talking—but I do not fully know the other. I do not identify the other with
myself, which would make the other fully knowable to me; rather, I open myself to them and
engage in a reciprocity of our intentions as a means of understanding the other. Understanding is
a “synchronizing modulation” that involves a “transformation of my being, which resonates the
intentions of the other.”29 Understanding here is my involvement with an other who is capable of
altering my own existence.
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The communicative potential of gestures is made possible because my experience of the
other is fundamental to my understanding of my own existence. We understand what the other’s
gesture communicates because we share a common world towards which we are both
intentionally directed. I thus perceive the other’s gestures as expressive of their unique
entanglement with the world. And, in witnessing the other’s gesture, I recognize it as
immanently meaningful even if I do not grasp the meaning expressed in it. To recognize a
gesture as immanently meaningful means, for Merleau-Ponty that “The sense of the gesture thus
‘understood’ is not behind the gesture […] The sense of the gesture spreads across the gesture
itself.”30 That is, the meaning of their gesture is not underneath or behind the gesture, rather it is
the gesture itself. In other words, the meaning of the gesture is not the meaning which the
gesture expresses, but the meaning it is. Expressive gestures, as modes of communication, are
understood as immanently meaningful because they express another embodied intentionality’s
particular way of being-in-the-world.
According to Merleau-Ponty, the process of reciprocation between my embodied
intentionality and another’s, which is engendered by witnessing the other’s bodily gesture,
occurs in a similar manner when I witness or hear their linguistic gesture. Merleau-Ponty
characterizes speech as a gesture—a “verbal gesture—in order to explain how speech itself is
immanently meaningful. First, he explains that bodily gestures are immanently meaningful
because the perceptible world is “given to the spectator through natural perception.” 31 We saw
this in the example of gestures of anger. In contrast, however, Merleau-Ponty explains that the

30

Merleau-Ponty, Perception, 192.

31

Ibid.

163

verbal gesture “intends a mental landscape that is not straightaway given to everyone.” 32 The
meaning of the verbal gesture does not appear to spread across the verbal gesture itself.
However, Merleau-Ponty situates verbal gestures within culture and argues that they signify
within culture in the same manner that bodily gestures signify within the natural world:
culture here offers what nature does not provide. Available significations, namely, previous
acts of expression, establish a common world between speaking subjects to which current
and new speech refers, just as the gesture refers to the sensible world. 33
Humans are cultural beings. We have various conventions within our respective cultures, which
allow for communicability between subjects. Thus, while verbal gestures may intend a mental
landscape, they express cultural significances that may be immediately discerned by another who
shares this culture. Vasterling explains, “Linguistic signification, that is, the expression of
meaning in speech, prolongs and accomplishes the gestural signification that is deployed in
bodily forms of behavior.”34 Both linguistic and bodily gestures are immanently meaningful
because they immanently express one’s manner of being-in-the-world. To further explore the
immanently expressive nature of linguistic gestures it is important to turn to a distinction that
Merleau-Ponty draws in Phenomenology of Perception between two forms of speech, both of
which are linguistic gestures. These are constituted speech and constituting speech, sometimes
referred to by him as spoken speech and speaking speech. I now explore each form of speech in
order to examine how linguistic gestures are immanently expressive of an embodied
intentionality’s way of being-in-the-world. In both cases of constituted and constituting speech,
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expression is contained within speech precisely because speech emerges from an embodied
intentionality.
Constituted speech. Constituted speech draws upon “constituted systems of vocabulary and
syntax, or the various empirically existing ‘means of expression,’ [which] are the depository and
sedimentation of acts of speech.” 35 The references to sedimentation in this context are clearly
linked to the notion of sedimentation I discussed in chapter II in the context of body schema.
What Merleau-Ponty finds in constituted speech is a specifically linguistic sedimentation that
makes intelligible speech possible. We accrue this sedimentation by experiencing speech, which
means that speech, like habit, depends upon an existential relation to the world through
perceptual and motor experiences. Because constituted speech is so familiar to us, we forget its
contingency. That is, we forget that speech does not exist independent of us; its existence is
contingent upon the subject who can and does speak. “Speech forgets itself as being a contingent
fact, it relies upon itself and, as we have seen, this gives us the ideal of a thought without
speech.”36 This is similar to Merleau-Ponty’s critique of reflection. Neither empiricism nor
intellectualism examined original perception. Instead, they relied upon a second-order
perception—the reflection of our perception—in order to account for the subject’s relation to the
world. Merleau-Ponty extends this critique of reflection to the context of speech. We forget the
original speech and instead we restrict ourselves to examining constituted speech. For MerleauPonty, original speech is “that of the child who utters his first word, of the lover who discovers
his emotion, of the ‘first man who spoke,’ or of the writer and the philosopher who awaken a
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primordial experience beneath traditions.” 37 Original speech is not the original acquisition of
speech, but a form of speech that alters one’s being-in-the-world. It is the introduction of new
significance oneself and, at times, for others who inhabit the world.
Constituted speech is creative even though it draws upon already established conventions of
language. Examining T.E. Lawrence’s, The Seven Pillars of Wisdom, Merleau-Ponty explains
that constituted speech includes the possibility to alter one’s being-in-the-world.38 In The Seven
Pillars of Wisdom, Lawrence describes his experience of learning Arabic and adopting Arabic
customs while station in Jordan in the early 1900s. For Lawrence, this process required that he
leave behind his English self: “In my case, the efforts for these years to live in the dress of
Arabs, and to imitate their mental foundation, quitted me of my English self, and let me look at
the West and its conventions with new eyes: they destroyed it all for me.” 39 In order to learn
Arabic customs and language, Lawrence had to abandon his English self and take up the Arabic
world. He had to adopt a new way of being-in-the world and was, therefore, existentially
transformed. Arabic is constituted speech; it has its own syntax, vocabulary, and means of
expression. However, Lawrence’s emergence into Jordanian customs and learning Arabic was a
creative expression of constituted speech. Constituted speech is, thus, a repetition of
conventional language, which, paradoxically is also creative.
How should we understand this paradox? Donald Landes’ 2013 text, Merleau-Ponty and the
Paradoxes of Expression, describes spoken speech—constituted speech—as a paradox because it
is both creative and a repetition of spoken speech. 40 According to Landes, this paradox is
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resolved if we understand that speech takes up already established linguistic conventions, but it
also expresses the particular way one inhabits the world. “Words are not simply message bearers
but are expressions of a certain style of singing the world; different languages are not simply
different means for expressing the same ideas, but are different ways of being in the world.”

41

The style with which we say words, the emotional sense of our words, express our being-in-theworld. And, precisely because I must adopt a style of speech, a way of being-in-the-world, my
style of speech has the potential to create new modes of signification. Thus, constituted speech is
immanently meaningful because it expresses our style of being-in-the-world; the style of beingin-the-world is spread across the speech itself such that the speech is no longer an empty
instrument for the expression of this style but an expression of it. Constituted speech is,
therefore, immanently meaningful in the Merleau-Pontian sense, where immanently meaningful
denotes the fact that meaning is not hidden behind the gesture but expressive in and through it. In
other words, the meaning and sense of the speech spreads across the speech itself.
Constituting speech. Constituting speech is more clearly creative than is constituted speech.
Both are technically creative because they are significations of an embodied intentionality.
However, as Veronica Vasterling explains in the 2003 article, “Body and Language: Butler,
Merleau-Ponty and Lyotard on the Speaking Embodied Subject,” constituting speech is
“language or expression at its primary stage, where the signifying intention is ‘at the stage of
coming into being.’”42 Constituted speech allows for the intelligibility of the one who speaks; it
draws upon a sedimentation of previous creations of signification that occur in constituting
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speech. When I say, “I like my chair,” an example of constituted speech, my meaning is
immediately graspable by another because I have expressed myself using very basic elements of
linguistic conventions. However, even this mundane statement is an expression of my relation to
the world, specifically my chair, which expresses my embodied intentional attitude toward my
situation in the world. In contrast, when I say, “I love you,” for the first time to a romantic
partner, an example of constituting speech, I have altered by manner of being-in-the-world. My
declaration is a form of original speech because it transforms my existential situation. When I
say that I love my chair, I am simply describing a situation. Perhaps I am trying to persuade you
to love my chair and to go out and buy your own. However, if I am genuine when I say that I
love you, then I am introducing new meaning within my being-in-the-world. For Merleau-Ponty,
all speech has an emotional sense and expresses our being-in-the-world. However, only original
speech, such as ‘I love you,’ expresses our new way of being-in-the-world. This is distinct from
Lawrence’s experience of ‘leaving his English self behind,’ because Lawrence did not create a
new manner of being-in-the-world; he merely adopted an alternative and already constituted
manner of being-in-the-world. Again, this is the paradox of Merleau-Ponty’s theory of speech.
Arabic customs were new for Lawrence and, therefore, led him to develop a new manner of
being-in-the-world; but this new manner is a repetition of a style of being-in-the-world that
already exists.
Constituting speech does more than accomplish one’s own fully pre-existing thought; it also
creates new thoughts for the one who listens. Merleau-Ponty examines what speech
accomplishes in the case of an orator: “Through speech […] there is a taking up of the other
person’s thought, a reflection in others, a power of thinking according to others, which enriches
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our own thoughts.”43 For the listener, speech reveals and creates new significations. When I
listen to someone deliver a paper at a conference, for instance, I do more than comprehend how
the words fit together. The meaning contained in the words provokes new meaning for me. I
might, for instance, already be familiar with Kant’s first Critique. When listening to a paper that
explores the possible interpretations and arguments presented in Kant’s work, however, I become
more attuned to a greater field of signification related to Kant. This process of understanding the
speech of another occurs “as if the other person’s intention inhabited my body, or as if my
intentions inhabited his body.” 44 Merleau-Ponty is clear that this process of inhabiting the
intentions of another subject does not mean that I pretend to be the other subject, or that I am
even able to epistemically adopt the position of the other subject. I understand the significance of
another’s speech through an exchange between my intentionality and my understanding of
another’s intentionality. “The entire difficulty is to conceive of this act properly and not to
confuse it with an epistemic operation.” 45 Bodily gestures and linguistic gestures are understood
in the same manner because they are both expressions of an embodied intentionality.
Understanding the speech and gesture of another requires that I place my own intentional
framework into a reciprocal relation to the perceived intentionality of another. Understanding
here is not achieved by translating another’s speech through my intentionality, nor is it a process
of abandoning my intentionality to adopt another’s intentionality. Rather, I understand another’s
speech when “the powers of my body adjust to it and fit over it.”46 Thus understanding another’s
speech involves a kind of communion with the intentionality of the other, similar to the
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communion between subject and world described by Merleau-Ponty in the context of originary
perception.
In this communion, new significance emerges. That is, speech creates something new; it is an
intersubjective act of meaning-making. The other with whom I am in conversation understands
my speech because we both participate in the conventions of constituted speech. The listener is
also affected by my speech. The listener inhabits my field of signification to access new
meanings and significations, which then become elements of the sedimentation that shapes the
listener’s unique body schema. When I “adjust my body to fit over” another’s speech, I am
altering my body schema. In other words, I am expanding my field of signification, my
intentional “I can,” in the process of understanding another’s speech. Consider instances of
learning new slang, or instances when you discover that a word you took to be universally
understood within your culture is in fact specific to your hometown. For example, after
explaining to my mom what “on fleek” meant several years ago, she now uses the term with
familiarity (even though this term is now outdated). The slang altered her body schema and
became sedimented to such a degree that she continues to call upon it with—far too much in my
opinion—ease.
Fugitivity
In chapter II, I examined the Black lived experience under white supremacy, which I
characterized as inhibited by the racializing gaze. My interest in this section is identifying spaces
wherein the contemporary Black subject is free from the direct surveillance of this gaze, which
therefore allows them to experience an uninhibited embodied intentionality. I define fugitive
spaces as places wherein Black subjects can create life-worlds and new forms of meaning
without regard for whiteness or anti-Blackness. Fugitive spaces are areas wherein Black subjects
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are temporarily released from their defensive posture and can, therefore, adopt a robust habit
body open to spontaneous and creative movements and meaning-making. In this vein, I identify
two features important to my notion ‘fugitivity’. First, I develop Hartman’s concept of the
‘loophole of retreat’ to characterize fugitive territory as a retreat from anti-Blackness. And
second, I describe the spaces wherein Black queer ballrooms did and, in some cases still do,
characterize fugitive territory in its most concrete form.
Loopholes of retreat
In Scenes of Subjection, Saidiya Hartman uses the term ‘loophole of retreat’ to characterize
fugitivity. Reading Harriet Jacob’s narrative, Incidents in the Life of a Slave Girl, Hartman
examines the way in which Jacob’s retreat from her captor also made her captive to the loophole.
In her text, Jacobs writes about the seven years spent in the crawlspace above her grandmother’s
shed to escape her captor. Reading Jacob’s account of retreat, Hartman defines this loophole as
“a space of freedom that is at the same time a space of captivity.” 47 For Jacobs, this loophole of
retreat was a material location, an actual place of concealment. Hartman extends this concrete
conception of the loophole to explore how Black people in the US have historically sought out
spaces to gain varying degrees of freedom within a society that disallows such freedom for Black
subjects. Jacobs is free so long as she remains in the crawlspace; her confinement to the
crawlspace, however, is at the same time a space of captivity. This double-bind expressed in the
concept of ‘loophole of retreat’ is precisely what I seek to emphasize in my own conception of
fugitivity. Freedom from persecution in the case of Jacobs, or freedom from anti-Black
disciplinary regimes in the context with which I am concerned, is sustainable only if one allows
oneself to remain in the space of captivity—to remain out of sight. Fugitivity speaks to the
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historical exclusion of Black subjects from freedom, from protection, and basic rights. It is only
through a withdrawal from a white supremacist society that the Black subject achieves the
muscular freedom characteristic of a robust habit body and, as a result, achieves the means of
cultivating creative and spontaneous forms of meaning.
While the notion of captivity is important for my own conception of fugitivity, it does not
eclipse the potential freedom that is also created in this space. Freedom here is freedom from the
direct surveillance of anti-Black disciplinary regimes. Recognizing that, as Foucault argues, one
is never entirely outside of power, fugitive territory occupies an ambiguous space that is both
inside and outside of the polis. So, I now explore fugitive territories that exist along the margins
of surveillance and in the loopholes between discursive regimes.
Fugitive Territories
Alex Mugler: We’re too different. We’re too queer. We’re too Black. So we come to the
ballroom.
Jelani Mizrahi: Ballroom says, “you’re not gay.”
Precious Ebony: “Here you’re cunt.”
Mizrahi: Ballroom says, “you’re not lost.”
Mugler: “You’re a legend.”
Ebony: Ballroom is a safe place for us. It’s like the Golden Gates to our community.
Mugler: Ballroom is our release, our battleground, our strength, our imagination. It’s
our story.
Ebony: We all speak the same language because dance is art and art is communication.
Mizrahi: If you’re alone, this is your family. If you’re homeless, this is your house. 48
The epigraph to this section includes the opening lines of Viceland’s first episode of My House.
There, Black queer ballroom performers describe what ballroom means to them—the freedom it
provides. Mugler’s description of being “too queer” or “too Black” expresses feeling out-ofplace in dominant culture. His queerness and his Blackness render him vulnerable to violence
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under white supremacy. At the ball, however, not only does one feel at-home, but one’s
queerness and one’s Blackness make them a legend or an icon. Within this space, which I refer
to as a fugitive one, Black subjects have cultivated a sophisticated world of meaning that is not
about whiteness or anti-Blackness, but about celebration, joy, and family.
I will return to creation of new meaning within fugitivity in the final section of this
chapter to explore the gestures produced within Black queer ballroom. For now, however, I want
to focus on the places where these ballrooms are, for the most part, held. In his 1995 article, “The
Slap of Love,” journalist Michael Cunningham describes ballroom performances and their
performers, which he encountered while in search of details concerning the background of
ballroom icon Angie Xtravaganza.49 Cunningham arranges a meeting with Dorian Corey, another
icon of Black queer ballroom, at the drag club Sally’s II. Cunningham’s description of the space
emphasizes for us just how underground, how out of view ballroom performances were,
especially in the nineties:
Corey’s show took place in a largish room behind the bar proper, a leftover from some
other incarnation, its walls covered with faded murals of Edwardian men cavorting
heterosexually. The room was furnished with scarred garden furniture—wobbly white
plastic tables and molded plastic chairs. 50
While the performance Cunningham describes is a drag show and not a ballroom show, it does
still give us insight into the types of spaces occupied by participants of the Black queer ballroom
scene—spaces where these performers could safely express themselves through queer
gesticulation. These spaces were undergrounds of already underground venues. In order to freely
gesture, these performers had to seek out spaces left behind, forgotten by members of dominant
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culture. Despite this, however, or perhaps because of this, ballroom grew into a spectacle that
could last for twelve hours. The ballroom scene of today, where performers freely walk the
runway in public, would be impossible without the pioneers of queer ballroom who developed
their performances in fugitive territory. This is not to suggest, however, that ballroom is no
longer fugitive territory. While performers are no longer restricted to the underground for balls,
at least not as frequently as they had been, they are still by and large in flight. In an interview
originally aired in December of 2019, multidisciplinary artist Rashaad Newsom describes the
continued importance of balls as a refuge from violence, or, in the context of our current
discussion, from anti-Black and anti-LBGTQ+ disciplinary regimes: “There’s this whole idea …
about ballroom kind of being this utopian space, safe space for black queers. And in some ways
it is. […] So much of it is in those spaces are coming from violence, diminishment and
abandonment.”51 It is impossible to isolate Newsom’s Blackness from his queerness when
analyzing the forms of violence, which he describes as needing to escape. We can be certain that
more than one disciplinary regime is at work to enforce multiple norms in an effort to render his
Blackness and his queerness docile. However, we can also be certain that anti-Black disciplinary
regimes are included in the larger list of regimes from which he continues to flee.
Fugitive spaces offered performers in Black queer ball culture the possibility to
experience muscular freedom and produce new meaning. In this regard, we see that fugitive
territory is not only freedom from anti-Black disciplinary techniques, but also freedom to new
access a robust habit body capable of spontaneously and creatively developing new meaning.
Unlike Jacobs who had to restrict her movements in her grandmother’s crawlspace or risk being
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discovered, the fugitive spaces with which I am concerned allow for a release of one’s
musculature, a freedom to move and exist in undisciplined ways. In his 1961 text, The Wretched
of the Earth, Fanon describes the muscular release I am imagining. Describing the restricted
movements of the colonized subject, Fanon writes:
The first thing the colonial subject learns is to remain in his place and not overstep its
limits. Hence the dreams of the colonial subject are muscular dreams, dreams of action,
dreams of aggressive vitality. I dream I am jumping, swimming, running, and climbing. I
dream I am laughing, I am leaping across a river […] During colonization the colonized
subject frees himself night after night between nine in the evening and six in the morning. 52
In fugitive territory, these muscular dreams become a reality. One can jump, swim, dance, and
gesture without fear of the racializing gaze or the anti-Black disciplinary techniques of
surveillance.
Black Gestures
The list of Black gestures I provide are by no means exhaustive, nor are these gestures
performed in the same way and with the same significance by all Black people. My position is
that Blackness is expressed through embodied gestures that convey cultural, historical, social,
and political belonging to the Black community. Blackness may be identified, lived, experienced,
and targeted through bodily gestures. The specific bodily gestures at issue are learned in some
cases, intergenerationally “inherited” in others, and sometimes lost due to changes in disciplinary
regimes governing Black life. To be clear, although the theory of Black gesture established in
this chapter argues that Black gestures express Black meaning, it does not reduce Blackness per
se to its gestural representation.
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The Black Nod
The Nod is perhaps the most quintessential Black gesture. Without explanation, most
Black people will know to what I refer when I say, ‘the Nod.’ For those unfamiliar with this
gesture, the Nod is a slight movement of the head that the Black Diaspora performs, which
signifies differently depending upon the context. Sometimes the Nod means ‘solidarity,’ and
other times the Nod is a more affective expression of affirmation of another’s Blackness,
especially when one is in a predominantly white region. However, drawing upon Lacan, I
explain that the Nod functions as an empty signifier. It is not really meaningful in itself; rather,
the Nod points away from itself and toward fugitive Black meaning.
Recently, while sitting on the beach in Croatia with two Kosovar friends, I had the unique
opportunity to demonstrate the nod in action. Among a large group of white people, I spotted one
other Black person, a Black woman, swimming in the Adriatic Sea. I had just finished explaining
my philosophical interest in Black gestures to these two friends, when I saw an opportunity to
highlight the kind of everydayness of my more abstract philosophical claims. Without much
effort, a simple glance in the Black woman’s direction, she did it! She gave me the Nod! Her
gesture said, “I see you in this place where people like us are few and far between. I see you
exploring geographies that were historically meant to be beyond our reach.” Nodding back, I
signaled the same sentiment: “I see you. I recognize you celebrating life out here by the sea. I see
you flaunting your Blackness rather than trying to blend in.” The Nod is a gesture that both
expresses and grounds the Black community. In receiving the Nod, I feel affirmed in my sense of
belonging to the Black community. By giving the Nod, I also affirm the other’s belonging to the
Black community. The Nod, and other Black gestures, exemplify forms of meaning that are
about and for Black subjects and, therefore, not about white supremacy.
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The Black Nod is paradoxically meaningful and meaningless at one and the same time. I
described feeling affirmed in my Blackness when another Black woman gave me the Nod in
Croatia. But, when pressed to fully translate the meaning of the nod at the time to my friends, I
was at a loss. I could characterize its affective value; but I could not explain it in the way one can
explain the meaning of a wave. In his 2014 article, “The Nod: A Subtle Lowering of the Head
You Give to Another Black Person in an Overwhelmingly White Place,” Musa Okwonga offer a
similar account to my own. He describes what the Nod means for him: “It’s a swift yet intimate
statement of ethnic solidarity. The Nod is saying, ‘Wow, well, I really didn’t expect to see
another one of us out here, but you seem to be doing your thing just fine. More power to you,
and all the best’.”53 Okwonga’s characterization of the Nod as ‘intimate’ evokes the affective
character of the gesture at the same time that it evokes the notion of solidarity. The surprise
Okwonga describes as partially motivating the Nod is also, for me, an intuitive understanding of
its meaning. But again, the meaning of the Black Nod is evasive; the Nod is a sign that points
away from itself in the direction of an external meaning found in fugitive space. However, even
as a sign, the Nod tells a story of solidarity and it expresses the intimacy of belonging to the
same community, even if those engaging in the Nod are strangers. The story is not itself the
Nod’s meaning. The Nod points to the space where meaning is cultivated through the solidarity
and intimacy of the Black community. Mukoma Wa Ngugi catalogues the various meanings
associated with the Nod’s in his 2013 article, “The Black Man’s Nod”: “The nod of solidarity”;
“The black power nod”; “The nod of I see you even when others do not”; The stay cool/keep
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your cool nod”; and “The Rasta greeting.”54 Each version of the Nod is described by Ngugi in
terms of solidarity and intimacy. Thus, we are reminded that the Nod’s meaning is not reducible
to a single purpose; it is a manner of relating to one another that varies depending upon the
context. I believe that the meaning of the Nod, its purpose or definitive significance, is not
actually immanent to the Nod itself. Or rather, the Nod is meaningful, but only as a gesture that
points away from whiteness and toward Black life-worlds. Following Lacan, we could say that
the Black nod is the purloined letter—the empty signifier.
In Écrits, Lacan discusses Edgar Allen Poe’s “The Purloined Letter” to explain how it is
possible for a signifier to be empty. Poe’s story concerns a Queen who receives a letter that
would jeopardize her “honor and peace.”55 We are never told the contents of the letter, only that
it contains information that the Queen wishes to remain secret. When the character, Minister D—
, enters the room in which both the Queen and the King reside, the Queen places the letter face
down in the hopes that neither the King nor Minister D— notice. However, this gesture, subtle
though it may be, was not only witnessed by Minister D— but immediately recognized as
meaningful. Specifically, he understood in the Queen’s gesture that the letter contained secret
and, therefore, valuable information. The letter is stolen several times throughout the story, and
the efforts to retrieve it ultimately fail. What is important for our purposes, is that the content of
the letter is never revealed. We know that there is a letter; we know that, if revealed, the letter
could damage the Queen’s reputation; but, we never actually learn what information is in the
letter itself. The presence and absence of the purloined letter is, for Lacan, emblematic of the
empty signifier: “For the signifier is a unique unit of being which, by its very nature, is the
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symbol of but an absence. This is why we cannot say of the purloined letter that, like other
objects, it must be or not be somewhere but rather that, unlike them, it will be and will not be
where it is wherever it goes.”56 The letter is a symbol insofar as it represents something the
Queen wishes to hide. However, its symbol is of an absence because it is never retrieved and,
more importantly, we never learn of its content.
I suggest we read the Black Nod as analogous to Poe’s purloined letter; it is a gesture of
which everyone is aware, though few would be able to define its meaning. 57 The Nod happens
every day and it seems to occur across the Black Diaspora, if my experience and the articles
referenced are any indication. But I could neither tell you definitively what it means, nor could I
tell you how and when it became such a familiar practice amongst Black subjects. I could not
even tell you when I began performing the nod. It was only when, in the presence of a white
friend, a stranger and I exchanged the Black Nod that I realized I had cultivated the practice.
When asked if I knew the person to whom I nodded, my friend was confused by my casual
response that I had never seen them before in my life. The Nod has become so familiar to me,
has sedimented so thoroughly into my body schema that I call upon it without necessarily being
aware that I do so. And, though I describe the Black Nod from my personal perspective, it is not
hard to imagine that many contemporary Black subjects have similarly acquired and performed
this gesture in a pre-cognitive manner. I would therefore consider the Black Nod as part of the
body-memory of the Black archive described in chapter III of this dissertation.
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Black Gestures Expressed within an Anti-Black World
In 1968 during the Olympic Medal ceremony held in Mexico City, Tommie Smith and
John Carlos each held a raised fist in the air throughout the duration of the playing of the “The
Star-Spangled Banner.” This took place during the height of civil rights activism in the US. The
Supreme Court had handed down its decision in Loving v Virginia only the previous year, and
Martin Luther King Jr. had been assassinated just six months earlier. The Montgomery bus
boycotts, various sit-ins, and other protests in response to the discriminatory laws of Jim Crow
had culminated in the 1964 Civil Rights Act, which banned discrimination based on race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin. Within this context, Smith and Carlos’ raised fists became a
symbol of the protest for Black rights.
In this section I explore the significance of Smith’s and Carlos’ gestures in two contexts:
the significance during the moment they raised their fists, and the significance this gesture has
within the contemporary context. I interpret the deliberate and undeliberate significance of their
gesture. That is, Carlos and Smith deliberately intended to express significance in their raised fists,
which, for Flusser, would make their gestures vehicles of meaning for others to de-code.
Additionally, further, perhaps undeliberate, significance was expressed and continues to be
expressed in their gestures.
As I outlined in section I of this chapter, Flusser distinguishes between mere movement
and gesture, and identifies gesture as a willful act performed by a subject with the intention of
conveying a code for another to interpret. I understand Smith’s and Carlos’ raised fists as symbolic
representations of protest in response to international anti-Black violence. In a 2016 interview with
Smithsonian Magazine, the then 72-year-old Tommie Smith stated that his raised fist was “a cry
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for freedom.”58 Here, Smith decodes the symbol contained in his gesture for us; the meaning of
his raised fist was a cry for freedom, or, as I have characterized it, a protest. However, in this same
interview, Smith lists several other symbols that he and Carlos intended to express alongside their
raised fists.
The socks represented poverty, black people’s poverty from slavery to where Tommie
Smith and Carlos were. …The bowed head represented prayer. The Christian experience
of us on the victory stand wasn’t there by mistake. We were there because we were
appointed in that moment by God to do something representing freedom to man. The fist,
Smith continues, represented power…a need to move forward proactively. Not necessarily
the black pride of an illegitimate type of fight with the background of militancy. Militancy
had nothing to do with that victory stand. 59
The bowed head symbolically represented the Christian act of prayer, and their raised fists
symbolically represented Black power. Even their clothes were deliberately chosen to convey
symbols to those in the stands or watching from home. They wore socks without shoes to signify
Black poverty; and, in his autobiography, The John Carlos Story: The Sports Movement that
Changed the World, Carlos explains that the beads worn around their necks symbolized the
lynching of Black people in the US: “I looked at my feet in my high socks and thought all about
the black poverty I’d seen from Harlem to East Texas. I fingered my beads and thought about the
pictures I’d seen of the ‘strange fruit’ swinging from the poplar trees of the South.”60 Carlos’
description of Black lynched bodies as ‘strange fruit’ provides for us the code to interpret the
symbolic meaning represented in his gesture. It is a clear reference to Nina Simone’s, Strange
Fruit, which is about the lynching of Black people in the US. From their bodily gestures to their
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choice in clothing, Carlos and Smith deliberately constructed symbols for others to interpret. In
this manner, their gestures are distinctly Flusserian. However, the meaning of their gestures
exceeded what both Smith and Carlos describe as their original intention in two ways. First, their
bodily gestures immanently expressed what Flusser calls the ‘freedom to act as a subject’. That
is, their gestures expressed more than ‘a cry for freedom’; they expressed a kind of freedom.
Second, their gestures immanently expressed their Black-Being-in-the-world.
According to Flusser, we recognize gestures as expressions of inwardness [Innerlichkeit],
which for him means subjectivity, precisely because gestures are artificial constructs. That is,
gestures, in contrast to mere movement, are not natural in a physiological or reflexive sense, but
rather artificially constructed by subjects. Therefore, we must attribute subjectivity to one
capable of performing a gesture. Furthermore, for Flusser, gestures inherently express a subject’s
freedom to act: “the concept of ‘gesture’ may be defined as a movement that expresses freedom.
[…] But what makes it unique is that […] it expresses a subjectivity that we are forced to call
freedom.”61 In other words, freedom is manifest in the meaningful and creative act of
gesticulation. Freedom here refers to the freedom to act, move, or exist in manners that are not
pre-determined. This is not a political freedom, but a causal or mechanistic conception of
freedom. A subject is free to gesture in contrast to, for example, an amoeba the movements of
which are constrained by the natural laws governing its organic life. The gesture of Smith’s and
Carlos’ raised fists symbolizes power, as they intended; but it also unintentionally signified their
inherent freedom as subjects. For Flusser, the freedom expressed in Smith’s and Carlos’ gestures
is merely a freedom to willfully move. It would be odd to describe this form of freedom as
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political in character; even the most ardent racist will acknowledge that a Black person is freely
capable of movement. However, if we include in this notion of freedom the freedom to construct
meaning, where gestures are expressions of meaning, then we may identify a political dimension
of Smith’s and Carlos’ freedom. Because, Flusser explains, only subjects have the capacity to
artificially construct meaning, then it follows that Smith and Carlos expressed not just the
freedom to move, but the freedom to construct meaning. And it is this freedom to construct
meaning as expressed in their gesture that constitutes a form of political freedom. I understand
this latter point to be the fundamental reason why Smith’s and Carlos’ raised fists shook the
world, so to speak. As Black men, they stood, quite literally, on an international platform and
dared to exercise and express their freedom to create and express meaning, a freedom disallowed
them under white supremacy, especially during Jim Crow.
In a 2018 article written for History News titled, “How the Black Power Protest at the
1968 Olympics Killed Careers,” journalist Erin Blakemore describes the crowd’s reaction to
Smith’s and Carlos’ protest: “As the American athletes raised their fists, the stadium hushed,
then burst into racist sneers and angry insults.”62 Later, when the two men returned to the US,
they received death threats for their actions. Obviously, their gestures hit a nerve. In this case, I
propose that the backlash was not solely in response to what the gestures symbolized to Carlos
and Smith; I do not believe the crowd could have so immediately decoded the multiplicity of
symbolic meanings expressed in Carlos’ and Smith’s gestures and clothing. This is evident in the
fact that, forty-eight years later, Smith had to explain the various symbols that were never
directly acknowledged. With the exception of the raised fist, the other gestures and symbols—
socks, beads, and lowered head—were not as transparent. That is, these other symbols relied
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upon a code with which the audience was likely unfamiliar. It is my contention that the crowd
was roused to anger simply and precisely because their gestures were immanently meaningful
expressions of their subjectivity and, thus, their right to freedom. In other words, even if
members of the crowd did not immediately understand the symbolic meaning represented in
Carlos’ and Smith’s gestures, they did recognize their acts as gestures rather than mere
movements. In this regard, I think Flusser is correct in saying that gestures are intuitively
recognized, at least this is often the case; and, in the case of Carlos’ and Smith’s gestures, I
suggest that the crowd intuitively recognized them as such. Furthermore, following Flusser, I we
can understand the crowd’s angry reaction to Carlos and Smith as motivated by the recognition
that their gestures were expressions of freedom due to their subjectivity. In an effort to reject
their expression of freedom to create and express meaning, the crowd sought to reject their
claims to freedom by hurling racial epithets intended to dehumanize them. The gesture of
Carlos’ and Smiths’ raised fists was an act of defiance; it was a rejection of the racializing gaze
and anti-Black disciplinary techniques of white supremacy. Refusing fragmentation of their
phenomenal body before the racializing gaze, their gestures expressed a robust habit body, rather
than the routinized habit body demanded of them.
Through gesticulation, Carlos and Smith expressed their uninhibited embodied
intentionality, and forced Black meaning into the space of white supremacy. I characterize the
meaning of their gestures as Black for several reasons. First, the codes of their symbols were not
discernable to the audience at the time, which, at the very least, suggests a form of meaning
independent of white supremacy. And second, we see the significance of the Black power fist as
expressed in contemporary protests in response to the murders of Black and Brown people at the
hands of police. The raised fist continues to signify Black power and solidarity with the Black
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community. Carlos and Smith were not the first to use a clenched fist as a sign of protest, but the
significance of their protest continues to reverberate throughout the world today. In solidarity
with Black Lives Mater, many people have replaced their profile pictures on various social
media platforms with the image of a Black raised fist. As I walk through my neighborhood, I see
yard sign after yard sign of the clenched Black fist in solidarity with Black people. The Black
power fist signifies the right to Black meaning. For Black people who raise their fist in protest,
the gesture also signifies Black-being-in-the-world as one under siege. It is, thus, existentially
meaningful in its expression.
Black Queer Ballrooms
This section returns to the context of Black queer ballroom in order to identify Black
gestures performed by a robust habit body that spontaneously and creatively creates new forms
of meaning. I begin this analysis by examining the history of Black queer ballroom, which
emerged after white queer ballrooms failed to incorporate Black performers into the
competitions.
While queer ballroom gained international attention after Jenny Livington’s 1990
documentary, Paris is Burning, Madonna’s Vogue music video of the same year, and, more
recently, the television series, Pose, the history of the gestures created within and shared
throughout ballroom culture far precedes these relatively recent surges of ballroom’s popularity.
Tim Lawrence describes the history of ballroom in his 2011 article, “’Listen, and You Will Hear
all the Houses that Walked There Before’: A History of Drag Balls, Houses, and the Culture of
Voguing.” Lawrence traces the history of ballroom back to the 1920s. During this time, drag
shows included a majority white gay community. As Lawrence explains, Black performers were
expected to whiten their skin if they hoped to win a contest, and even then, their chances of
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winning were slim. Because of the anti-Blackness of queer ballroom, Black and Latinx queer
communities created an independent ballroom scene in the 1960s. 63 This turn away from antiBlackness was not expressed as a form of resistance, but rather as establishing a space outside of
anti-Blackness—a space of fugitivity. By the 1970s, these new ballroom communities had
established houses. These houses fulfilled a variety of needs for performers: a chosen family
unity, a name under which members of the house would perform and one they would also
represent both in the ballroom and in everyday life, and importantly security and access to
resources for the POC youth who, for a variety of reasons, were forced to live on the streets. 64
Within the fugitive spaces of Black queer ballrooms and their respective houses, these
communities did more than merely survive, they flourished to create radically new styles of
gesture and, in turn, new meaning. The Black queer ballroom scene is characterized by the
celebration of Black and Latinx queerness through dance, competitions, and, of course, shade.
Exploring the robust habit body displayed in the performer of Black queer ballroom, we find
significance both intentionally and unintentionally expressed Black gestures.65
Each ball has a theme and a set of categories. The categories vary from competition to
competition; however, they generally include the following: voguing, runway, realness, realness
with a twist, face, and many more. Despite their apparent ambiguity, the guidelines for each
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category are understood by both judges and performer. For example, when asked by the makers
of Vice’s My House to describe the elements of voguing, ballroom commentator Precious Ebony,
vacillates between a verbal description and a physical demonstration: “These are the five
elements of vogue. The first one is hands. Then, you wanna transition to a catwalk. Then you
would go into ‘big girl I focus on rising.’ Then you have spin dance. And then full
performance.”66 Precious Ebony, referred to by friends as Precious, performs each category as
she describes them. One recognizes that there is an ineffable quality to each category. What does
‘hands’ mean? What does ‘big girl I focus on rising’ mean? To understand these terms requires
familiarity with the forms of meaning produced within this fugitive space, which remains
independent of dominant culture even if it is occasionally represented in film or television. Thus,
an outsider such as I, would have difficulty understanding the elements of vogue based upon
Ebony’s description; however, members of the community know and perform these elements
with deep familiarity. In order to recognize voguing when it is performed or, better yet,
recognize a good as opposed to bad voguing performance, one has to know the significance
expressed in the performance itself. This recognition is more than the Flusserian notion of
intuition. Rather, knowledge of what a gesture means and of the measure by which gestures are
assessed requires familiarity with the meaning produced within this specific fugitive culture.
Consider the various categories included in Black queer ballroom. Realness, for example,
is the performance of cis-heteronormative expressions of masculinity by a queer and/or trans
man. A good performance means that one would be ‘unclockable.’ That is, the performer must
portray a convincing image of straight masculinity without letting slip their ‘true’ queer or trans
identity. In a BET series called Queer as F**k, ballroom performer, Krystal Labeija, describes
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realness as a question: “Can you go get food for the house?” 67 In other words, can you
convincingly move through the world as non-queer or non-trans such that you can get a
‘legitimate’ job without being discovered as queer and, thus, vulnerable to discrimination? Even
more than the category of voguing, the performance of realness exceeds the limits of verbal
description. The gestures involved in the performance of ‘realness’ rely upon background
experiences of both performer and judge. That is, the standards for judging realness require
familiarity with Black and queer identity as lived under white supremacy, as well as familiarity
with the horizons of the ballroom scene itself. Someone may be clocked in their performance,
and thereby fail in their expression of realness if, for example, their hips sway a bit too much, or
if their facial expressions are not hardened enough. Having either had their own queer and/or
trans identity be clocked in the real world or having to move through the world with the fear of
being clocked, judges and performers understand the meaning of realness.
Each category—with the possible exceptions of face, pretty boy, futuristic or bizarre—is
a gestural performance. The element of hands in the performance of voguing involves deliberate
movements of the arms to strike a series of poses. Realness involves deliberate gestural mimicry
of unintentional gestures conditioned by hetero-masculine norms in dominant culture. In her
1993 text, Bodies that Matter: On the discursive limits of “sex”, queer theorist Judith Butler
describes these performances in terms of their reiteration and impersonation of gendered norms:
[W]hat determines the effect of realness is the ability to compel belief, to produce the
naturalized effect. This effect is itself the result of an embodiment of norms, a reiteration
of norms, an impersonation of a racial and class norm, a norm which is at once a figure, a
figure of a body, which is no particular body, but a morphological ideal that remains the
standard which regulates the performance, but which no performance full approximates. 68
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Butler recognizes in queer ballroom performance the parodic inhabitation of norms, which are so
deeply ingrained in our society that they have the appearance of a naturalness based upon
biology. 69 In Black queer ballroom, performers impersonate the norm, either by repeating those
gendered norms that are not designated for biologically male bodies, or by mimicking gendered
norms with such exaggeration that the norm itself is seen as unnatural. It is important that, in the
above quote, Butler calls our attention to the body in the performance. While the ballroom
performance is itself modeled on the unattainable norms governing of how straight bodies should
move, it also relies upon a very real body for the performance. That is, the performance of each
ballroom category is bodily performance, and these bodily performances are sets of gestures
constructed according to gendered and racialized norms.
Queer ballroom performances are not, however, restricted to the repetition or mimicry of
dominant norms. As a fugitive culture, the performers access an uninhibited embodied
intentionality, which releases them from the routinized habit body and allows them to cultivate a
robust habit body. Take, for example, the category ‘realness with a twist’. The performance
begins according to the same rules of ‘realness,’ then, the performers shift into bodily gestures
that signify queerness. The ‘twist’ in this category is the ability to reproduce the dominant norm
and then shift to unroutinized gestures expressive of queerness. Again, what a queer gesture
means, how it is judged, requires familiarity with a field of meanings particular to these fugitive
spaces. The meanings produced in fugitivity are not (often) represented in dominant culture.
Therefore, one does not understand these meanings as ‘common sense’—naturalized and selfevident.
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Fugitive space affords members of the Black queer ballroom scene the safety to relax
their musculature. Before becoming mainstream, if we now consider the ballroom scene
mainstream, these performances occurred late into the night in the backs of queer clubs. Hidden
from the view of the police who surveilled the streets in search of homosexuality that needed to
be disciplined through carceral mechanisms, and away from the white, queer ballroom scenes
that rejected any hint of non-whiteness in the performance, Black and Latinx LGBTQIA+
communities created fugitive meaning. They gained access to a robust habit body and
uninhibited embodied intentionality to creatively and spontaneously express immanently
meaningful Black gestures.
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Conclusion
This project is an endeavor to draw attention to the concrete expressions of contemporary
Black life and Black meaning in the contemporary US. I have aimed to do so primarily in response
to Afropessimists who claim that contemporary Black life is overdetermined as nonbeing due to
the schism created during chattel slavery between Blackness and being or Blackness and the
Human. To be clear, Afropessimists do not claim that Black people are dead, just that we are
socially dead. According to this tradition, Black people cannot re-gain ontological presence so
long as our demands for freedom and liberation from nonbeing continue to rely upon humanist
discourse.
This rejection of humanism on the grounds that it cannot guarantee Black liberation from
nonbeing is not, however, the sole provenance of Afropessimism. Existentialists of Black studies,
especially those whose work draws upon Frantz Fanon, similarly dismiss humanism as a viable
means for Black liberation. For existentialists, Black liberation is not liberation from an ontological
essence as nonbeing, but from an anti-Black world that produced Black nonbeing—what Fanon
calls the ‘zone of nonbeing.’1 What differentiates existentialists from Afropessimists, however, is
their respective characterization of the world. As existentialist Lewis Gordon explains in his
contribution to the 2017 article, “Critical Exchange: Afro Pessimism,” “‘an antiblack world’ is not
identical with ‘the world is antiblack’.”2 In the first case, an anti-Black world is an existentialist
project; in the second, claims that the world is anti-Black are distinctly historical. As an
existentialist project, an anti-Black world is open-ended and, therefore, has the potential to become
different in kind. In contrast, the historical claim that the world is anti-Black suggests, to Gordon

1

Frantz Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks, trans. Charles Lam Markmann (New York: Grove Press, 1967), 8.

2

Lewis Gordon, “Critical Exchange: Afro pessimism,” Contemporary Political Theory 17, no. 1: 106.
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at least, permanency and immutability. Following Fanon, existentialist theorists argue that the
liberation from an anti-Black world requires a new humanism since the present humanism
originally made possible the exclusion of Black subjects from what Wynter refers to as ‘Man’.
The Afropessimist and existentialist focus on humanism has led these theorists to neglect
the presence of Black existence in our current historical era in favor of a future Black existence,
which may or may be achieved. If the ontological presence of Black being is only possible after
the overthrow of humanism, as these traditions assert, it then follows that Black life is an
ontological absence in the present historical period. If, however, we can identify Black meaning,
meaning that is neither about white supremacy nor anti-Blackness, then we may identify Black
being in the here and now. My interest is not to restore humanism; rather, I have sought to restore
attention to concrete expressions of Black life and Black meaning in order to demonstrate that,
despite white supremacy’s greatest efforts, our meaning and our being persist.
In the process of researching and, eventually, writing this dissertation, I have come to
realize that there is no single tradition on which this work of affirming the ontological presence of
contemporary Black subjects in the US can rely. As yet, I have found no text dedicated to an
analysis of the ontological presence of Black being. In process of analyzing Black ontological
presence in and through Black gestures, I have also found no rigorous theory of gesture nor a
documented path to follow into the space of fugitivity. The absence of established discourse on
gesture and fugitive space has proven difficult in my efforts to theorize contemporary Black
meaning and Black life along the lines of interest that I have pursued. My concern with Black
gesture has presented, for me, a strange paradox: I must draw upon concrete, lived experience in
order to justify my larger philosophical claims regarding Black life and yet, such concrete analysis
is regarded as anthropological, anecdotal, or distinctly unphilosophical. But how does one theorize
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gesture without considering specific examples of gesture? There is a demand for evidence—a
concrete example in support of one’s claim—and, at the same time, a rejection of one’s
philosophical claim because the evidence is itself too specific. In fact, I regard this paradox as
illusory. Gestures are not examples of Black meaning; they are themselves expressions of the
presence of Black meaning. Whether gestures are immanently meaningful, as Merleau-Ponty
argues, or symbols of meaning, as Flusser claims, gestures are inherently expressive of a subject’s
ontological presence. The gestures involved in vogue, as I have argued, are immanently expressive
of Black meaning and, therefore, Black ontological presence. And, as I have demonstrated, Smith’s
and Carlos’ gesture of the raised fist is inherently expressive of their capacity to construct and
express meaning—a capacity unique to subjects who have ontological presence. If humanism has
yet to be overthrown, then how can we account for these examples of Black ontological presence?
If we leave aside critiques of humanism in our analysis of Black existence, then we may
find the potential to theorize Black life and Black meaning in a manner that affirms Black existence
as it concretely unfolds in the current period. This analysis requires a historicization of Black life
in the contemporary US. Such historicization would not conflate the present with the past, nor
would it disregard the present in favor of analyzing the future. While contemporary Black subjects
in the US descend from the enslaved subjects of chattel slavery, our current existence if not
identical to these subjects. The violence endured by enslaved subjects is fundamentally different
from today’s forms of anti-Black violence under white supremacy. This difference is not accounted
for in contemporary Black subject’s increasing access to socio-political life, as Patterson would
claim. Rather, it is due to our ability to develop kin relations, to trace our ancestry through several
generations, to own property as opposed to being property, and to participate in a socio-cultural
sphere even if this sphere is not that of dominant society. The changes to Black life since chattel
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slavery may not constitute full liberation for Black subjects, but they have afforded us the means
to cultivate meaning that remains independent of white supremacy, anti-Blackness, and dominant
society. Black liberation from oppression and anti-Blackness must be the ultimate aim for those of
us who seek to dismantle anti-Blackness and white supremacy. Until then, however, we should
highlight the presence of Black life and Black meaning that persists in the face of a world designed
on its erasure.
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